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Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

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Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#191

Post by fsflover »

NayamAmarshe wrote: post #125
NdMAND wrote: post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes and no. [1] Signal is working to support an encrypted "cloud backup feature" (some hints on this are on their code base), as per "sync" that's already done in the forward direction by Signal (by sending all new messages to all your devices) I'm sure you could provide some sort of backward sync as well. [3] Signal already supports groups up to 1000 people iirc, I'm sure a read-only channel larger than that could a…

> Signal already supports groups up to 1000 people iirc, Which is where the practicality fails. This is why Telegram is the only app that works in large protests, unlike Signal. Time and again, Telegram proves that the lack of E2EE actually becomes its strength, as proven by the protestors in Myanmar, Hong Kong, Iran and more countries: https://x.com/Pinboard/status/1474096410383421452 I'm not really against E2EE, bu…

> Matrix could be better but it leaks tons of data

Unless you use your server or a trusted one.

> has been hacked multiple times in the past too

Any links? Looks like it was long ago.

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#192

Post by emptysongglass »

mr_mitm wrote: post #172
jiiam wrote: post #156

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is quite a large amount of people believing that Telegram stores messages in plaintext. I would like to know how they got that idea. So far the best I've got is something along the line of: if you can get your chats when you log in with a new device, then so can a Telegram employee. With no proof of the claim of course.

Somehow they must transfer the chat history from their servers to the user. Either it's plain text, or encrypted and they either use the keys to decrypt or send the keys to the user along with the encrypted content. In all cases they can simply access the contents themselves.

The protocol is fully documented. You are free to read it for yourself without resorting to guessing. [1]

Messages are not stored in plaintext. The claim they are stored in plaintext is false.

One can have cogent arguments about one's preference for E2EE or not but the repeated claim here and elsewhere that messages are stored in plaintext is simply hearsay.

[1] https://core.telegram.org/mtproto/AJiEAwIYFoAsBGJBjZwYoQIwFM...

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#193

Post by mr_mitm »

emptysongglass wrote: post #192
mr_mitm wrote: post #172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Somehow they must transfer the chat history from their servers to the user. Either it's plain text, or encrypted and they either use the keys to decrypt or send the keys to the user along with the encrypted content. In all cases they can simply access the contents themselves.

The protocol is fully documented. You are free to read it for yourself without resorting to guessing. [1] Messages are not stored in plaintext. The claim they are stored in plaintext is false. One can have cogent arguments about one's preference for E2EE or not but the repeated claim here and elsewhere that messages are stored in plaintext is simply hearsay. [1] https://core.telegram.org/mtproto/AJiEAwIYFoAsBGJBjZwYo…

I didn't make that claim. I said it's either this or that. That's a different claim.

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#194

Post by usea »

jiiam wrote: post #186
barsonme wrote: post #168

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the chat is not end-to-end encrypted, which Telegram “cloud” chats are not, then by definition Telegram (the company) has access to the chats. Full stop.

Something being true only by definition is unfortunately a very weak claim. For example the company servers could be hosted on an island with armed guards instructed to burn everything if anyone approaches and the decryption happens only on those servers: sure they have access by definition, but they really don't.

If the only thing stopping them from decrypting your messages is instructions to their own employees to not allow it to be done, that is not a defense against providing access to law enforcement. They can just change those instructions at any time without anybody knowing. Just like they can just change the server software to allow it.

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#195

Post by pjietr »

guappa wrote: post #51
maeil wrote: post #20

> If, however, the French are simply saying that Durov’s failure to police his users or respond promptly to French document requests is the crime (which I suspect is the case), then this represents a dramatic escalation in the online censorship wars. What it means is that European states are going to try to extraterritorially dictate to foreign companies what content those companies can and cannot host on foreign-bas…

There have been several arrests of drug dealers using whatsapp over the years. Do you have any official source that criminals on telegram are more? Or is it just a feeling you have?

