Wow you weren't kidding. These are vulns that would have been embarrassing a decade ago.
I think the timeline is the more damaging part too. Not only was their design woefully inadequate, they don't seem to care.
I used the app briefly a few months prior to their discovery. The app was riddled with bugs. Things like chats not loading (received the push notification, but in the app not visible until force quit/reload). I’m not surprised it took them so long to remediate. I would guess a shoestring contractor dev team.
Wow you weren't kidding. These are vulns that would have been embarrassing a decade ago.
I think the timeline is the more damaging part too. Not only was their design woefully inadequate, they don't seem to care.
The problem is they probably don’t have full time developers. They probably built the app once years ago via a dev shop and then never updated it again. The talent moved on and updating it is expensive now.
I think the timeline is the more damaging part too. Not only was their design woefully inadequate, they don't seem to care.
The problem is they probably don’t have full time developers. They probably built the app once years ago via a dev shop and then never updated it again. The talent moved on and updating it is expensive now.
Cost minimizing aligns well with the criminal-negligence theory. In fact every egregious security issue I've come across, like plain text passwords, public S3 buckets, publicly-accessible internal tools... it all directly correlates to being cheap in my experience.
It seems like they implemented permission checks purely in the frontend, and not just on one endpoint, but almost everywhere. While it is conceptually easy to avoid this, I have seen similar mistakes much more frequently than I would like to admit. Edit: the solution "check all permissions on the backend" reminds me of the solution to buffer overflows: "just add bounds checks everywhere". It's clear to the community…
You shouldn't be touching the server-side code if you find this hard to keep straight.
It seems like they implemented permission checks purely in the frontend, and not just on one endpoint, but almost everywhere. While it is conceptually easy to avoid this, I have seen similar mistakes much more frequently than I would like to admit. Edit: the solution "check all permissions on the backend" reminds me of the solution to buffer overflows: "just add bounds checks everywhere". It's clear to the community…
You shouldn't be touching the server-side code if you find this hard to keep straight.
Ultimately, I don't disagree.
However, I also try to make it a habit to not blame people for not knowing something. This presents as a structural problem in that company: they needed to hire people who do know how to secure server code and put them into a position to do so. Blame the company and those who decided to save every last penny in personnel cost.
It seems like they implemented permission checks purely in the frontend, and not just on one endpoint, but almost everywhere. While it is conceptually easy to avoid this, I have seen similar mistakes much more frequently than I would like to admit. Edit: the solution "check all permissions on the backend" reminds me of the solution to buffer overflows: "just add bounds checks everywhere". It's clear to the community…
You shouldn't be touching the server-side code if you find this hard to keep straight.
Yet after decades of this messaging, we still have these people touching the server-side code. Is it likely another few years of the same messaging will fix it?
I am honestly amazed that these researchers held off for as long as they did on publishing. If crappy startups are given 6 months to close egregiously bad privacy holes like this, they will continue to abuse the privilege they have in collecting this information to begin with. I say give them 2 months and then release. Fuckers need to learn not to play dice with people's private information.