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Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

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Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Matrix also keeps your message on the server. Except you can run your own server. And the messages are end to end encrypted. And you can keep a proper backup of the keys. Granted it can be clunky at times, but the properties are there and decentralised end to end encrypted messaging is quite and incredible thing. (Yes, Matrix nerds, it's not messaging per se it's really state replication, I know :))

My Matrix messages are, I presume, not encrypted, because every device I have prompts me to sign this device's keys with the keys of another device (which doesn't exist) and the option to reset the encryption keys and lose access to old messages doesn't work either (it just crashes Element).

You can enable it on a per chat basis.

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#292

I am amazed at the low quality comments here. Encryption really doesn’t matter as much as the trust of the app here. Any malicious app author can 100% secure encrypt everything in wire and yet leak 100% of your data to some state actor. Anything you type into the chat box is only encrypted by the app after you type and probably storing it in the clear in some local SQLite db. It gives them a whole bunch of options to…

>Encryption really doesn’t matter as much as the trust of the app here. Any malicious app author can 100% secure encrypt everything in wire and yet leak 100% of your data to some state actor.

This is exactly the problem with Telegram. Telegram defaults to client-server encryption for everything, and you can't enable end-to-end encryption for anything on desktop, or group chats ever. Only 1:1 chats and calls on mobile have end-to-end encryption. Client-server encryption is exactly the "100% secure encrypt in wire". When that data arrives to the server, it's no longer encrypted, and Telegram can do whatever it wants with that data, including leaking it to some state actor (like FSB/SVR).

>Anything you type into the chat box is only encrypted by the app after you type and probably storing it in the clear in some local SQLite db.

If endpoint security is of concern, your options with networked TCBs are quite limited. Are you sure the malware doesn't have a chance to escalate its privileges and read messages in clear from RAM?

>It gives them a whole bunch of options to mess with that plain text data.

I'm looking forward to hearing about how you managed to fix this. Should we implement memory as eFuses (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFuse) to prevent editing logs? What if the user wants to delete his messages?

>Even if the app source code is published as you don’t know if they backdoored it before they submitted to App Store.

E.g. with Signal android, you can pull off the APK from the device, and compare its hash against the client that was reproducibly built from the source code you have in your possession. Been there done that https://imgur.com/a/wXYVuWG

>I am amazed at the low quality comments here.

Too bad you're not exactly improving them with your nonsense.

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#293
post #249

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Urbit uses NFTs as IDs, which can be transferred "Urbit IDs aren’t money, but they are scarce, so each one costs something. This means that when you meet a stranger on the Urbit network, they have some skin in the game and are less likely to be a bot or a spammer." https://urbit.org/overview Who pays for the hosting of ActivityPub and Matrix instances? What if one instance abuses other instances too much? How do you…

I could go on for literal days. The blockchain isn't a panacea, and rationally most solutions don't ultimately settle on a bespoke transactional network with audited consensus protocols. It is stupid, overdesigned, and as a sign of its poor fitness it dies over time. I'm not relaying some "evil villain" speech from someone that wants to see decentralized services die, this is a reality check from your peers who also…

Ugh.

> I could go on for literal days

I believe there should be a way to have a rational discussion about this, point by point, maybe threaded. This ain't it. But whatever.

I am not married to blockchains, I have literally criticized blockchains. I have said that smart contracts and distributed systems are what we need, whether that's Internet Computer canisters, SAFE network datachains, IOTA DAGs, Hashgraphs, or Intercloud (something I designed). I don't know why people on HN love to do this strawman over and over.

Blockchain is a settlement layer. I don't even say it's needed for day-to-day micropayments. I explain how the systems could work, which could use any smart contracts for their settlement layer, I don't care about the underlying technology for those, but the Web2 elements are there: https://qbix.com/ecosystem#DIGITAL-MEDIA-AND-CONTENT

> The last I heard of [LBRY]

Yeah, they got sued by Gary Genzler's SEC even though their coin was one of the few actually being used as a utility token. They were forced to shut down their entire company, and only the network survived. Similarly with Telegram, with the SEC. I will wager that you're reflexively on the side of Gary Gensler and the government "because blockchain". But I would have liked to see this innovation grow, not be killed by governments.

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#294

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not really. WhatsApp only keep them temporarily (and E2EE!) until they're delivered to each device. Signal too. Telegram keeps everything for all time. Which is kinda handy too I have to say. Of course you can send your backup to Google for WhatsApp and signal but that's optional. You can keep it locally too. And it's encrypted too. With WhatsApp you can even choose to keep the key locally only.

WhatsApp? The closed source app that AFAIK has never been externally audited, owned by one of the most privacy-disrespecting corporations in the world? You say I can trust it wholeheartedly as long as I don't upload backups to the cloud?

