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Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

security.googleblog.com

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Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#61
post #60
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think we're playing the same game here. This is a random info page at ICANN from 2019. It doesn't even have a byline. I had to go to archive.org to figure out when it showed up. Why would you think this would be persuasive?

I assumed that you would consider ICANN an authority, but apparently you only consider named people to be authoritative and being capable of having any argument of merit? Your mind is truly fascinating.

This is like saying that the DNSSEC working group endorses DNSSEC, Teddy. Like, yes, I agree that they do, but it's not interesting to point that out. It is in fact interesting that Geoff Huston is entertaining questions about the success of the protocol, because he's a major DNSSEC advocate and a globally recognized authority on core Internet infrastructure and, in particular, DNS measurement.

This is what I mean when I say we're not really talking to each other. I don't think you understand or care about the argument I'm making, and so you're not engaging with it. That's fine! But then: let's just stop engaging.

Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#63
post #61
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I assumed that you would consider ICANN an authority, but apparently you only consider named people to be authoritative and being capable of having any argument of merit? Your mind is truly fascinating.

This is like saying that the DNSSEC working group endorses DNSSEC, Teddy. Like, yes, I agree that they do, but it's not interesting to point that out. It is in fact interesting that Geoff Huston is entertaining questions about the success of the protocol, because he's a major DNSSEC advocate and a globally recognized authority on core Internet infrastructure and, in particular, DNS measurement. This is what I mean wh…

I’m not interested in whether ICANN or Geoff Huston is or is not endorsing DNSSEC. I’m interested in what arguments they make for and/or against DNSSEC. You, on the other hand, seem to be having some electoral college model, where you don’t consider facts and arguments at all, but only care how many people in authority are for or against it. This is why you namedrop all the time, and dismiss my (and others’) arguments as coming from “randos”.

Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#64

I see most of the bot traffic hiding behind Google and Cloudflare. I appreciate that. They take a lot of load off my servers. If I had one request of Google it would be to remove the TTL cap of 21600 or raise it to 86400 to further reduce the traffic that comes through from them as my TTL records are very high on purpose for my own reasons that I will not debate. I know memory is still a limit. CF seem to honor my TT…

> my TTL records are very high on purpose for my own reasons that I will not debate. Why are your records high? Is the load on your servers too intense otherwise? (not trying to debate, am curious because I've really appreciated your comments/insights in the past)

Waited for this to fall off the front page

For my personal hobby sites I change things so rarely that I can keep my TTL's very high, especially for NS records and most TXT records. There are some records I could theoretically set to 68 years though obviously nobody would keep a record that long. Going against the grain I also keep neg-ttl negative cache really high to help spot the bots that ignore neg-ttl. It's a hobby of mine to study bots and what they are enumerating. Sometimes it gives me a jump start on zero-day vulnerabilities. For example a number of bots suddenly start looking for a specific A record such as cpanel to use an old and silly example.

Non bot clients will respect TTL's within reason. Most ISP recursive DNS servers will cap the TTL to 24 hours for NS records and sometimes higher for A, CNAME, PTR, etc... Most corporate DNS servers will be close to the defaults of whatever recursive daemon they are using, usually Active Directory, sometimes Bind. The remaining limiting factor is memory but most recursive DNS servers these days have obscene amounts of RAM and CPU time that the DNS admin may allocate. There are ways to even further optimize recursive servers such as periodically flushing junk zones via cron and many other things that do not need to be there as well as tuning slabs and threads based on core count. This will vary by organization and requires getting detailed zone and client statistics. An example of a junk zone would be a zone used by a corporate spy to exfiltrate data over DNS that will result in hundreds of thousands of unique A records data-flow-outbound customer or intellectual property data or TXT records inbound that are actually encrypted data data-flow-inbound encrypted malware, instrucitons.

Bot scripts will bypass recursive DNS servers and will typically talk directly to authoritative servers. Most of these scripts do not even look at zone or resource record TTL times which is unfortunate for them as it makes spotting them trivial. I then dig deeper into the networks they are originating from, find their IPv4/IPv6 CIDR blocks, who they peer with, what business they claim to be. Sometimes they are squatters that are announcing routes from businesses that went under and had laid off the people that would have released the IP allocations. I help get those clawed back when I can, taking the IP allocations away from the squatters.

Side project idea for Google / Cloudflare / OpenDNS / etc... These companies have a unique view into DNS traffic and could also help spot the squatters. They could free up a significant amount of IP space if they allocated a small team of interns to analyze their traffic, use automation to build graphs and reports, then once confidence is high enough submit this data to all the IP registries. Registries are also much more likely to take communication from these companies far more seriously than some retired hobbyist.

