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6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

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Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#111
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Doesn't this imply that LinkedIn doesn't salt the password prior to storing it. So then a good chunk of those passwords will be in a rainbow table.

With these sorts of simple hashes, you don't need rainbow tables when you have a few GPUs and OCLHashcat.

It would still take a moderate amount of time for a single password if it's long and complex -- you're essentially generating the rainbow table. You might as well just download a sha1 rainbow table and just perform a O(1) lookup. You could reverse all the 6.5M password hashes in mere seconds.

Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#113
post #59
post #9

I've just downloaded the database linked and it only contains the hashed passwords, not the account usernames / e-mail addresses. I wonder if someone has the account details to match up otherwise you've no idea which password belongs to who, and you'd hope that LinkedIn would have lockout functionality.

To get a sense of it, I downloaded it from a link here. Below is the structure of the first few lines. Caveat: it's garbage/useless data below -- I intentionally changed around the actual numbers to give a sense of the structure, only: 000000a94d47b9cb82ca8a3b492a51263b40a66e 000000a98a624314892af97c6f1a0635472eae38 000000a9ba60e7f13fcac444a5a791af7807a3a3 000000a97ea34e74a97a6d1ce08ebc68d3e9aab2 000000a9b4b2a3497aaa…

The pattern 000000a9 is just in presentation - I counted the occurrences of different bytes in that position (also misled by the apparent pattern, where many lines in a row would have the same 4th byte), and each possible value is present more or less equally often.

It seems like it's just sha1.

EDIT: however, 3.5 million hashes start with 5 zeroes, which is way too many for just coincidence. Possibly they used multiple hash functions?

Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#114
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Keep in mind that whoever leaked the hashes is probably keeping the usernames / emails for themselves. The forum in question doesn't allow posting of user-identifiable information according to the forum guidelines. The leaked hashes seems to be SHA-1. I've also confirmed that the hash of my own (semi-complex) LinkedIn password is in the list. Accidentally this is the same password as I had for HN and that I've now ch…

As a more general question: why is it not an industry standard to salt with the username/email in addition to the random key? (i.e. Sha1($salt + $email + $password)). Even if the random salt were excluded, I would think that this is much more secure. Existing rainbow tables would not be anywhere near as helpful, and attempts to generate a rainbow table for a specific salted database would be ineffective because the s…

Why would you use the email? Mostly when passwords/usernames are stolen the email is there too. For my site I have an unique 128-bit token for every user. I also have a 128-bit site_key (which is in the application, not db) and mix those with the password and then hash.

Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#115
"We were curious what would happen to our share price if our company did something incredibly stupid"

The above comment might seem incredibly harsh, but really, there's no good excuse for a site this prominent to not have a salted, secure password hashing system. Even if they started with an unsalted password system, users can be migrated to the newer more secure system on next login.

The only way I could regain respect for LinkedIn is if we find that these unsalted hashes were from users who never logged in to LinkedIn after the security upgrade. From the replies of other HN users who have found their password hashes in the leaked list, this doesn't seem to be the case though.

I can understand database leaks. Bad things happen. Not being prepared for such an event however is where I draw the line. These leaks impact users far beyond just the site at fault.

It's not enough to say users should use LastPass. They don't, and that's the world we live in, for better or worse. If computer security doesn't take into account problematic users, then it's flawed computer security.

Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#116

Good Guy Startup Founder would cross reference this password list with their own password system and force those that match to reauthenticate and change their passwords. This wouldn't be difficult to do and your users would appreciate it.

i agree, but think about the backlash this would create amongst the userbase. the majority of the users will probably never even realize / read that their passwords have been stolen and thus linkedin probably does best in keeping a low profile about this (and start from now on using a better encryption). this is obviously not in the interest of the users, but it is in the interest of linkedin.

Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#117
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Keep in mind that whoever leaked the hashes is probably keeping the usernames / emails for themselves. The forum in question doesn't allow posting of user-identifiable information according to the forum guidelines. The leaked hashes seems to be SHA-1. I've also confirmed that the hash of my own (semi-complex) LinkedIn password is in the list. Accidentally this is the same password as I had for HN and that I've now ch…

As a more general question: why is it not an industry standard to salt with the username/email in addition to the random key? (i.e. Sha1($salt + $email + $password)). Even if the random salt were excluded, I would think that this is much more secure. Existing rainbow tables would not be anywhere near as helpful, and attempts to generate a rainbow table for a specific salted database would be ineffective because the s…

Then the password has to be updated whenever your email changes. I believe Amazon does it like that, literally "forking" whenever you change password; at one point it was possible to simply log on with the old password and live an "alternate reality" where all changes you'd done after changing pwd had not been applied. Don't know if it's still the case today.

Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#118
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Keep in mind that whoever leaked the hashes is probably keeping the usernames / emails for themselves. The forum in question doesn't allow posting of user-identifiable information according to the forum guidelines. The leaked hashes seems to be SHA-1. I've also confirmed that the hash of my own (semi-complex) LinkedIn password is in the list. Accidentally this is the same password as I had for HN and that I've now ch…

As a more general question: why is it not an industry standard to salt with the username/email in addition to the random key? (i.e. Sha1($salt + $email + $password)). Even if the random salt were excluded, I would think that this is much more secure. Existing rainbow tables would not be anywhere near as helpful, and attempts to generate a rainbow table for a specific salted database would be ineffective because the s…

The economics of password crackers changed and rainbow tables are pretty much obsolete nowadays. See http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/2012/04/speed-hashing.html section "What about rainbow tables?".

Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#119
post #90

Good Guy Startup Founder would cross reference this password list with their own password system and force those that match to reauthenticate and change their passwords. This wouldn't be difficult to do and your users would appreciate it.

Google once forced a password reset for emails/passwords that leaked from a bitcoin forum.

That's easy to do it you have the email addresses, but impossible to do if you only have the SHA-1 hash, as in this case (unless you're also using unsalted SHA-1 hashes, which is a much bigger issue by itself).

Re: 6.5 Million LinkedIn Password Hashes Leaked

#120

Good Guy Startup Founder would cross reference this password list with their own password system and force those that match to reauthenticate and change their passwords. This wouldn't be difficult to do and your users would appreciate it.

Better Guy Startup Founder would be using salted hashes anyway and wouldn't even be able to run a cross-reference.
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