I'm a maintainer (one of many) of an open source project, and this topic has been on my mind a lot lately as I review PRs. I am more suspicious of PRs from new contributors by default now. Of course I keep these suspicions to myself, but besides simply reviewing code for all the regular things, I now ask myself "what sort of sneaky thing could they be doing that appears benign on the surface?"
Why is there not a policy that any PR can be rewritten by a maintainer ? Wherever the PR looks a bit odd, rewrite it so do the same thing a different way. Enough unpredictable change to disrupt finely-tuned subterfuge.
Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
191–200 of 379 posts
Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#192 > This approach bears strong resemblance to the manner in which “Jia Tan” positioned themselves in the XZ/liblzma backdoor.
No, it doesn't. I stopped after read this. Jia's "attack" was near state level actor stuff. A bunch of emails asking/begging for commit access sounds like a 16 year old sending emails from the basement of his parent's house.Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#193So next the attackers playing the long game will just set out to develop the next great everybody-uses-it open-source library, so they control it from inception? Great that we'll finally get state-sponsored open-source development :D
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Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#194Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#195So next the attackers playing the long game will just set out to develop the next great everybody-uses-it open-source library, so they control it from inception? Great that we'll finally get state-sponsored open-source development :D
US gov has encouraged finance/tech industry to invest in the security of OSS supply chains. OpenSSF members: https://openssf.org/about/members 2021, $10MM, https://openssf.org/press-release/2021/10/13/open-source-sec... > Financial commitments from Premier members include Amazon, Cisco, Dell Technologies, Ericsson, Facebook, Fidelity, GitHub, Google, IBM, Intel, JPMorgan Chase, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, Oracle, Red…
Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#196Maybe we need a reporting system for maintainer changes of bigger projects. Some list where they get published and people can keep an eye on it. Those changes of maintainers need to be synced to package distribution sites like npm.js or Debian packages and put in context with versions/releases. In Europe this was introduced for banks after the banking crisis. If a bank does any organizational change, a report is sent…
I'm sure some security researcher is doing this, but we could easily create a visualization of "who has contributed over time" and identify transitioning of maintainers automatically just from git. This might be worth doing and contributing to a site like bestofjs or libraries.io (I don't really use that one though!)
When major security players insist that using GPG is bad, there is no way of knowing if bob@bob.bob is the same account that it was last month or not.
Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#197Earlier quoted context omitted.
Web of trust, but all commits must be signed by at least 3 intelligence agencies from rival countries.
At least 2 rival legal Jurisdictions/Alliances/Spheres At least 2 rival state intelligence Agencies per Sphere At least 2 rival corporations per Sphere TOTAL: 2*(2+2) = 8 Widely used OSS projects are contested spheres of collaboration.
Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#198Maybe we need a reporting system for maintainer changes of bigger projects. Some list where they get published and people can keep an eye on it. Those changes of maintainers need to be synced to package distribution sites like npm.js or Debian packages and put in context with versions/releases. In Europe this was introduced for banks after the banking crisis. If a bank does any organizational change, a report is sent…
> Maybe we need a reporting system for maintainer changes of bigger projects. Some list where they get published and people can keep an eye on it. The rust project does it. There's a repo with all [active] members and their permissions on github, etc. These get synchronized and updated every time there's a change.
Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#199Would it be interesting if Github (and others) had a program where they would verify people using the same regulations the banking industry uses for KYC (know your customer)? Optional step for developers to show they are who they say they are?
Re: Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
#200Earlier quoted context omitted.
At least 2 rival legal Jurisdictions/Alliances/Spheres At least 2 rival state intelligence Agencies per Sphere At least 2 rival corporations per Sphere TOTAL: 2*(2+2) = 8 Widely used OSS projects are contested spheres of collaboration.
So the long game is rival countries are secretly collaborating, so we secretly have world peace!