This will probably come up but some may say having high TTL's is risky. It can be, but not for me. If all of the internet shared one massive /etc/hosts and DNS ceased to exist, it would rarely have updates from me and if a record is stale there would be no harm, no foul as it pertains to me. There are a myriad of other reasons I have unusually high zone/record TTL's but it would turn into a blog post and I have been too lazy as of late to make any as interest is usually very low. I don't even have my blog VM's spun up.

Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#65
post #59
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The needs and risk profiles of Google are vastly different than basically every other organization on Earth. (I also note that you didn’t answer my question, and instead opted for a rhetorical cheap shot reply to my second paragraph only.)

Never mind. It's OK. I don't think we're speaking the same language, so to say.

I think your posting style of making confident statements, but responding to counter-arguments with rhetorical cheap shots and condescending non-answers, is unsuitable for HN.

Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#66
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And? The IETF RFC draft for ADoT still specifies that it relies on DNSSEC. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dickson-dprive-adot-a...

Check out the DPRIVE working group (ekr's comments in particular) for some of the backstory. DNSSEC isn't happening either way, but I think ADOX might.

I think this is a bit of an apples and oranges moment.

While I agree transport confidentiality is important, that is not what DNSSEC solves, nor should you see people saying that it does solve confidentiality.

DNSSEC protects the transport integrity of DNS responses. DNSSEC enabled zones 100% defeat on-path cache poisoning attacks to recursive resolvers that are DNSSEC enabled. Full stop.

ADo"X" protects the transport confidentiality of DNS responses. I suppose this "weakly" protects the transport integrity of DNS responses, but, again, the primary purpose is confidentiality.

After reading RFC 9539, it's clearly stated that it's opportunistic encryption. An on-path attacker will find it trivial to disable encryption and start poisoning caches. The RFC states in multiple places that if TLS setup fails, fall back to plaintext DNS.

If DNSSEC fails, an on-path attacker has no similar recourse. A properly configured recursive resolver will SERVFAIL and _never_ send back a potentially poisoned response to clients for DNSSEC signed zones.

Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#67
post #53
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Many years ago, when HTTPS adoption was in the 5% range, if someone would have said “HTTPS is the ultimate defense against web page spoofing”, would you have argued that it was false, just because the adoption was so low? DNSSEC is the ultimate defense against cache poisoning attacks, no matter the adoption percentage.

You should go tell Google that.

Google is aware and has enabled DNSSEC on their recursive resolvers for a long time.

Unfortunately, most people do not DNSSEC sign their zones, so Google have to resort to also enabling 0x20, which is helpful, but also (to an extent) security theater.

Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#68
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You should go tell Google that.

Google is aware and has enabled DNSSEC on their recursive resolvers for a long time. Unfortunately, most people do not DNSSEC sign their zones, so Google have to resort to also enabling 0x20, which is helpful, but also (to an extent) security theater.

"People" in this case includes Google, which does not sign its zones.

Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#69
post #63
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is like saying that the DNSSEC working group endorses DNSSEC, Teddy. Like, yes, I agree that they do, but it's not interesting to point that out. It is in fact interesting that Geoff Huston is entertaining questions about the success of the protocol, because he's a major DNSSEC advocate and a globally recognized authority on core Internet infrastructure and, in particular, DNS measurement. This is what I mean wh…

I’m not interested in whether ICANN or Geoff Huston is or is not endorsing DNSSEC. I’m interested in what arguments they make for and/or against DNSSEC. You, on the other hand, seem to be having some electoral college model, where you don’t consider facts and arguments at all , but only care how many people in authority are for or against it. This is why you namedrop all the time, and dismiss my (and others’) argumen…

No. I've spent 16 years on this site discussing DNSSEC in detail on this site, as the search bar will aptly show.

Re: Google Public DNS's approach to fight against cache poisoning attacks

#70
post #69
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I’m not interested in whether ICANN or Geoff Huston is or is not endorsing DNSSEC. I’m interested in what arguments they make for and/or against DNSSEC. You, on the other hand, seem to be having some electoral college model, where you don’t consider facts and arguments at all , but only care how many people in authority are for or against it. This is why you namedrop all the time, and dismiss my (and others’) argumen…

No. I've spent 16 years on this site discussing DNSSEC in detail on this site, as the search bar will aptly show.

If you’ve ceased to be willing to discuss and argue for your opinions, your presence here is now unproductive.
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