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International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI [pdf]

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Re: International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI [pdf]

#61

Recursively self-improving AI, of the kind Nick Bostrom outlined in detail way back in his 2014 book Superintelligence and Dr. Omohundro outlined in brief in [1], is the only kind which poses a true existential threat. I don't get out of bed for people worrying about anything less when it comes to 'AI safety'. On the topic: One potentially effective approach to stopping recursive self-improving AI from being develope…

> Such a program would incur minimal policing costs No, it wouldn’t. Just because the policing costs aren't tax-funded doesn't mean they don't exist. (And I'm not talking just about costs voluntarily incurred by bounty seekers, I'm also talking about the cost that the system imposes involuntarily on others who are neither actually guilty nor bounty seekers, because the financial incentives can motivate pursuits impos…

>[D]oesn't mean they don't exist

Never said they don't exist, merely that they are "minimal", aka no other policy I could think of seems like it would obviously lead to lower costs while still achieving the desired outcome.

>I'm also talking about the cost that the system imposes involuntarily on others who are neither actually guilty nor bounty seekers

This is a case from negative externalities. First, consider the simple argument from scale. If you buy the idea that a Bostrom-like AI is both (1) very likely to be created on our current technological trajectory, and (2) will probably kill us all, then it's not hard to argue that the benefits reaped from avoiding that fate justifies a similarly high cost to society, maybe several percentage points of global GDP. After all, you're not just risking deflating present-day GDP, you're risking multiplying all future GDPs by 0. Every country in the First World already imposes tremendous involuntary costs on people for things of much less significance, like 'forcing' you to go through TSA even though you would never in your wildest dreams try to hijack a plane, so the mere existence of involuntary costs doesn't sway me.

Alright, but what would the magnitude of those involuntary costs be? If this policy costs everyone a hundred bucks a year in hassle, we've still got a vexation. There is strong reason to believe that, for almost everyone, it really would be very, very low in absolute terms. How much of the population is currently engaged in frontier-pushing AI research right now? 1%? 0.1%? Actually probably a few orders of magnitude lower. OpenAI still employs less than, what, a thousand people, etc. etc.

The vast majority of people will never do anything remotely like that in their lives. So one would expect very cheap private insurance policies to appear as an effective way to get out of being pursued and harassed by private bounty hunters. The firms which pop up to provide this service would probably get very, very good at negotiating with private bounty hunters very, very quickly, to leave anyone not directly in the know out ASAP. The cost for almost everyone would be on the order of cents per year of protection, that's how unlikely it is that some random clerical worker in Kansas has any serious involvement in creating the next self-improving AI. In exchange, of course, these insurance policies have a very strong reason not to insure people who actually are involved in such activities, and so they could form a critical source of information for helping the bounty hunters target their own search.

>A major source of the international threat is governmental, where private bounties aren’t going to work at all

Strongest argument I've heard so far, thank you for raising it.

First I'll point out it would already be a dream come true for extending our AI doom timelines if the only people who can actually do AI research without fear of being extradited to a bounty-friendly nation is to work in a government lab. The Department of Defense is very impressive, but they still don't move nearly as quickly as private industry and independent universities do when it comes to work like this. That could be generations more of humanity around to live and love and prosper before we get snuffed out. Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good!

Let's get serious. AI researchers in your home country are the easiest case, because you have unilateral law on your side. AI reseachers in other countries are quite a bit more difficult, because now you're in the messy world of international diplomacy. If the other country adopts a bounty law as well, you both win. If neither of you do, you both lose. But what about the case where one of you does, and one of you doesn't? I posit that here, in the end, you probably have to make it so the bounty-friendly nation is the one that wins, with force - that is, allowing bounty hunters to turn in and extract money from even foreign employees if they get within your borders. And, yes, if the other governments decide to respond by closing their private AI businesses and opening up government labs only ... Well, you've slowed the wave quite a bit, but you're probably going to have to be more careful. No one ever said shifting the Nash equilibrium would be easy.

But you do have other options, even here. One hazy possibility in my mind, would be offering US or EU citizenship to any foreign national who is both (1) a credible AI researcher and (2) precommits to stopping their research as soon as they take the offer. Bounty hunters win because (duh) you now have a heavily pre-filtered list of marks you can watch like a hawk for the instant they slip up. And chances are good that someone on that list will, even after getting citizenship, and then you can extract a tidy sum from them for minimal effort. The foreign researchers who take the offer win because living and working in e.g. New York City as an employee of Jane Street is probably much nicer than working on recursviely self-generating AI in a secretive, underpaid, underfunded, underground lab in e.g. Chengdu. (It's important to remember that cutting edge AI researchers are, almost by definition, really really smart and really really good with computers and math. They have a uniquely great set of careers they can switch into easily.)

