Earlier quoted context omitted.
This sounds interesting, could you give more detail on what you're referring to?
I'm referring to his two works, the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" and "Philosophical Investigations". There's a lot explored here, but Wittgenstein basically makes the argument that the natural logic of language—how we deduce meaning from terms in a context and naturally disambiguate the semantics of ambiguous phrases—is different from the sort of formal propositional logic that forms the basis of western philosop…
I don't think Wittgenstein would agree, first of all, that there is a "natural logic" to language. At least in the PI, that kind of entity--"the natural logic of language"--is precisely the kind of weird and imprecise use of language he is trying to expose. Even more, to say that such a logic "allows" for anything (like metaphors) feels like a very very strange thing for Wittgenstein to assert. He would ask "what do you mean by 'allows'"?
All we know, according to him (in the PI), is that we find ourselves speaking in situations. Sometimes I say something, and my partner picks up the right brick, other times they do nothing, or hit me. In the PI, all the rest is doing away with things, like our idea of private language, the irreality of things like pain, etc. To conclude that he would make such assertions about the "nature" of language, of poetry, whatever, seems like maybe too quick a reading of the text. It is at best, a weirdly mystical reading of him, that he probably would not be too happy about (but don't worry about that, he was an asshole).
The argument you are making sounds much more French. Derrida or Lyotard have said similar things (in their earlier, more linguistic years). They might be better friend to you here.