451–460 of 472 posts
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Excuse me, why is linking to something bad? Especially when it contains your own data?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxing?lang=en
I'm not publishing or leaking any data either. I'm linking to something that was already made public which contains my own data.
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If the salt is public, what’s the point, then you can get all the salts, and combine them with every possible ssn, and you’re back where you were before.
No, that is kind of the point of a salt is that it doesn't need to be hidden - it's designed for a scenario where e.g. your database is hacked and they're visible as plaintext: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography) Since the salts are random, unique to each SSN and long: a) you'll find no existing rainbow table that contains the correct plaintext for your SSN hash and b) each SSN now requires its own brut…
In a password database, salt is not secret because the password combined with it is secret and can be anything. Even if you know the salt for a particular user, in order to crack that user, you need to start hashing all possible passwords combined with that salt. If a user picks a dumb password like password123, then they are not safe if the salt leaks. Other users with password=password123 will not be immediately apparent because other users have different salts. You would have to try password123 combined with each user’s salt to identify all the users with password123.
You said “It wouldn't be too hard to issue a very large, known, public salt alongside each SSN.” That means there should be some theoretical service where you pass it an ssn and get back the salt, right? So what have you gained? Any attacker with an ssn can get the salt, and nothing was gained. Or if attackers don’t have ssns they can just ask for all the salts, the mapping from ssn to salt is public so they know 000-00-000 has salt1, 000-00-001 has salt2, etc, so you haven’t increased the amount of hashes attackers have to do to do whatever it is they want to do.
You’re right about commercial interests being at play. That’s why we don’t have laws like GDPR in the USA. Crypto nerds have thought about this long and hard and if it was that easy we wouldn’t need stupidly complex laws like GDPR. They would “just add salt.” Or other services would “just add salt” instead of relying on more complex and expensive forms of identity verification and protection.
You don’t need to be a crypto nerd to try to describe a flow where having a public known salt per ssn helps with privacy. You do not need to be a crypto nerd to design secure one way hash functions that would plug into that flow.
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If the salt is public, what’s the point, then you can get all the salts, and combine them with every possible ssn, and you’re back where you were before.
"all the salts" * "all the SSNs" becomes a very big number. With a large enough but still reasonably sized salt, you can engineer it so that hashing all combinations takes an amount of time greater than the age of the universe even if you use all the computers in the world.
Even if such a service doesn’t exist, and you just have a list of all the salts without knowing which ssn they map to, you’re just hand waving how hard it will be to hash the entire salt*ssn set.
Hashing a salt+ssn can’t take too too long because data brokers need to be doing it frequently in order to verify identities.
In this report, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-..., it says monthly volume of credit card marketing mail is in the hundreds of millions per month. Can we assume that each piece of mail is roughly associated with one instance of hashing a salt+ssn? Given that number, how expensive (in terms of time, compute cycles, whatever) can it possibly be to hash a salt+ssn? If we make it too expensive, expensive enough to support your “age of the universe” claims, credit markets would grind to a halt.
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If the salt is public, what’s the point, then you can get all the salts, and combine them with every possible ssn, and you’re back where you were before.
A salt works by altering altering the encrypted output. It's not a secret (though it's often kept secret for an added layer of obscurity).
Poster above me just said “add salt” and waved their hands without describing anything concrete, like just saying some magic words can solve hard problems.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxing?lang=en
Doxxing involves targeting an individual, as mentioned in the first line of that wiki page. I'm not publishing or leaking any data either. I'm linking to something that was already made public which contains my own data .
Also it's just a really crappy thing to do IMO.
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> Someone created a magnet link yesterday Are you against simply sharing the infohash here? I'd like to download the leak to see what information it has on myself and my family, but I don't really relish the idea of signing up for a breachforums account and sifting though its posts if I can avoid it.
Here is a strongly encrypted base64 version to keep hackers out: bWFnbmV0Oj94dD11cm46YnRpaDozY2FhNzFmM2VjOGNiY2NjNmZjYTRmZWI3MTg1ZGEyYmFiMTQ5YmE3JmRuPU5QRCZ0cj11ZHA6Ly90cmFja2VyLm9wZW5iaXR0b3JyZW50LmNvbTo4MCZ0cj11ZHA6Ly90cmFja2VyLm9wZW50cmFja3Iub3JnOjEzMzcvYW5ub3VuY2U= Allegedly, the password (also base64 encrypted) is: aHR0cHM6Ly91c2RvZC5pby8=
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Here is a strongly encrypted base64 version to keep hackers out: bWFnbmV0Oj94dD11cm46YnRpaDozY2FhNzFmM2VjOGNiY2NjNmZjYTRmZWI3MTg1ZGEyYmFiMTQ5YmE3JmRuPU5QRCZ0cj11ZHA6Ly90cmFja2VyLm9wZW5iaXR0b3JyZW50LmNvbTo4MCZ0cj11ZHA6Ly90cmFja2VyLm9wZW50cmFja3Iub3JnOjEzMzcvYW5ub3VuY2U= Allegedly, the password (also base64 encrypted) is: aHR0cHM6Ly91c2RvZC5pby8=
Elsewhere in this thread I posted a detailed commentary on what the torrent contains.
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I don’t think the parent is satirical at all; as an enumerated power, the IRS needs modernization and better funding. Recent hiring expansions have increased audits for high earners and generated additional revenue. Turbotax’s lobbyists are losing influence and we’re enjoying free filing options for individuals in some states. It’s also reasonable to say that a revenue service is not responsible for defining authenti…
I'm sure you've seen teams that have bad leadership / a culture of dysfunction. They're always asking for more headcount and no much how much you add they don't get any better. I assume parent was pointing out that no matter how many resources you give to the IRS they won't get functionally better. You need to change the leadership/incentives/culture, which is hard with govt agencies but resources also won't make the…
0. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106112
1. https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-launches-new-effort-aimed-a...
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The US doesn't need a national ID. It needs a national PKI. The US Postal Service is in a great position to be the one who executes it. They have access to delivery physical goods to the entire country. They have the staff and procedures to do identity verification for their current products that could be extended to a PKI offering. It'll never fly, politically.
If you look at the best National ID systems in Europe, effective it’s all leveraging PKI. It needs a name, of course (National ID) and a purpose, however the entire core of these systems rest on PKI