Missing from the context of sibling replies is the (in my experience as an SRE, quite large) category of alerts that are
mostly-but-not-entirely noise and
high-effort-duration to properly improve.
Consider a not-that-hypothetical example: "host computer is unreachable" alerts that page oncall when they arrive for members of a fleet of critical database servers or replicas.
The alerts have proven their usefulness (they tend to arrive several minutes before application-level error spikes when a database is e.g. so overloaded the monitoring agent can't function or a replica is gone so changelogs are overflowing) ... when they're genuine. However, they're mostly not genuine: alerting agents crash and automatic-restart-service init scripts bug out or give up; per-database-owner customizations in hosts' available file descriptor numbers are propagated incorrectly to non-database services and prevent the alerting agent from running, databases that serve infrequent-but-critical on-demand reporting loads are subjected to tens-of-minutes-long load spikes during which the host is doing what it's supposed to but so pegged that the alerting agent won't work, and so on.
What do you do with those alerts?
"Just fix the problems causing the false positives!" Fine, but that takes a lot of time and coordinated effort, even if the oncall folks are empowered to prioritize the work getting done (which is far from a given at many companies, for reasons both good and bad): auto-restart-agent scripts can be replaced with better scripts (time, effort, debugging of some hokey bash that needs to run on a wide variety of environments) or systemd (time, effort, maintenance windows, and approval/retraining to update ancient linux distributions running critical databases). File descriptor/per-database tunings can be unified and continually audited for/invalidated before configs are pushed (developer effort, coordination with teams writing configs). Reporting databases can be upsized (money, maitenance windows) or the database processes can be moved into a cgroup to leave some resources to spare (effort, distro upgrades, maintenance windows).
That's going to take awhile, if it ever happens to completion.
Meanwhile, this "host unreachable" alert is useless 90% of the time and very useful (as in: it can be leveraged to prevent downtime for customers entirely) the remaining 10% of the time.
Like, sure, some of those issues are stupid. But none are hypothetical, all are younger than 5y, and I bet this kind of struggle is common and representative even at companies who are invested in operations and operations staff.
That's not an "inability to create useful observability", that's a genuinely hard problem resulting in noisy, spurious alerts that, depending on the rate-of-change/regulatory space of the company, might persist for months or years. What's more, alert management is an ongoing process. Even if one family of noisy alerts is addressed, another one will emerge as new behaviors and technologies are adopted.
I guess this is all to say that I don't think tools like Opslane (which I have not used) are "enabling bad cultural practices". Organizations that don't give a shit about operations will continue to suck at operations no matter what tools they use. But products Opslane are valuable even (especially?) in capable, operations-focused organizations as well.