The world wins because the risk of self-caused extinction goes down another iota. China "loses", but it loses in the smallest way possible - it decided to undertake risky research instead of telling its citizens to choose something more straightforwardly good for humanity, and it suffered a bit of brain drain. That's aggravating, but it's hardly worth launching a China v. NATO war over. And hey, if China wants to stop the brain drain, they already have a good model for a very effective law they could implement to get people to stop doing dangerous research - that same bounty law we've been discussing.

I freely admit this is the weakest part of my theory, becuase it's the weakest part of anyone's theory. International stuff is always much harder to reason about. Still, whereas most policies I've seen put forward seem to fail instantly and obviously, mine seems only probably destined to fail. That's a big improvement in my eyes.

Re: International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI [pdf]

#62
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Such a program would incur minimal policing costs No, it wouldn’t. Just because the policing costs aren't tax-funded doesn't mean they don't exist. (And I'm not talking just about costs voluntarily incurred by bounty seekers, I'm also talking about the cost that the system imposes involuntarily on others who are neither actually guilty nor bounty seekers, because the financial incentives can motivate pursuits impos…

>[D]oesn't mean they don't exist Never said they don't exist, merely that they are "minimal", aka no other policy I could think of seems like it would obviously lead to lower costs while still achieving the desired outcome. >I'm also talking about the cost that the system imposes involuntarily on others who are neither actually guilty nor bounty seekers This is a case from negative externalities. First, consider the…

> First I’ll point out it would already be a dream come true for extending our AI doom timelines if the only people who can actually do AI research without fear of being extradited to a bounty-friendly nation is to work in a government lab.

Yeah, the problem with AI doomers is that they let fantastic baseless estimates of p(doom) drown out much more imminent risks, such as AI asymmetry facilitating tyranny, which is an immediate, near-term, high-probability risk.

Re: International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI [pdf]

#63
post #58
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Wouldn't there be 100x more of the same capability looking for threats and trying to head them off? Hard to determine. It's fairly easy to put absolutely everyone under 24/7 surveillance. Not only does almost everyone carry a phone, but also laser microphones are cheap and simple, and WiFi can be used as wall penetrating radar capable of pose detection at sufficient detail for heart rate and breath rate sensing. Bu…

> It's fairly easy to put absolutely everyone under 24/7 surveillance. I was referring more to the fact that if an AI can help you create something you couldn't previously, it seems likely it could also help you examine data points in looking for threats as well, and with many times more resources to throw at the problem that's not a bad bet in my eyes. I understand the threat model doesn't necessarily mean that it's…

> I was referring more to the fact that if an AI can help you create something you couldn't previously, it seems likely it could also help you examine data points in looking for threats as well, and with many times more resources to throw at the problem that's not a bad bet in my eyes. I understand the threat model doesn't necessarily mean that it's just as hard to build a threat as to detect and defend against it, but you can even use AI to attach that problem and figure out what specific information is the most useful to know to detect the threats.

A question to make sure we're on the same page (though I may forget to reply as this thread is no longer in my first page):

Do you mean, for example, that AI can help us make new vaccines really fast, so even synthetic pandemics are not a huge risk?

Because I'd agree with the first part, it's just I have no reason to expect the second half to also be true. (It might genuinely be true, I just don't have reason to expect that).

> An AI isn't necessarily a singular person, and does not need to come up with the idea "itself". Spawn X copies with different weight values, or create Y new AI's with similar methodology but somewhat different training sets, let them compete, or collaborate, as needed, to come up with something better. Use evolutionary programming to dynamically change weights little my little and see how it affects output. Rinse and repeat. Cull unuseful variants.

All true, but I don't think this is pertinent: simulated evolution absolutely works (when you have a fitness function), but it also leads to digital equivalents of the recurrent laryngeal nerve or the exploding appendix, and to fixed points like how everything eventually turns into a crab.

> The problem as I see it is not so much that one AI entity will grow to dominate everything, as much as that as a class of entity AI will out-compete humans very quickly once the average AI is smarter than the 75th percentile of humans, much less the 90th or 99th percentile. The best we can hope for at that point is to be brought along for the ride. Even the autistic savant type versions we have not seem to be causing some level of this.

Indeed, though I think that depends on the details.

So, for the sake of a thought experiment, if I take the current systems and just assume we're stuck on them forever: they take a huge amount of training data to get good at anything, which humans generate, and that means we have to switch jobs every 6 months or so because that's when the AI is now good enough to replace us at the specific roles it just saw all of us collectively performing.

But that scenario is definitely not a universal, even if it happens in some cases: We've got some bounded systems with fixed rules and a clear mechanism for scoring the quality of the output, and for those systems we get very rapidly super-human output from self-play, as we have seen with AlphaZero.

