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Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

leviathansecurity.com

171–180 of 238 posts

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#171
post #25

There are numerous ways to defeat a VPN on a client device, this is why I prefer to put a router that terminates VPN tunnels with no other available routes between my clients and the Internet when I feel the need for a VPN. You can trivially set up one of these "travel routers" and carry it with you everywhere, which is exactly what I do.

If you could list some hardware and software, it would save us the effort ...

I currently carry a GL-Inet MT-3000 with me.

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#172
post #133

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In your step 4, what happens when the VPN traffic gets routed over option 121 pushed routes? Don't you block it - thus blocking your entire VPN? > OR it will attempt to go through the more specific option 121 pushed malicious routes added by the compromised DHCP server (depending on the destination ip of the outbound packets). This right here... we don't want our VPN-secued traffic going out over routes broadcast by…

Read my reply to the other poster, i answer exactly this. Actually test it yourself. Stop theorizing. I tested it. It works exactly as I said. I think i know where you're confused. There is a firewall whitelist on the VPN endpoint route. Also it's impossible for the DHCP server to push a route more specific than this since it's a /32 route, so it's unaffected (together with the firewall rule allowing it) by anything…

I think you might be saying to add rules like `iptables -A OUTPUT -d /32 -j ACCEPT`, `iptables -A OUTPUT -o vpn0 -j ACCEPT`, and `iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP`.

I'm a bit confused though because you only mentioned one rule and that's three. But also, I think using that combination of rules would result in dropping all traffic that someone attempts this attack against - in other words, turning it into a denial-of-service attack instead of a loss-of-confidentiality one.

But there's no technical need to drop the maliciously-routed traffic, is there?

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you're connected to a random network, whose configuration you don't know in advance, how do you route packets to your VPN server? The usual answer is that the network's router tells you how to do that, by supplying DHCP options. The point I'm making here is that you can't just configure a firewall rule and have it work properly. What actually needs to happen is that the VPN client software is using one routing tab…

Let's walk through this step by step because there's a lot of confusion on your end. * Step one - You connect your computer to a network - yes you'll get a DHCP lease, and you'll get an ip address, and a default gateway. This default route will be added to your routing table. * Step two - If the TunnelVision exploit (DHCP option 121) is at play you'll also get a few MORE SPECIFIC routes than the default gateway. Thes…

The only problem with this persons comments is saying "you're wrong" "you're confused" so much.

The actual content is 100%.

Get over the "you're wrong" tone and ingest the tech message.

It's really a misnomer to call the firewall a kill switch since it isn't reacting, it's already in effect, already blocking the bad traffic before the bad traffic happens. No switch is thrown.

Any vpns that DO work that way are silly and should not be used. If this is most popular commercial vpns today, oh well so be it.

The articles going around saying "affects all vpns and nothing can stop it" are also just silly and wrong. But it is probably true that most convenient vpns are currently leaking.

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#174

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well said. This is a nothing-burger for all VPNs except the ones that are likely heavily leaking already due to the absence of basic firewall rules. Their "side channel attack" also made me spit out my drink. EDIT: looks like NordVPN (at least on mac) doesn't have those basic firewall rules and so IS vulnerable to this exploit.

A general rule for life is that companies making a big deal about military grade encryption or about how they are affiliated with Nordic countries are scams.

Or more generally, marketing budget and trustworthiness tend to be inversely proportional.

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#175

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One of the authors here, the intention was to provide a primer of the topics since we figured this would draw people from a nontechnical background too. That and half the information on the internet about VPNs is from VPN providers and is incorrect or not technical enough to describe how they _actually_ work. We had a sentence in the intro that was supposed to be a hyperlink to the “hey if you know this stuff you sho…

The PoC section doesn't explain the issue. I think a one-line TL;DR similar to the summary above would be best, e.g. "A malicious DHCP server can use DHCP Option 121 to set routing rules, which can override the routing rule used by VPNs and cause traffic to be routed outside the VPN" (I like it that you provide the background for people who need it, but also found the actually relevant information extremely annoying…

Or they could have maybe lead with that sentence and THEN given the explanation.

