It is as if you did not read the final paragraph of my previous post, from which I think it should be clear that I am neither misunderstanding nor disputing the broad thrust of your position (though, personally, I am not
routinely in situations requiring near-instantaneous reactions by the driver in order to prevent disaster, either as a driver or as a passenger in a road vehicle. I can see, however, that for anyone who prioritizes
unconscious over conscious decision-making, this could be the case.)
What I am saying is an addendum to that broad point: situations do generally develop more slowly in the cruise stage of flight, but in those cases where they develop without the pilot being aware of that happening (which they can, and do in a small but not trivial number of cases), then they can present a situation requiring a near-instantaneous reaction to avoid disaster (if that opportunity has not already passed.)
By excluding takeoffs and landings, you are, of course, stacking the deck towards your point, especially if you take this to include flying in congested terminal airspace, particularly in IMC. By the time we exclude cases where the pilots are not doing everything right (and we had better exclude cases where other pilots, ATC and other external persons whose actions or failure to act could create a dangerous situation, and mechanical or systems failures that affect airplane controlability or structural integrity - all of these have led to disasters or near disasters), we have a point that is well-nigh unassailable, but bearing little relevance to the question of why airplanes crash.
The same goes for the linked article: it is is mostly right but there are exceptions. Given that it is from AOPA, I think it is worth noting that the aphorism (as stated from time to time by general aviation pilots) that "the most dangerous part of flying is driving to the airport" is statistically false for general aviation itself (it may well be true for airline flight in many parts of the world.)