181–190 of 307 posts
I wonder why no one has introduced a hybrid of the two, for example, you have a private key on your Gov ID, you turn up to the polling station, sign your paper with your ID, bob's your dads brother. Seems like this would solve the ballot stuffing issues as well as being easily electronically verifiable, it's just not a fully digital solution
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because you need to ensure that the vote is given without anyone interfering.
I think a better measure against this is not physical presence, but allowing one individual to exercise their vote any number of times until the ballot period ends. This means that a malevolent entity that wants to influence votes needs to sequester the voter(s) for the whole ballot period, which is vastly more difficult than putting a gun to someone's head for a single vote. Executing this at scale so the effect can…
One important thing about any voting system – digital or not – is that it has to be good at producing agreeable consent . That means bitter, betrayed and hurt (but reasonable/democratic!) losing parties need to be able to say: yeah we accept the result because we are confident in the outcome of the election. This is something all digital systems are really bad at, even if everything is readable and verifiable, unless…
Same for machines, they’ll have to trust that some people did their job and checked these machines.
Not saying this will happen any time soon though ;)
Personally I love the idea of a fully verifiable election. I do the the current election protocol my county uses is pretty good: you present id in one room, they check your eligibility, then you’re given an anonymous ticket, in another room you vote using said ticket, and get a receipt. You can see your but counted online using said receipt. There are two problems with this: 1. You can’t verify extra or in eligible v…
If the receipt allows to view whom you voted for, then it can be used to buy votes or pressure to vote for a specific candidate.
Personally I love the idea of a fully verifiable election. I do the the current election protocol my county uses is pretty good: you present id in one room, they check your eligibility, then you’re given an anonymous ticket, in another room you vote using said ticket, and get a receipt. You can see your but counted online using said receipt. There are two problems with this: 1. You can’t verify extra or in eligible v…
For in-person voting use "fill in the oval" ballots that can be hand counted or counted by offline optical card scanners, and augment that with Scantegrity II [1]. Scantegrity II is a system that adds end-to-end voter verifiability [2] to such systems by combining some clever chemistry with some clever cryptography. It requires no hardware modifications at the voting site except that special markers have to be used t…
> The code cannot be used to prove to a third party, such as a vote buyer or vote coercer, that the person voted the "right" way.
What if the vote buyer is with the government and can actually inspect the ballots after voting? Knowing the code is a proof that you saw a specific ballot.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Please forget about showing up physically, it's noble to think of "you really care" but in places with organized crime they have ways to count if those that depend on them come and vote for their "right" choice. It has been estimated that around 20-30% of IRL votes in Italy follow the organized crimes choice.
Please forget about showing up physically because conflating l caring* with your ability to do things physically is ableist as fuck, and not all disabilities are visible and/or certifiable. Please forget about showing up physically because setting up a polling station in a place where there's effectively no public transportation cuts off poor people from voting. Please forget about showing up physically because mail…
I don't understand this part. What stops people responsible for giving out those ballots, from taking some of them and mail under someone's else name (for example, homeless person, drug addict etc)? You often need just several hundreds or thousands votes to win in a swinging state.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, but then all that's needed to attack the voting system is to trot out your own experts that voice disagreement. Without the means to assess the system for themselves, voters will lose trust in it. Especially in this day and age, when trust in institutions and expects in general is extremely low. (Heck, this attack already works to some extent with the current, extremely transparent system of ballots)
> Yes, but then all that's needed to attack the voting system is to trot out your own experts that voice disagreement. Which is precisely what Trump did in 2020. I doubt people made up their minds on whether the 2020 vote was sound based on the mechanics of how the votes were counted. The counting procedure with it's interlocking checks is rather complex, and differs between states. They made up their minds based on…
Personally I love the idea of a fully verifiable election. I do the the current election protocol my county uses is pretty good: you present id in one room, they check your eligibility, then you’re given an anonymous ticket, in another room you vote using said ticket, and get a receipt. You can see your but counted online using said receipt. There are two problems with this: 1. You can’t verify extra or in eligible v…
Why could they not verify against extra or ineligible voters? If each ticket is tied to a national ID, then you can verify all tickets, right? To ensure the secrecy of the vote, the votes should not be linked to the tickets. Each voter must verify that his vote has been counted. But once a vote has been counted, using blockchain can ensure that it cannot be undone or changed. Could this work?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because you need to ensure that the vote is given without anyone interfering.
I think a better measure against this is not physical presence, but allowing one individual to exercise their vote any number of times until the ballot period ends. This means that a malevolent entity that wants to influence votes needs to sequester the voter(s) for the whole ballot period, which is vastly more difficult than putting a gun to someone's head for a single vote. Executing this at scale so the effect can…
The system used two blockchains: a public one which recorded votes, but without linking to a voter, and a private one that linked voters to vote records in a public blockchain. So the voter couldn't see how many times he voted because this info was on a private blockchain.
So when allowing to change a vote there are several issues:
- how do you invalidate previous vote? You need some way to link those votes, that they belong to the same person which might lead to disclosing their identity
- how do you prevent government from changing your vote by pretending that you voted the second time?
This is not about government elections, right? Because it seems to have no protection from creating millions of fake accounts and voting in their name. Another problem with electronic voting is that votes can be bought or people might be pressured to vote specific way. The voter might save hashes/keys as a proof that they voted for a certain candidate and this can be used as a basis for payout or not being punished.
this only solves one problem: make a vote verifiable. It does not solve who is entitled to vote and how to identify this person – how could it? it’s different in every country. I do think it’s very useful though, it’s like one huge chunk of work done.
Without this the whole system can be easily compromised.