Earlier quoted context omitted.
The role of a maintainer is more than copying and pasting upstream. They are allowed to exercise their judgement in what they believe is appropriate for end users of a distribution. In this case, there does seem to be reasonable security justifications for it, and an alternative is provided.
Maybe Debian maintainers consider it their role to do this, but that's absolutely not true in other distributions (e.g., one reason I use Arch is to avoid such tinkering). Down this road lies problems with incompatibilities and new bugs that are distro-specific. As a user it defies my expectations to have software modified to remove functionality and retain the same name. This is a bit too opinionated for my tastes.
KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
171–180 of 367 posts
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#172What is the big issue? The maintainer put up two packages, one stripped down and another with full functionality. I'd say it's really good to have options so the user can choose themselves.
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#173Earlier quoted context omitted.
We ship a copy of bootstrap within our data files. They could just leave it as-is and have it working. Bootstrap is a CSS/JS library, there is no global /usr/lib to be concerned about.
> because it was built on top of Bootstrap 3, but Debian only shipped Bootstrap 2 at the time in a global package > there is no global /usr/lib to be concerned about Aside from possibly the path being different, which is of no concern, how can the 2 above sentences reconcile with each other?
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#174Earlier quoted context omitted.
>the alternative to including the yubikey code is not using a yubikey, which reduces security. The physics of someone cracking my passphrase and the physics of someone cracking my Yubikey are both in the boil the oceans amount of energy. I'm fine not letting a usb device masquerading as a keyboard have access to my password database. Remember: "When you lose your YubiKey or someone else gets access to it, your databa…
> When you lose your YubiKey or someone else gets access to it, your database is not secure anymore. You don't store your password on the YubiKey, you use it as a second factor in addition to your password. Do you know what a YubiKey is when you argue against it?
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#175Earlier quoted context omitted.
>the alternative to including the yubikey code is not using a yubikey, which reduces security. The physics of someone cracking my passphrase and the physics of someone cracking my Yubikey are both in the boil the oceans amount of energy. I'm fine not letting a usb device masquerading as a keyboard have access to my password database. Remember: "When you lose your YubiKey or someone else gets access to it, your databa…
What is the physics of someone sniffing your passphrase with a keylogger?
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#176Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure it does. If the software (1) only ever used on trusted data (2) never makes network requests, then even with most vulnerable libraries, it simply cannot be exploited. But features like "fetch favicon from untrusted websites" open huge security holes in case there are ever bugs in http or image libraries. (note that in case of local compromise, it does not matter if keepass is secure or not - the attacker can ins…
> If the software (1) only ever used on trusted data (2) never makes network requests, then even with most vulnerable libraries, it simply cannot be exploited. You're assuming the flags remove all of the whats-deemed-as-risky behavior. Trusting the flags from the lens of wanting to trim down a package size? Reasonable. Trusting the flags from the lens of wanting to boost security? Eh... Crafting a security policy bas…
I am worried about unintentional bugs which end up being remotely exploitable.
So while making sure the image library is bug-free is practically impossible, it is pretty easy to check for compile-time feature flags. Build it once, then ldd to make sure the http library is not linked. Or check debug messages. Or objdump and make sure method is missing. Tons of very simple methods.
From this standpoint, disabling favicon fetching is a 100% effective mitigation for all remote attacks. I've never bothered uploading favicons by hand, and I've never needed any images in my notes.
No security theater, just a pragmatic view.
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#177Earlier quoted context omitted.
They disabled all plugins, not just those that may access networks. This is not good, it's nonsensical.
Thinking browser or other local integration is not as dangerous as network features is nonsensical. All of the disabled features are expendable. I never used any even while they were in there. Yet I do use keepassxc all day every day for the one job it actually does exist to do. Convenience and necessity are two different things. You want conveninece, and you're not wrong to want it, but you don't need it, and your w…
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#178Earlier quoted context omitted.
What is the physics of someone sniffing your passphrase with a keylogger?
The same as someone sniffing the Yubikey communications.
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#179Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm replying just to +1 this as well. This has saved me multiple times not from phishing attacks but from simple mistakes such as entering a password into a HTTP page when the website supports HTTPS. Often I'm just browsing along and try to get KeepassXC to autofill a password only to be frustrated when it refuses to work. Then the frustration turns to relief when I go into KeepassXC and see that I've entered " https…
It's not like the clipboard is secure either. Any arbitrary app can listen to the clipboard in X11, and while it seems harder in Wayland, I'm not sure if I've ever seen a clipboard permission dialog (my Wayland experience is limited though). Turning off the browser intergation means that the user may accidentally auto-type into the wrong website. Turning off auto-type means that external applications can see the pass…
That said, this ends up also making this like clipboard managers or wl-paste not work, so there is a wlroots protocol (wlr_data_control) that lets the client know about all data offers. How is a malicious process prevented from being a client of this interface (or even should a process be prevented...) depends on the compositor.
Re: KeePassXC Debian maintainer has removed all network features
#180Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If the software (1) only ever used on trusted data (2) never makes network requests, then even with most vulnerable libraries, it simply cannot be exploited. You're assuming the flags remove all of the whats-deemed-as-risky behavior. Trusting the flags from the lens of wanting to trim down a package size? Reasonable. Trusting the flags from the lens of wanting to boost security? Eh... Crafting a security policy bas…
I am not worried about xz-style intentional backdoors. I am worried about unintentional bugs which end up being remotely exploitable. So while making sure the image library is bug-free is practically impossible, it is pretty easy to check for compile-time feature flags. Build it once, then ldd to make sure the http library is not linked. Or check debug messages. Or objdump and make sure method is missing. Tons of ver…
CMakefiles are susceptible to bugs too. KeepassXC could also very well remove these build flags and people would be none the wiser.
As I said, concerned users should look at other ways to isolate the application’s behavior here instead of relying on the build process.
Run it in an isolated network namespace if network connectivity is the prevailing concern.