Anecdotal Instagram evidence on the situation in Berlin: https://www.instagram.com/reel/CxJGJs7s-lE/

In Finland, stuff seems to be more on Telegram than on dark web as well

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#196

Post by tptacek »

adolph wrote: post #163
cperciva wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Indeed. Two of the more common questions I get with Tarsnap are Q. How do I know that Tarsnap is secure? A. Read the source code. Q. Ok, but you're really smart, what's stopping you from putting in a backdoor and hiding it really well? A. I don't want to get tortured, and ensuring that I can't decrypt your data protects *me*.

Q. How do I know that Tarsnap is secure? A. Read the source code. This is a "good enough" but less than reassuring answer in the post-Solar Winds world. (It wasn't before, but less so since the advent of "package managers" and the like.) How would someone evaluate the quality and security of the build process and minimal dependencies (which might have their own problems [0])? As a non-security person thinking of how…

Tarsnap is usually installed from source.

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#197

Post by jiiam »

usea wrote: post #194
jiiam wrote: post #186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Something being true only by definition is unfortunately a very weak claim. For example the company servers could be hosted on an island with armed guards instructed to burn everything if anyone approaches and the decryption happens only on those servers: sure they have access by definition, but they really don't.

If the only thing stopping them from decrypting your messages is instructions to their own employees to not allow it to be done, that is not a defense against providing access to law enforcement. They can just change those instructions at any time without anybody knowing. Just like they can just change the server software to allow it.

I mean at this point they could also change the code running on the user devices, probably someone would notice but that's another story.

The point is: even if they could, should they do so when compelled by authority?

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#198

Post by tptacek »

emptysongglass wrote: post #190
tptacek wrote: post #152

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nothing in the comment linked upthread is at all relevant to the analysis of Telegram we are discussing.

You don't get to make a false claim and then handwave it away. You made the claim and you were given evidence otherwise. This was not a case of a user confusing encryption in transit, as you claim.

No false claim was made, and nothing in that thread was relevant to the analysis of this story or on this thread. I'm very comfortable leaving it there, and that the people who will take my word on none of this mattering are the only ones I need to care about.

Do not use Telegram.

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#199

Post by barsonme »

jiiam wrote: post #186
barsonme wrote: post #168

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the chat is not end-to-end encrypted, which Telegram “cloud” chats are not, then by definition Telegram (the company) has access to the chats. Full stop.

Something being true only by definition is unfortunately a very weak claim. For example the company servers could be hosted on an island with armed guards instructed to burn everything if anyone approaches and the decryption happens only on those servers: sure they have access by definition, but they really don't.

On the contrary, it’s a very strong claim.

The guards could decide they’re not getting paid enough and steal the data. Or the government could arrest them. Or the government could MITM the data center. Or any hundreds of different scenarios.

At the end of the day, the only thing preventing somebody from accessing the data is that they just… don’t.

This is very weak security and it is why cryptographers and security professionals call it “effectively plaintext.”

Re: Thoughts on the Durov Arrest

#200

Post by jiiam »

barsonme wrote: post #199
jiiam wrote: post #186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Something being true only by definition is unfortunately a very weak claim. For example the company servers could be hosted on an island with armed guards instructed to burn everything if anyone approaches and the decryption happens only on those servers: sure they have access by definition, but they really don't.

On the contrary, it’s a very strong claim. The guards could decide they’re not getting paid enough and steal the data. Or the government could arrest them. Or the government could MITM the data center. Or any hundreds of different scenarios. At the end of the day, the only thing preventing somebody from accessing the data is that they just… don’t. This is very weak security and it is why cryptographers and security p…

I am saying that in practice the security might be structured in such a way that it requires several different parties to connive, rendering it essentially fine.

I mean, having to modify server code in order to access data that is "effectively plaintext" is not so different from installing a backdoor inside the client: it's not like the user has any choice of client, so even for apps like whatsapp and signal that run E2EE one is still making a leap of faith.

If we add the fact that everything runs inside an os built by companies who may or may not be constantly spying on their users we could say that by definition there's a lot of stuff in our lives that lives in "effective plaintext".

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