Is artificial consciousness achievable? Lessons from the human brain

> medicine

Sciences that directly concern human flourishing (medicine, psychology, sociology, economy) are either largely stuck in the middle ages (we can barely make things work reliably, and when they occasionally do we are not quite sure why), or in fact invoke materialism-inconsistent ideas to various degrees (e.g., stress being recognised as a cause or contributing factor of numerous diseases).

> Belief in idealism not only did not produce anything

And what has belief in the materialism produced?

Idealism, materialism, dualism, etc. concern theory of mind first and foremost, and would likely be irrelevant to “producing” whatever artefacts you were thinking of.

> Parts of the work of Aristotle that were based on idealism are the parts that have been discarded as hindering understanding of physics or plain wrong.

Let’s unpack this.

1. Artistotle’s takes on soul and so on are not based on idealism. (Check them out. They have much more in common with Cartesian dualism than with what we refer to idealism, but of course could be based on neither given both were fleshed out after his time.)

2. The parts you refer to were not discarded—on the contrary, they are believed by, probably, most people on the planet today (who follow some Abrahamic religion).

3. Many prominent Western scientists indirectly believe or believed in Aristotle’s takes, too—by being Christian. There is no conflict in a scientist holding that belief if you understand scientific method, its scope, its purpose, and lack of explanatory powers: natural sciences do not concern themselves with non-falsifiable questions such as “why things exist?”, “do I see things as they actually are?”, “what makes me myself?”, “why do I think?”, “does consciousness arise from atoms?”, and so on. In the framework of scientific method, questions like those cannot have a wrong answer—the questions themselves merely lie out of scope. Obviously, that does not make those questions unimportant—it only makes scientific method not a suitable tool for investigating them at this time.

Any evidence here would be unsound if you try to apply natural science’s requirements to it.

Scientific method is about making observable predictions; i.e., it ultimately hinges on the experience of the observer and existence of observer’s mind. When you try to apply it to the theory of mind itself, you short-circuit that logic. There is pretty much no useful (falsifiable or provable) claim or conclusion to be made, and all evidence is immediately tainted as it gets deconstructed into arbitrary categories in vogue today, goes through the meatgrinder of lossy verbal descriptions, and ultimately gets subjectively interpreted by your own mind.

In other words, it is not the problem of the evidence—this is among the best evidence you can get—it is the problem of the framework you are interpreting it in.

Earlier today, I got around to viewing the video you linked to in your first reply. As I have been looking into this issue for several years, its trajectory is familiar: start from a re-statement of Frank Jackson's 'knowledge argument' from "Epiphenomenal Qualia", assume that this shows consciousness to be inexplicable as a physical process, jump to the conclusion that consciousness is the fundamental reality on which the physical world supervenes, and throw in some arguments from incredulity to coax the reluctant to make this rather huge leap - plus, in this video, a smattering of vitalism.

Jackson's knowledge argument had been fully anticipated by (and probably inspired by, I would guess) Bertrand Russell's aphorism "It is obvious that a man who can see knows things that a blind man cannot know; but a blind man can know the whole of physics." [The Analysis of Matter, 1927.] Fair enough, but where does idealism stand? Is there any non-circular argument for the proposition that learning all of idealism (or any specific variety of panpsychism or dualism, for that matter) would achieve for Russell's blind man what knowing all of physics cannot? Will he come to know what it is like to see the world?

The "metabolic maximum" is around 1250, though. And a mediocre lifting or running momentarily increases it from 125 to 700.

What you perceive as a "huge leap" is not so much the promotion of consciousness as fundamental, but rather the demotion of matter from that same stance. The former is simply a byproduct of the latter. That in the process it seems to interlock so well with findings in various fields of study should admittedly be considered for now as just a happy accident. But we've abided by the law of parsimony to orient our inquiries on much less hints.

> assume that this shows consciousness to be inexplicable as a physical process, jump to the conclusion that consciousness is the fundamental reality on which the physical world supervenes, and throw in some arguments from incredulity to coax the reluctant to make this rather huge leap

You must ensure to have a proper grasp of the chasm between qualia and conceptual knowing that is pointed at in the hard problem of consciousness. Anyone who does should see how removed from physical processes qualia are. It's just self-evident, not a belief. The experience of a smell is not a thought. You don't reason the taste of chocolate. Those "things" sit in their own mysterious "weirdness".

We experience reality in exactly two ways. Consciousness and matter. Those are the only two big mysteries. So, either matter is first, consciousness is first, or they co-arise independently and somehow coalesce. Those are the three possibilities. To declare any one to be a "huge leap" implies that you conceive of another as more acceptable.

If by "huge leap" you mean specifically anything that is not materialism, note that of the three propositions, materialism is by far the least parsimonious and the one that creates the most problems. We culturally favor it as the default stance for two reasons. First, our perception of reality is biased to it. Second, we've had great success studying that perceived reality with science. But as Russell noted, science has only explained how the world works, not what the world is. We've traditionally approached the latter question starting with a "rookie mistake", as Donald Hoffman puts it. We assumed that science also pointed at the world being material. Under analysis, that assumption crumbles, as it's revealed to be built upon other unchecked assumptions, that cause many problems in philosophy and in physics.

We have two possible alternatives to materialism. Of the two, consciousness as sole primitive is the most parsimonious and the one which solves most problems in the process, while creating the least.

> Is there any non-circular argument for the proposition that learning all of idealism (or any specific variety of panpsychism or dualism, for that matter) would achieve for Russell's blind man what knowing all of physics cannot?

I'm not sure that I understood your question here, but there's no such proposition. Idealism is a field of inquiry. It's a set of arguments that eliminate matter as a possible candidate for the basis of reality. Like physics, or any other philosophy, it belongs to conceptual knowledge. It can't give you access to experiential knowing.