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The "email is authentication" pattern

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Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#111
post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I haven't heard a compelling argument that anything needs to be fixed with email-based auth patterns. It is imperfect but not bad, and every proposed alternative seems to be worse. The article seems to lean into security and usability concerns. On the security front: the weak-point is still the human. If you hand over your credentials to someone nefarious, well.. you handed over your credentials to someone nefarious.…

One flaw is I'm pretty sure a lot gmail account is lost forever. Contacting Google to retrieve access would not go well. Related is that if you try to self host email your messages are unlikely to reach anyone.

Self-hosting outbound email is hard.

Self-hosting inbound email is trivial. Anybody will send email to any random domain, they're just not willing to accept it from random sources.

And the latter is what is relevant for password recovery.

I self-host inbound but use established servers for outbound through my ISP and have had no trouble with that setup for a while. Forwarding to people through my domain has gotten a bit more challenging lately but I've got it working well enough to satisfy gmail so far. (The advantage with forwarding is you only have to convince one server to accept it, not everyone in the world, and there's some crypto stuff involved now that involves trusting some keys, not just a domain or IP, which also helps a lot.)

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#112
post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I haven't heard a compelling argument that anything needs to be fixed with email-based auth patterns. It is imperfect but not bad, and every proposed alternative seems to be worse. The article seems to lean into security and usability concerns. On the security front: the weak-point is still the human. If you hand over your credentials to someone nefarious, well.. you handed over your credentials to someone nefarious.…

One flaw is I'm pretty sure a lot gmail account is lost forever. Contacting Google to retrieve access would not go well. Related is that if you try to self host email your messages are unlikely to reach anyone.

I'm not saying there aren't flaws, I'm saying none of them happen at a rate significant enough to be worth switching to another system (with an entirely new set of flaws).

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#113
post #68
post #3

Email accounts are the highest common denominator in online authentication. Phones are competitive, but people lose phones. Phone numbers are more common and durable, but the security of phone numbers is leagues below that of a flagship provider email account. It makes sense that so many authentication flows work this way. When designing a "fantasy football" alternate authentication system for the Internet, start wit…

Auth apps are crap - each one pretends to be unique and authoritative. TOTP secrets are a string, not just a QR code that can only be seen once and never again - the QR code merely encodes that string! That string can be used in multiple places to generate codes. KeepassXC can do it and that can be shared. I've seen loads of organisations and sites with an elderly mobile phone that has the TOTP auth app on it. Normal…

I'm increasingly coming around to the idea that in reality, there's only one factor, at least as far as the Internet is concerned: Something you know. There's different ways of knowing it and various difficulties involved in knowing it, but "something you are" is only every a fancy way of presenting something you know (because if you know it, you can generally forge it with reasonable effort) and "something you have", over the Internet, is just "something you know but is pretty difficult to directly extract".

TOTP was what really kicked me into thinking this way. They tried to make it "something you have". They tried to lock it behind apps and pretended really hard that it wasn't just a particular shared secret... but it is. It's just something you know.

The rule is, if it could be stuck in your password manager, it's a thing you know. That includes even things like Yubikeys, which are things that can be cloned and stuck in a password manager. They're just really, really hard to clone, and that's a valid step up from "a password". I'm not saying that the differences between all these "things you know" are irrelevant; they matter a lot. Having a password + a TOTP is a legitimate step up from having just either one alone. I'm just saying that analyzing things in terms of the other two factors isn't particularly relevant.

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#114
Well, yeah, “magic link” is a thing and one of the easiest form of authentication supported by many providers, like Supabase, Vercel and libraries like Next Auth.

Another great side effect is that your backend doesn’t have to store user passwords which means removal of a lot of compliance headaches.

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#115
post #111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One flaw is I'm pretty sure a lot gmail account is lost forever. Contacting Google to retrieve access would not go well. Related is that if you try to self host email your messages are unlikely to reach anyone.

