Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can simulate the Golden Gate Bridge on a sufficiently powerful computer, though, such that the simulation will behave exactly like the real thing. Chinese room is a good example of begging the question, since the postulate that "understanding" is somehow distinct from observable behavior of the system implies the outcome. But from a materialist perspective, Chinese room, considered as a whole , does understand wh…
>Chinese room, considered as a whole, does understand what it does. The fact that the man inside of it does not is simply irrelevant Searle does address this point even in the original paper. That argument doesn't hold water because you can imagine taking the whole room and putting it in your head and then you still don't understand Chinese. Or put differently if you're a Mandarin speaker and we two sit in a room and…
The reason why we have to speak of the room and the person inside as a system is because the real magic is in the instructions. The fact that they are performed by a self-aware human is completely irrelevant to the setup and is only there to confuse the matter.
In your other example with two people, viewing them as a system doesn't make much sense because one of those people is redundant - you can leave just the person who speaks Mandarin, and that is sufficient for the whole to function. So they alone are "the system". And it also operates based on instructions, except that those instructions are stored in the person's head and executed by low-level processes in the brain.
Searle believes that consciousness cannot be simulated as a digital computation, period. Given that any other physical process can be, this requires a belief that consciousness is somehow magically different from any other physical process in some unspecified way (that appears to be conjured out of thin air solely to make this one argument, at that). That is not materialism.