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Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

trufflesecurity.com

291–300 of 394 posts

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#291

Users should never be expected to know these gotchas for a feature called "private", documented or not. It's disappointing to see GitHub calling it a feature instead of a bug, to me it just shows a complete lack of care about security. Privacy features should _always_ have a strict, safe default. In the meantime I'll be calling "private" repos "unlisted", seems more appropriate

I see your point, on the other hand, the standard procedure for that on GitHub UI is to create a repo and then select another as a template.

That doesn't fork, but does what you would expect, a fully private repo.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#292
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Honest question. Submitting these types of bugs only to get a: "we have determined it is known low risk issue..." seems like they really don't want to pay for someone else's time and dedication in making their product safer. If they knew about this, was this disclosed somewhere? If not I don't see them playing a fair game. What's the motivation to do this if in the end they can have the final decision to award you or…

companies vary wildly in their honesty and cooperation with bug bounties and develop reputations as a result. if they have a shit reputation, people stop doing free work for them and instead focus on more honest companies

Not all free work is wanted. Discouraging frivolous reports is exactly what is being accomplished by not paying for them.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#293

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Honest question. Submitting these types of bugs only to get a: "we have determined it is known low risk issue..." seems like they really don't want to pay for someone else's time and dedication in making their product safer. If they knew about this, was this disclosed somewhere? If not I don't see them playing a fair game. What's the motivation to do this if in the end they can have the final decision to award you or…

Disagree. This is obviously a deliberate design choice with obvious implications. Expecting a bounty for reporting this is unreasonable. These kind of beg bounties are exactly what gives security "researchers" a bad name. The security implications are also minor. The only problem really is with making a fork of a private repo public - that should only make what exists in that fork public and not any other objects. So…

I wasn't really expecting a bounty, more so hoping they'd fix the issue. For example, to this day I keep having to tell people to never fork the Unreal Engine repository, instead making a manual copy, just in case.

This causes lots of problems for repositories that are private with the expectation that companies will make private forks with their own private changes.

Someone once pushed a bunch of console SDKs (under strict NDA) to a private fork without knowing this. Now that code is just there, if you can guess the commit hash, forever. Literally nothing can be done to remove it. Great.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#294

Users should never be expected to know these gotchas for a feature called "private", documented or not. It's disappointing to see GitHub calling it a feature instead of a bug, to me it just shows a complete lack of care about security. Privacy features should _always_ have a strict, safe default. In the meantime I'll be calling "private" repos "unlisted", seems more appropriate

Yep, I see GitHub as "public only" hosting, and if I want to host something private, I will choose another vendor.

> if I want to host something private, I will choose another vendor.

Or you know, self-host, preferrably on-prem.

Basic git hosting only needs a sshd running on the server. If you want collaborative features with a web UI then there are solutions for that available too.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#295

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If you published a key Why would anyone think that a private fork is "published"!? This is the footgun here: The UI is telling you that nobody can see the secrets you committed to your private copy , but actually it is widely accessible. A similar example of UI-vs-reality mismatch that I've noticed recently is the Azure Store Account "public" visibility. By default, it uses your authenticated account for RBAC acces…

The bit you quoted is referring to public forks that were deleted. That sounds like a non-issue to me, and I'm not at all surprised that 1. Public "forks" are just namespaced branches that share an underlying repo 2. They don't run the garbage collector all the time I'd be surprised if those weren't true. Like I said, the behavior with private forks sounds indefensible. The OP is mixing together multiple things. Bein…

As far as I can tell, they never run the garbage collector. Code I pushed to a fork that was deleted several years ago can still be accessed through the original parent repo.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#296
post #207
post #199

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It's disappointing to see GitHub calling it a feature instead of a bug git is a "distributed" version control software afterall. It means a peer can't control everything.

Anyone at your company and just push to a public git repository at any time. Nothing stopping them except threat of consequences.

So? Employees with access to sensitive data are capable of leaking that data. News at eleven!

And anyone in the world can pull what was pushed to a public git repo before you delete it. You should always assume that has happened.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#297

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I thought a person of your background (who no doubt has it all figured out) would surmise that I was talking about backing up to an external disk and not to another disk on the same laptop. And would grant another person some good faith and be able to generalize without spelling it all out for them: if the point is to back things up then maybe I can infer that other means of backup are also in the cards, like sneaker…

GitHub, for better or worse, has been one of the easiest ways to backup configuration for ..decades now. It's more secure than sending an email to yourself, Google drive still doesn't have an official linux client, AWS is too enterprisey for a handful of small backup files, and git is incredibly easy to set up + available on so many computers. I completely get why people would want to use GitHub for a low friction wa…

> I completely get why people would want to use GitHub for a low friction way to store versioned configuration data.

Store the remote backup you mean? Because the versioned configuration data is of course just Git.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#298

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Honest question. Submitting these types of bugs only to get a: "we have determined it is known low risk issue..." seems like they really don't want to pay for someone else's time and dedication in making their product safer. If they knew about this, was this disclosed somewhere? If not I don't see them playing a fair game. What's the motivation to do this if in the end they can have the final decision to award you or…

No large company running a bug bounty cares one iota about stiffing you on a bounty payment. The teams running this programs are internally incentivized to maximize payouts; the payouts are evidence that the system is working. If you're denied a payment --- for a large company, at least --- there's something else going on. The thing to keep in mind is that large-scale bug bounty programs make their own incentive weat…

In my (admittedly limited) experience, whilst payouts for bugs might be seen as a positive internally, payments for bad architecture/configuration choices are less so (perhaps as they're difficult to fix, so it's politically not expedient to raise them internally).

To provide one example I reported to a large cloud provider that their managed Kubernetes system exposed the Insecure port to the container network, meaning that anyone with access to one container automatically got cluster-admin rights. That pretty clearly seems like not a good security choice, but probably hard to fix if they were relying on that behaviour (which I'm guessing they were).

Their response was to say it was a "best practice" behaviour (no bounty applicable) and that they'd look to fix and asked me not to publicly mention it. Then they deprecated the entire product 6 months later :D

That's one example but I've seen similar behaviour multiple times for things that are more architecture choices than direct bugs, which makes me think reporting such things isn't always welcome by the program owners.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#299

I cannot access the commit https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/commit/7bc0b shown in one of the pictures in the article (right before "Where do you get these hash values") despite this repo is even public. What gives?

As mentioned it works for valid short hashes, if there are multiple commits with those first 5 characters then you need to make it more specific by bruteforcing, appending a 2, 4, 7, or 8 will lead to a valid commit.

Re: Anyone can access deleted and private repository data on GitHub

#300
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yep, I see GitHub as "public only" hosting, and if I want to host something private, I will choose another vendor.

Which vendors work best for private projects?

JetBrains Space, Atlassian Bitbucket, GitLab (also On-Premises), Gitea

Order does not indicate any preference.

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