Self-hosting outbound email is hard. Self-hosting inbound email is trivial. Anybody will send email to any random domain, they're just not willing to accept it from random sources. And the latter is what is relevant for password recovery. I self-host inbound but use established servers for outbound through my ISP and have had no trouble with that setup for a while. Forwarding to people through my domain has gotten a…

That seems a great compromise. I hadn't registered the distinction in direction. Even without organising the forwarding part there are plenty of organisations that email me password resets that I don't need to send email out to.

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#116
post #3

Email accounts are the highest common denominator in online authentication. Phones are competitive, but people lose phones. Phone numbers are more common and durable, but the security of phone numbers is leagues below that of a flagship provider email account. It makes sense that so many authentication flows work this way. When designing a "fantasy football" alternate authentication system for the Internet, start wit…

Government provided digital IDs would solve a lot of this. Yes, they may have their own problems, but outsourcing the action of identifying individuals to the government seems valuable and less prone to "lock outs" like Google and friends.

My wife works in a city clerk's office. They provide (among other things) vital records services for the city. Like getting birth certificates.

To get a birth certificate, you must provide government photo ID with a name matching that of one of the names on the certificate you're trying to get. So you can get your own, or your child's, but not some random other person's.

Lots of people were born before RealID driver's licenses. Some of them went by names other than the names on their birth certificates, and thus are unable to get new copies of their birth certificates using the government-issued photo ID they currently have. E.g. I've got a grandfather who went by Sam his entire life but was apparently named Harold. His driver's license had Sam as his first name. If he had lost his birth certificate, he would not have been able to obtain a new copy legally using that driver's license! This still happens to people. Also sometimes house fires or similar disasters happen, and people lack the ID needed to get new government-issued ID.

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Government provided digital IDs would solve a lot of this. Yes, they may have their own problems, but outsourcing the action of identifying individuals to the government seems valuable and less prone to "lock outs" like Google and friends.

How about a bank-provided digital id that you get when opening an account by walking into a physical bank location and providing your photo ID? It would tick the "less prone to lock out" problem without placing even more power in government hands.

We have this in Belgium and it’s really not that good. It created a pattern of companies relying on people having an account at certain banks; which when you’re either immigrant or unbanked is unlikely and shuts you out of certain businesses.

It’s been phased out for the government provided login system which is much better but not exactly simple for laypeople to set up. On top of this, integrating with it requires an extensive certification process, it’s not just an open API.

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#118

I’ll be hyperbolic and say the login flow is identical. A) Go to website, click through a password manager to copy and paste an arbitrary string of characters, receive TOTP request sent to your email to confirm your identity. Or B) Go to website, click forgot my password. Receive link to login. Enter an arbitrary string of characters. In many instances, login flow B is actually quicker and seldom slower. Clicking the…

> B) Go to website, click forgot my password. Receive link to login. Enter an arbitrary string of characters.

> In many instances, login flow B is actually quicker and seldom slower.

And B) can be accessed whereever I have email and doesn't need either an app or my phone which may or may not be on my person.

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#119
I am one of those people who always clicks "forgot password", and sorry but it's actually fine. I type a long, completely nonsense sequence of words and characters for my new password, then ctrl-c to copy, then log in with that password, and then promptly forget it.

It cannot be more secure to store it in a password manager than not to store it at all. The email recovery path exists in either case, so that part is a wash.

Re: The "email is authentication" pattern

#120
post #3

Email accounts are the highest common denominator in online authentication. Phones are competitive, but people lose phones. Phone numbers are more common and durable, but the security of phone numbers is leagues below that of a flagship provider email account. It makes sense that so many authentication flows work this way. When designing a "fantasy football" alternate authentication system for the Internet, start wit…

> If the answer is "they just don't get access anymore" or "a panel of their peers attests to them", your fantasy authentication system also needs a fantasy species of sentient beings to serve as users, because it won't work for humans.

This has been my single biggest argument against blockchain/cryptocurrency stuff for years: the "lose your key, lose your wallet" thing is fundamentally incompatible with real users.

Humans need to be able to recover from their mistakes.

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