If you have the ability to disassemble your electronics, do so! Do a DDG search for the identifiers on all the chips. You will learn a lot.
A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
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Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#42An even easier one would be a modified keyboard. Anyone could fit an esp32 into a keyboard, swap it out, leave it lying around, sniff keystrokes, access with Bluetooth or WiFi, could have it only have the radio on for certain windows in time etc.
The mouse is more commonly swapped in situations with physical access.
Without physical access, those non-BlueTooth wireless mice (with their own RF dongle) are vulnerable to remote keystroke injection.
Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
That is valid for any centralized service in general. Fun fact: I am working on something in that field in my spare time(whenever I have both time and motivation) and I opted for LoRa instead specifically for that reason, even though it comes with a wide range of limitations: payload, range is determined by line of sight, no multiplexing and all that. But did make some real world testing late last year and the range…
The 900MHz bands also have much better penetration. But even the 2.4 LoRa are a huge step up from the other chips I've seen eg. TI CC2500.
True, well I'm in the EU so 868MHz in my case. Still, it is very susceptible to external conditions. It truly is a hit or miss. Personally I host a things network gateway(indoors), I live on the last floor of a building at one of the highest points in the city and it is still very inconsistent when I've been fiddling with it. Back when I was doing my tests a few months ago I took a micro controller with a LoRa module up on the roof so those truly were ideal conditions. I have yet to test the CC2500.
Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#44An even easier one would be a modified keyboard. Anyone could fit an esp32 into a keyboard, swap it out, leave it lying around, sniff keystrokes, access with Bluetooth or WiFi, could have it only have the radio on for certain windows in time etc.
Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#45Would it be possible to shield the host device while frying the GSM antenna with selected frequenzies?
Kind of preemptive sanitization of new hardware.
Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#46Would it be possible to shield the host device while frying the GSM antenna with selected frequenzies? Kind of preemptive sanitization of new hardware.
Lots of cables have chips in them these days.
Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#47I always wondered what if an SSD can surreptitiously funnel out the data it has on a secure channel, unbeknownst to the owner... Maybe all that would indicate the backdoor is some slight (?) change in the throughput speed.
This is easily mitigated with full disk encryption.
Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#48If you have the ability to disassemble your electronics, do so! Do a DDG search for the identifiers on all the chips. You will learn a lot.
As I learned when I was a child taking apart electronics, the hard part is reassembling them, haha. Taking photos of the disassembly steps can be helpful in remembering how the parts fit together.
Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#49Is there some kind of device that can detect bugs like this? (I'm thinking of the "bug sweepers" I've seen in films)
I posted this on my Discord, one of our members is a security guy and pointed out that anyone concerned about things like this would be using a device called a NLJD, Non-Linear Junction Detector: https://reiusa.net/nljd/, which can detect circuit boards:
> The NLJD antenna head is a transceiver (transmitter and receiver) that radiates a digital spread spectrum signal to determine the presence of electronic components. When the energy encounters semi-conductor junctions (diodes, transistors, circuit board connections, etc.), a harmonic signal returns to the receiver. The receiver measures the strength of the harmonic signal and distinguishes between 2nd or 3rd harmonics. When a stronger 2nd harmonic is represented on the display in red, it indicates an electronic junction has been detected. In this way, a hand-held ORION is used to sweep walls, objects, containers, furniture, and most types of surfaces to look for hidden electronics, regardless of whether the electronic device is turned on.
Re: A low budget consumer hardware espionage implant (2018)
#50I always wondered what if an SSD can surreptitiously funnel out the data it has on a secure channel, unbeknownst to the owner... Maybe all that would indicate the backdoor is some slight (?) change in the throughput speed.
If someone has physical access to a device containing secure information, you're already boned. Thankfully, very few people are targets of surveillance / espionage like that.