Also, as we see with image GenAI, what domain experts think they've been selling before now, often turns out to not be that close to what their customers thought they were buying. This is why even the current systems — systems which put in two horizons, or three legs, or David Cronenberg the fingers — are nevertheless harming artist commissions.

> Will that happen soon? Will that happen ever? I don't know. Probably not. Hopefully not.

"If the human brain were so simple that we could understand it, we would be so simple that we couldn’t."

On the one hand, this is why I suspect that any self-improvement process will be limited (though I don't know what the limit will be).

On the other, our DNA didn't really "understand" the brains it was creating as it evolved us, and our brains are existence proofs that it is possible to make a human-level intelligence in a 20 watt, 1 kg unit.

The counterpoint is, this took billions of years of parallel development, and even then might have been a fluke. (And while we can't use the lack of evidence for space-faring civilisations to say if the fluke is before or after the creation of life itself, we can say that at least one of [life emerges, life evolves our kind of minds] must be a fluke).

Re: International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI [pdf]

#64
post #42

I understand that this report is not really about AGI, but I would like to again raise my main concern: I am much more worried about the implications of the real threat of dumb humans using dumb "AI" in the near-term, than I am about the theoretical threat of AGI. Example: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39944826 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39918245

This is like someone saying "I am much more worried about the implications of dumb humans using flintlock muskets in the near term, then I am about the theoretical threat of machine guns and nuclear weapons." Surely the potential for both misuse and mistakes goes up the more powerful the technology gets.

Rather loaded analogy. We're well aware of the practical threat nuclear weapons pose, you're assuming a lot to compare them with AGI. It's as valid to say it's like someone in the 1980s talking about how they're much more worried about the dangers of poorly operated and designed Soviet fission reactors than they are about the theoretical threat of fusion (sure to become economical in the next twenty years!)

Re: International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI [pdf]

#65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No it does not. This is the scary part.

Do you mean scary as in "it is scary that apparently intelligent and sane people are wasting time and money on producing documents that consist purely of meaningless fluff"? If so, I agree.

Yes, but also scary that it can produce meaningful fluff that will move you and you can't tell the difference.

Re: International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI [pdf]

#66
post #63
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It's fairly easy to put absolutely everyone under 24/7 surveillance. I was referring more to the fact that if an AI can help you create something you couldn't previously, it seems likely it could also help you examine data points in looking for threats as well, and with many times more resources to throw at the problem that's not a bad bet in my eyes. I understand the threat model doesn't necessarily mean that it's…

> I was referring more to the fact that if an AI can help you create something you couldn't previously, it seems likely it could also help you examine data points in looking for threats as well, and with many times more resources to throw at the problem that's not a bad bet in my eyes. I understand the threat model doesn't necessarily mean that it's just as hard to build a threat as to detect and defend against it, b…

> A question to make sure we're on the same page (though I may forget to reply as this thread is no longer in my first page):

https://www.hnreplies.com/

> Do you mean, for example, that AI can help us make new vaccines really fast, so even synthetic pandemics are not a huge risk?

I'm sure they can, if they can also help someone make a disease or virus, but more that I this the setup required to make something like that successfully, even with an AI, likely is more than what the average home lab has. Can someone create something? Sure. Can they iteratively test is and see how it works to iron out the bugs? I think that's likely much more complicated, requires some additional infrastructure, and is something that can be looked for an tracked, and AI will probably excel at finding the signal in the noise for things like that.

> So, for the sake of a thought experiment ... are nevertheless harming artist commissions.

For the record, I meant to say "Even the autistic savant type versions we have now seem to be causing some level of this." and I don't really disagree with what you're saying here, so I think we're in almost complete agreement on this.

> The counterpoint is, this took billions of years of parallel development, and even then might have been a fluke.

The counterargument to that is that natural selection seems to work on much larger timescales for any sort of species with intelligence. Intelligence seems to be a trait most useful for long lived organisms, since it's costly and requires a long time for organisms to learn from their environment enough to make it worth while, so seems mostly limited to larger and longer lived organisms, causing adaptations to take relatively longer. Intelligence is just one tool in the toolbox.

AI and increases in AI are not a natural process, but directed action, and on a scale where the time between generations seems to be shortening. That shortening for now might be because we're still tapping the low-hanging fruit of advances to make, but it's also limited by business needs because of the systems in which it operates. The "rogue AI decides to advance itself" may not necessarily need to operate within that system in some respects, either because it's beyond that system already or (more likely, in my opinion) it can just take a few percentages of resources lost to the black market every year to hide itself until it's too late. Just cybercrime is $10 billion annually, and that's up with 14% jump. Would anyone really know by who if that grew by another billion or two? That would be a lot of resources.

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