I 100% trust they implement the signal protocol as they claim. I am also similarly sure that they ALSO have a sidechannel for everything.

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#295

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Telegram is the only messaging app that I know of which brought attention to the fact that your messages go through Google/Apple notification APIs, which seems like it would utterly defeat any privacy advantage offered by E2EE

Why? I think Google suggests that you send the payload encrypted through the notification. Google then only knows which app to send the message to, they don't know from whom the message originates (only "a Telegram server") nor what the content is. Also, you could just send a notification instructing the app to fetch a new message from your server. From the docs: Encryption for data messages The Android Transport Lay…

Assuming an adversarial relationship, what sort of metadata could Google capture simply knowing which app was sending the notifications and who was receiving them?

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#296

Reads like a hit piece on Telegram from a crypto expert who couldn't be bothered to explain in more than one paragraph why the app he is calling not an encrypted app (according to how he personally thinks everyone refers to when talking about encryption) actually uses some encryption technology that he's not exactly sure of but suspects is insecure.

He specifically explains what people think an encrypted app is:

>Many systems use encryption in some way or another. However, when we talk about encryption in the context of modern private messaging services, the word typically has a very specific meaning: it refers to the use of default end-to-end encryption to protect users’ message content. When used in an industry-standard way, this feature ensures that every message will be encrypted using encryption keys that are only known to the communicating parties, and not to the service provider. From your perspective as a user, an “encrypted messenger” ensures that each time you start a conversation, your messages will only be readable by the folks you intend to speak with.

So and encrypted messaging app means to people the security that an end-to-end encrypted app provides.

He then explains how Telegram is not end-to-end encrypted.

* No end-to-end encryption by default

* No end-to-end encryption for groups, not even small groups.

To add, there's no end-to-end encryption for desktop chats either. And no end-to-end encrypted cross-platform chats either.

Your post reads like dollar-store damage control team post that didn't even read the article they're trying to discredit.

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#297
post #242

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Telegram is the only messaging app that I know of which brought attention to the fact that your messages go through Google/Apple notification APIs, which seems like it would utterly defeat any privacy advantage offered by E2EE

This claim is what really makes me skeptical of Telegram's privacy story. Their assertion is completely incorrect. (Source: have implemented end to end encrypted payload delivery over APNs / GCM.) And if they are so off base on this, they must either be incompetent or liars. Neither of which builds trust.

I’m old enough to remember when Signal first implemented cross-device sync using a Chrome plugin.

I’d rather developers issue cautionary warnings than give a false sense of perfect security

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#298
post #176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well of course, but this is a feature of Telegram. It's the only messaging app where messages are stored on the cloud. This of course has security implications, but also allows you to have a big number of chats without wasting your device memory like WhatsApp does, or having to delete old conversations, and allows you to access your chats from any device. By the way you can also set a password to log in from another…

This is such a misrepresentation. Telegram could at-will feed the cloud-2FA password to password hashing function like Argon2 to derive a client-side encryption key. Everything could be backed up to the cloud in encrypted state only you can access. Do they do that? No. So it's not as much as trade-off, as it is half-assed security design.

Telegram currently has very intuitive and snappy search, even in very active groups with years of content. That's because the heavy lifting is done by the server. Think that'd still be possible if there was no way for the server to process the data?

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#299

Simple question denotes whether its encrypted..... Does cloud server store the message and key..... If answer is yes, ITS NOT FULLY ENCRYPTED! Sounds contrary right? If key and message is on server any LEO org can get it....for it to be fully encrypted cloud server should never store the keys.... So how many services claiming encryption have this flaw? All.... Why do you think Telegram has shell companies to avoid go…

>So how many services claiming encryption have this flaw? All....

Telegram is actually one of the only apps I've seen to defend their super-duper secure storage of keys online. All lies of course.

The overwhelming majority of secure messaging apps have no way to recover user data if you drop your phone in the ocean. This includes Signal, Wire, Threema, Session, Element, iMessage etc.

Re: Is Telegram really an encrypted messaging app?

#300

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Telegram is the only messaging app that I know of which brought attention to the fact that your messages go through Google/Apple notification APIs, which seems like it would utterly defeat any privacy advantage offered by E2EE

If the text appears on your screen I'm pretty sure there are ways for Google to capture it. I don't need to know how android's API works, knowing it probably just makes one blind to the big picture. You have to trust your OS/phone maker not to do a MITM.

Yes, but Google cannot be compelled to turn over data they don't actually have on their servers because the users encrypted it before it arrived with keys Google don't control.

Signal could modify the application so a remote flag in the Play store binaries could be triggered to exfiltrate data as well. But the key distinction is the normal path of Signal gives them absolutely nothing they can tell anyone other then the bits they've put in the disclosure reports (namely: date and time an account ID used Signal I believe).

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