The Cambridge Security Lab is not fucking around. Assume this is not hype. I'm less curious about whether overseas silicon is backdoored than I am in how exposed the attack/activation surface for those backdoors are.
"Currently there is no economical or timely way of ascertaining if a manufacturer's specifications have been altered during the manufacturing process (99% of chips are manufactured in China)," That claim about 99% of chips being manufactured in China is very easy to verify as being utterly false. I have to wonder about the trustworthiness of the rest. - kryptiskt, http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4030818 It has ac…
Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
81–90 of 159 posts
Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#82found a previously unknown backdoor inserted by the manufacturer. This backdoor has a key...
It's hard to understand what this guy is talking about. Is he claiming that the manufacturer added additional hardware that the designers were unaware of? Or they made modifications to existing circuitry so it doesn't match the design? It would be very hard to do either without cooperation from the designers, especially given the paranoia of hardware engineers (and of defense hardware engineers, an entirely different level of paranoia). The question "are we manufacturing what we designed?" is one that is constantly asked throughout the lifetime of a part. In fact the answer, for individual parts, is often "no", because they can be defective. Still, the question is constantly asked with a variety of automated tools at all points of the manufacturing process.
Here's what I think he might have found: an additional fixed key introduced by the designers themselves into the chip, and having nothing special to do with the manufacturer. In other words, a deliberate backdoor.
Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#83The chip in question seems to be an Actel Microsemi ProASIC3 (PA3) [1,2], given the hints in the screenshot of the paper. [1] http://www.actel.com/products/pa3/ [2] http://www.actel.com/documents/pa3_faq.html (I guess there is no real advantage in keeping this obscured)
Power glitch detection, mechanisms to detect decapping/stripping, wire mesh shielding, protection against ultra-violet laser stimulation of transistors, ... are all important.
For those interested in further reading, Security Engineering[1] by Ross Anderson contains a section on chip security. Another paper[2] by Ross Anderson and Markus Kuhn (1996) provides additional background.
Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#84How could the authors know the backdoor design is not the intent of American military?
Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#85Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#86The bit that surprises the fuck out of me is that they're buying stuff in from China. I've never seen that - ever! They would buy expensive stuff fabbed specially in the US rather than import usually. I did a lot of work for the UK Ministry of Defence and the US Department of Defence over the years on custom silicon and FPGA work and the paranoia factor is scary. We had the layouts of everything bought in - even 74-s…
Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not sure I see the problem. They let the biggest debt buyer cut out the middle man. I'm sure there was some backroom dealing going on there, but it seems like the biggest losers there are the middlemen who wound up getting cut out.
The middle man was getting a cut anyway. It was mainly to make China's purchases secrete. Primary dealers are not allowed to charge customers money to bid on their behalf at Treasury auctions, so China isn't saving money by cutting out commission fees.
Sometimes the typos are more fun than the whole thread.
Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#88Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#89The bit that surprises the fuck out of me is that they're buying stuff in from China. I've never seen that - ever! They would buy expensive stuff fabbed specially in the US rather than import usually. I did a lot of work for the UK Ministry of Defence and the US Department of Defence over the years on custom silicon and FPGA work and the paranoia factor is scary. We had the layouts of everything bought in - even 74-s…
I simply do not believe one could find a "back door" looking at a chip in a SEM. It sounds to me like you are describing destructive physical analysis whose purpose is to make sure requisite manufacturing practices are being followed.
Re: Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not sure I see the problem. They let the biggest debt buyer cut out the middle man. I'm sure there was some backroom dealing going on there, but it seems like the biggest losers there are the middlemen who wound up getting cut out.
The middle man was getting a cut anyway. It was mainly to make China's purchases secrete. Primary dealers are not allowed to charge customers money to bid on their behalf at Treasury auctions, so China isn't saving money by cutting out commission fees.