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Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

ian.sh

61–70 of 459 posts

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#61
post #18

Hilarious that the entire TSA system is vulnerable to the most basic web programming error that you generally learn to avoid 10 minutes into reading about web programming- and that every decent quality web framework automatically prevents. It is really telling that they try to cover up and deny instead of fix it, but not surprising. That is a natural consequence of authoritarian thinking, which is the entire premise…

> Hilarious that the entire TSA system is vulnerable to the most basic web programming error that you generally learn to avoid 10 minutes The article mentions that FlyCASS seems to be run by one person. This isn't a matter of technical chops, this is a matter of someone who is good at navigating bureaucracy convincing the powers that be that they should have a special hook into the system. What should really be inves…

The problem is deeper and simpler than that.

Authentication should not need to be re-implemented by every single organization. We should have official auth servers so that FlyCASS doesn't need to worry about identity management and can instead just hand that off to id.texas.gov (or whatever state they operate from) the same way most single-use tool websites use Google's login.

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Hilarious that the entire TSA system is vulnerable to the most basic web programming error that you generally learn to avoid 10 minutes The article mentions that FlyCASS seems to be run by one person. This isn't a matter of technical chops, this is a matter of someone who is good at navigating bureaucracy convincing the powers that be that they should have a special hook into the system. What should really be inves…

Someting I’ve been thinking about, esp since that crowdstrike debacle. Why do major distributors of infrastructure (msft in case of crowdstrike, DHS/TSA here) not require that vendors with privileged software access have passed some sort of software distribution/security audit? If FlyCASS had been required to undergo basic security testing, this (specific) issue would not exist

Money. Eventually the lobbyists would make it so cumbersome to get the certification that only the defense industry darlings would be able to do anything. Look at Boeing Starliner for an example of how they run a “budget”.

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Hilarious that the entire TSA system is vulnerable to the most basic web programming error that you generally learn to avoid 10 minutes The article mentions that FlyCASS seems to be run by one person. This isn't a matter of technical chops, this is a matter of someone who is good at navigating bureaucracy convincing the powers that be that they should have a special hook into the system. What should really be inves…

The problem is deeper and simpler than that. Authentication should not need to be re-implemented by every single organization. We should have official auth servers so that FlyCASS doesn't need to worry about identity management and can instead just hand that off to id.texas.gov (or whatever state they operate from) the same way most single-use tool websites use Google's login.

This seems like exactly the sort of work the US Digital Service should take on.

Would still need an audit to make sure sites are actually using the shared auth and not rolling their own.

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#64
post #18

Hilarious that the entire TSA system is vulnerable to the most basic web programming error that you generally learn to avoid 10 minutes into reading about web programming- and that every decent quality web framework automatically prevents. It is really telling that they try to cover up and deny instead of fix it, but not surprising. That is a natural consequence of authoritarian thinking, which is the entire premise…

> Hilarious that the entire TSA system is vulnerable to the most basic web programming error

Because it's a scam and the system is a grift.

I'm a pilot and own a private aircraft. Landing at any airport, even my home airport which is restricted by TSA is legal without any special requirement or background check. In fact, I have heard horror stories where TSA wouldn't let a pilot retrieve their aircraft for some bullshit administrative reason or another, so they enlisted a friend with a helicopter to drop them into the secure area to fly it out. Perfectly legal. The fact that the system can be brought down with a SQL attack is the least of it.

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Hilarious that the entire TSA system is vulnerable to the most basic web programming error that you generally learn to avoid 10 minutes The article mentions that FlyCASS seems to be run by one person. This isn't a matter of technical chops, this is a matter of someone who is good at navigating bureaucracy convincing the powers that be that they should have a special hook into the system. What should really be inves…

Someting I’ve been thinking about, esp since that crowdstrike debacle. Why do major distributors of infrastructure (msft in case of crowdstrike, DHS/TSA here) not require that vendors with privileged software access have passed some sort of software distribution/security audit? If FlyCASS had been required to undergo basic security testing, this (specific) issue would not exist

In the case of msft/crowdstrike isn't this exactly the opposite of what HN rallies against? The users installed crowdstrike on their own machines. Why should microsoft be the arbiter of what a user can do to their own system?

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#66
post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Hilarious that the entire TSA system is vulnerable to the most basic web programming error that you generally learn to avoid 10 minutes The article mentions that FlyCASS seems to be run by one person. This isn't a matter of technical chops, this is a matter of someone who is good at navigating bureaucracy convincing the powers that be that they should have a special hook into the system. What should really be inves…

We know that backdoors can be intentional for use by 3-letter agencies. And there is plausible deniability of the bureaucracy when they can pass blame onto a single individual. Or it's beuracracy being beuracracy. The TSA is a lot of security theater anyways.

This is a bit of ridiculous comment. Who in the right mind would say a sql injection is a backdoor for a 3LA?

Added, why would they use FlyCass when they could just access the data directly?

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#67
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're not wrong, but I would have a hard time as a jury member convicting them of a CFAA violation or whatever for creating a user named "Test TestOnly" with a bright pink image instead of a photo. If they had added themselves as known crewmembers and used that to actually bypass airport screening, then yeah, they'd be in jail.

What if they incremented a number in a url on a publicly available website?

Yeah I wouldn't have convicted weev either. There is a difference though. He used that incremented number to access actual user PII. These guys created a user with no PII and no actual malicious use.

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem is deeper and simpler than that. Authentication should not need to be re-implemented by every single organization. We should have official auth servers so that FlyCASS doesn't need to worry about identity management and can instead just hand that off to id.texas.gov (or whatever state they operate from) the same way most single-use tool websites use Google's login.

This seems like exactly the sort of work the US Digital Service should take on. Would still need an audit to make sure sites are actually using the shared auth and not rolling their own.

I'm not saying anyone should be disallowed to run their own authentication.

I'm saying we need the digital equivalent of "show me your driver's license".

Re: Bypassing airport security via SQL injection

#69
post #14
post #9

Since they actually went past the SQL injection and then created a fake record for an employee, I'm shocked that Homeland did not come after and arrest those involved. Homeland would have been top of the list to misinterpret a disclosure and prefer to refer to the disclosure as malicious hacking instead of responsible disclosure. I'm more impressed by this than the incompetence of the actual issue.

You're not wrong, but I would have a hard time as a jury member convicting them of a CFAA violation or whatever for creating a user named "Test TestOnly" with a bright pink image instead of a photo. If they had added themselves as known crewmembers and used that to actually bypass airport screening, then yeah, they'd be in jail.

That's what jury instructions are for. The judge can instruct the jury to ignore pretty much any facts and consider any subset of what really happened that they want. So they'd just instruct "did they access the system? Were they authorized? If the answer to the first question is yes, and to the second is no, the verdict is guilty, ignore all the rest". The jury won't be from the HN crowd, it would be random people who don't know anything about CFAA or computer systems, it will be the easiest thing in the world to convict. Those guys got so lucky DHS exhibited unusually sensible behavior, they could have ruined their lives.
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