Much like the consumer decision on the other side of that secrecy barrier, when it was decided the MULTICS was too complex, and you really didn't need all of that complexity (to allow mutli-level security), the easing of hardware requirements, and systems design time all seemed worth it.
Here we are 50 years later, and both decisions have proven to be disastrous. We've swiss-cheesed our infrastructure in a manner that can only be hinted at metaphorically. The closest analogies I know are:
Imagine the power grid and modern society, with absolutely zero circuit breakers or fuses.
Imagine running an economy without being able to divide wealth into uniform small amounts, dollars, cents, etc.
In both cases, everything becomes all or nothing. This is what we have with computers, all or nothing. You have to trust software you run, or you simply can't run it. It's the same with the "License Agreement", nobody actually reads them, and nobody tries to enforce them, yet there they are.It's possible to have secure computing, we had it in the 1980s, but we didn't realize it. It was crude, but effective, because we had systems with no persistent internal storage, and we could write protect the storage we had. Thus it was possible to manage data, and the side effects allowed, in a simple, powerful way by simply not putting data at risk, making copies, and using those instead.
Until we reverse the bad decisions of the 1970s, we're going to keep up the deranged behavior, blaming everything and everyone, and ignoring the one way out of this.
You shouldn't ever have to trust a program you execute to behave in the manner you expect. Your computer should enforce the limits you expect, and the program should have zero ways around those limits.
[1] https://csrc.nist.rip/publications/history/ande72.pdf
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security
[3] https://web.archive.org/web/20120919111301/http://www.albany...