tldr DHCP can add routes, so it can add routes for the internal network of a VPN. It’s not obvious to me why this works, because VPNs set metric 1 on their routes, that’s why traffic goes into them regardless of what IP the surrounding network used. DHCP option 121 has no metric field, so it should get a high default metric and shouldn’t have any impact on a VPN with specific routes. If you only “set the default gate…
Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
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Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#12tldr DHCP can add routes, so it can add routes for the internal network of a VPN. It’s not obvious to me why this works, because VPNs set metric 1 on their routes, that’s why traffic goes into them regardless of what IP the surrounding network used. DHCP option 121 has no metric field, so it should get a high default metric and shouldn’t have any impact on a VPN with specific routes. If you only “set the default gate…
because unless you have matching routes, most specific wins
Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#13Is there a tl;dr so we don't have to wade through swathes of AI generated text explaining what a network is?
An attacker who controls the DHCP server can give your device more specific routes and this apparently can cause traffic to go over those routes instead of the VPN. So if your VPN says that it's taking traffic for 0.0.0.0/0, and the DHCP server says 0.0.0.0/1 and 1.0.0.0/1 route over 10.1.1.1, then all your traffic gets sent over 10.1.1.1 because those routes are more specific so they "win". (Please feel free to corr…
Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#14it's interesting, but of limited usefulness - the device has to accept responses from a dhcp server. if an attacker controls a dhcp server, he's either on the network already or has already had to do a lot worse than installing a couple static routes to get there.
it's not nothing - a compromised home gateway could use this technique to sneak into a corporate VPN via a users' laptop, but if you have a compromised home gateway, you have a lot of other problems that could lead to the same result.
Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#15Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#16VPN can be trivially defeated any number of ways. I was shocked when I first learned this ten fifteen years ago through a site that showed my internet provider and location despite being on a VPN. I forgot the name of the site. A huge problem that doesn't even require defeating is, most OSs and VPN clients, if the connection is shaky, just reverts to the default connection. Even a single packet is enough for your VPN…
> A huge problem that doesn't even require defeating is, most OSs and VPN clients, if the connection is shaky, just reverts to the default connection.
This is mostly a function of the VPN client, not the OS. Some clients will reinstate default routes pretty quickly when they lose connectivity, others are pretty sticky.
At least Android even offers a specific “always-on VPN” option to prevent leaks like that.
Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#17VPN can be trivially defeated any number of ways. I was shocked when I first learned this ten fifteen years ago through a site that showed my internet provider and location despite being on a VPN. I forgot the name of the site. A huge problem that doesn't even require defeating is, most OSs and VPN clients, if the connection is shaky, just reverts to the default connection. Even a single packet is enough for your VPN…
Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#18VPN can be trivially defeated any number of ways. I was shocked when I first learned this ten fifteen years ago through a site that showed my internet provider and location despite being on a VPN. I forgot the name of the site. A huge problem that doesn't even require defeating is, most OSs and VPN clients, if the connection is shaky, just reverts to the default connection. Even a single packet is enough for your VPN…
Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#19VPN can be trivially defeated any number of ways. I was shocked when I first learned this ten fifteen years ago through a site that showed my internet provider and location despite being on a VPN. I forgot the name of the site. A huge problem that doesn't even require defeating is, most OSs and VPN clients, if the connection is shaky, just reverts to the default connection. Even a single packet is enough for your VPN…
Are there any router/cheap "bridge" devices that can sit between your router and the internet and force outbound communication to go through the VPN, as if it were your ISP?
no personal experience but sounds nifty, maybe there are other options too
Re: Attackers can decloak routing-based VPNs
#20I don't know why this article is so long. DHCP Option 121 allows the DHCP server to set routing rules for a given CIDR range, which end up having a higher priority than the default 0.0.0.0/0 rule due to higher specificity (longer prefix).
That and half the information on the internet about VPNs is from VPN providers and is incorrect or not technical enough to describe how they _actually_ work.
We had a sentence in the intro that was supposed to be a hyperlink to the “hey if you know this stuff you should skip to the POC section”. I’ll make sure that gets updated/more obvious.