Too many tech people have that "I want to slowly lead you to the point like Sherlock Holmes mystery" style of writing, and it is such a time-waste. Arthur Conan Doyle was paid by the word, you aren't. Please, everyone, back to middle school: State a Thesis in your first sentence and THEN expand on it, don't force me to spend pages trying to figure it out.

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#176
post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In general, Nordic countries are known for their extensive privacy laws, which in theory would make it harder for law enforcement to gain access to your traffic (and with a court order it is very easy to decloak your VPN traffic). However, as all Nordic countries are part of the Schengen Area, they are bound by European laws - and their enforcement. When Europol started cracking down on VPN providers that didn't comp…

So, should they be requested to do so by a formally issued court order, they would comply and start logging a user’s activity, but do not do so by default. Calling them worthless at providing secure browsing seems far-fetched; calling them a scam is fully disingenuous.

What, specifically, is the “secure browsing” that they offer and how does it improve on HTTP over modern TLS?

Funnelling your traffic through another entity doesn’t magically increase security.

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The PoC section doesn't explain the issue. I think a one-line TL;DR similar to the summary above would be best, e.g. "A malicious DHCP server can use DHCP Option 121 to set routing rules, which can override the routing rule used by VPNs and cause traffic to be routed outside the VPN" (I like it that you provide the background for people who need it, but also found the actually relevant information extremely annoying…

Or they could have maybe lead with that sentence and THEN given the explanation. Too many tech people have that "I want to slowly lead you to the point like Sherlock Holmes mystery" style of writing, and it is such a time-waste. Arthur Conan Doyle was paid by the word, you aren't. Please, everyone, back to middle school: State a Thesis in your first sentence and THEN expand on it, don't force me to spend pages trying…

It's not just tech people, but any field with a high enough complexity.

The "abstract" of a journal article is supposed to contain all the key points of a science experiment including the results, but it's too rare that they do.

I think some folks are just hitting their limits, and needed more time to digest/ review their publication.

Other folks are doing it I obfuscate or pad their work, for whatever reason.

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#178

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Let's walk through this step by step because there's a lot of confusion on your end. * Step one - You connect your computer to a network - yes you'll get a DHCP lease, and you'll get an ip address, and a default gateway. This default route will be added to your routing table. * Step two - If the TunnelVision exploit (DHCP option 121) is at play you'll also get a few MORE SPECIFIC routes than the default gateway. Thes…

The only problem with this persons comments is saying "you're wrong" "you're confused" so much. The actual content is 100%. Get over the "you're wrong" tone and ingest the tech message. It's really a misnomer to call the firewall a kill switch since it isn't reacting, it's already in effect, already blocking the bad traffic before the bad traffic happens. No switch is thrown. Any vpns that DO work that way are silly…

I can see how you can write rules that block "bad traffic", but I can't see how you write them so they don't also block some "good traffic" when the network assigns a routing rule.

I think the person here might be glossing over writing overzealous rules that cause the VPN connection to go down when an Option 121 route is assigned, when the ideal solution leaves the VPN functional (and causes tunneled traffic to ignore the route).

Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs

#179
post #143

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you expand on that? Specifically the affiliation with Nordic countries? I’m a Nord VPN customer, I’d quite like to know more — may help inform any future decision on renewing or even staying with them.

In general, Nordic countries are known for their extensive privacy laws, which in theory would make it harder for law enforcement to gain access to your traffic (and with a court order it is very easy to decloak your VPN traffic). However, as all Nordic countries are part of the Schengen Area, they are bound by European laws - and their enforcement. When Europol started cracking down on VPN providers that didn't comp…

You are missing one valid use-case: avoiding three-strikes letters being sent to your ISP by the MPA. Unless you're part of a release group, the complaints from the MPA never rise to the level of actual legal action, so your VPN provider is free to bin them, whereas your actual ISP would almost certainly act on them.
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