Earlier quoted context omitted.
Maybe they weren't all sockpuppets. Here Jigar Kumar was nitpicking Jia Tan's changes: https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00556.h... That was not necessary to gain trust. Writing style is different, too. Later when Jia gained commit access he reminds him to merge it.
that's precisely what sock puppetry does ... talk/write in a different writing style to make others believe it's different people.
Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
381–390 of 500 posts
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#382Earlier quoted context omitted.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tailored_Access_Operations
Be sure to check out the mentioned catalog. [1] The NSA's capabilities back in 2008 were pretty astonishing: "RAGEMASTER" A $30 device that taps a VGA cable and transmits the contents of your screen to the NSA van sitting outside! Crazy stuff. Makes you wonder what they've built in the last 15 years. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANT_catalog
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#383This whole thing has been consuming me over the whole weekend. The mechanisms are interesting and a collection of great obfuscations, the social engineering is a story that’s shamefully all too familiar for open source maintainers. I find most interesting how they chose their attack vector of using BAD test data, it makes the rest of the steps incredibly easier when you have a good archive, manipulate it in a structu…
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#384Earlier quoted context omitted.
I agree that this is probably about persistence. Initially I thought the developer was playing the long-con to dump some crypto exchange and make off with literally a billion dollars or more. But if that was the case they wouldn't bother with the key. It'd be a one-and-done situation. It would be a stop-the-world event. Now it looks more like nation-state spycraft.
It's worth also noting that the spycraft involved a coordinated harassment campaign of the original maintainer, with multiple writing styles, to accelerate a transition of maintainership to the attacker: https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00566.h... https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00568.h... https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00569.h... While this doesn't prove…
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#385This whole thing has been consuming me over the whole weekend. The mechanisms are interesting and a collection of great obfuscations, the social engineering is a story that’s shamefully all too familiar for open source maintainers. I find most interesting how they chose their attack vector of using BAD test data, it makes the rest of the steps incredibly easier when you have a good archive, manipulate it in a structu…
A main culprit seems to be the addition of binary files to the repo, to be used as test inputs. Especially if these files are “binary garbage” to prove a test fails. Seems like an obvious place to hide malicious stuff.
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#386Earlier quoted context omitted.
Probing for vulnerable deployments over the network (without the attacker's private key) seems impossible, not non-trivial. The best one could do is more micro-benchmarking, but for an arbitrary Internet host you aren't going to know whether it's slow because it's vulnerable, or because it's far away, or because the computer's slow in general -- you don't have access to how long connection attempts to that host took…
Should be able to do it by having the scanner take multiple samples. As long as you don’t need a valid login and the performance issue is still observable, you should be about to scan for it with minimal cost
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#387Earlier quoted context omitted.
I doubt that if Google detected it with some internal tool, they'd reach out to Microsoft to hide their contribution. It was reported by an MS engineer who happens to be involved in another OSS project. MS is doing business with the US intelligence community, for example there is the Skype story: First, rumors that NSA offers a lot of money for people who can break Skype's E2E encryption, then MS buys Skype, then MS…
> an MS engineer no this engineer is world-known for being core PostgreSQL, a team with high standards.. unlike that company you mention
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#388Comment I saw on Ars: >Interestingly enough, "Jia Tan" is very close to 加蛋 in Mandarin, meaning "to add an egg". Unlikely to be a real name or a coincidence.
Jia Tan could mean literally anything as pinyin since it doesn't have diacritics for tone. 嘉坛 (Jiā tán) could be a totally plausible name, and so could 佳檀 (also Jiā tán). Chinese names can largely use any character that doesn't come with a really bad meaning
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#389Comment I saw on Ars: >Interestingly enough, "Jia Tan" is very close to 加蛋 in Mandarin, meaning "to add an egg". Unlikely to be a real name or a coincidence.
Re: Xzbot: Notes, honeypot, and exploit demo for the xz backdoor
#390Earlier quoted context omitted.
Jia Tan could mean literally anything as pinyin since it doesn't have diacritics for tone. 嘉坛 (Jiā tán) could be a totally plausible name, and so could 佳檀 (also Jiā tán). Chinese names can largely use any character that doesn't come with a really bad meaning
Yeah a quick Google brings up lots of real Jia Tans who clearly aren't behind this and hopefully aren't being wrongly accused here. But it is clearly a real and common name.