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XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

bsky.app

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Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#391
post #218

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Another analysis locates Jia in Eastern Europe: https://rheaeve.substack.com/p/xz-backdoor-times-damned-time... But I would like to see analysis of timestamp of GitHub events (like PRs and comments timestamps) which are harder to fake.

It's a nice analysis but he misses the fact that the Eastern Europe timezone doesn't match office hours, in particular it'd mean he worked around evenings primarily (see this graph https://files.catbox.moe/4itspl.png ) I had noticed UTC+0300 commits in the repository under his name but I believed they might have been simply committed by the main Finnish maintainer who is in the UTC+0300 timezone. > But I would like t…

You can find the GitHub events here, I compiled them into CSVs.

https://github.com/emirkmo/xz-backdoor-github

I literally run a git hook that fixes my commit times so I don’t look like a freak to my coworkers making commits at 3am, I think an actor of this caliber would too, so I would bet the git commit times are highly choreographed.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#392

As a de facto maintainer of an obscure open source game, I see devs come and go. I just merge all the worthwhile contributions. Some collaborators go pretty deep with their features, with a variety of coding styles, in a mishmash of C and C++. I'm not always across the implementation details, but in the back of my mind I'm thinking, man, anyone could just code up some real nasty backdoor and the project would be scre…

> but in the back of my mind I'm thinking, man, anyone could just code up some real nasty backdoor and the project would be screwed

That's true of course, but it's not a problem specific to software. In fact, I'm not even sure it's a "problem" in a meaningful sense at all.

When you're taking a walk on a forest road, any car that comes your way could just run you over. Chances are the driver would never get caught. There is nothing you can do to protect yourself against it. Police aren't around to help you. This horror scenario, much worse than a software backdoor, is actually the minimum viable danger that you need to accept in order to be able to do anything at all. And yes, sometimes it does really happen.

But at the end of the day, the vast majority of people just don't seek to actively harm others. Everything humans do relies on that assumption, and always has. The fantasy that if code review was just a little tighter, if more linters, CI mechanisms, and pattern matching were employed, if code signing was more widespread, if we verified people's identities etc., if all these things were implemented, then such scenarios could be prevented, that fantasy is the real problem. It's symptomatic of the insane Silicon Valley vision that the world can and should be managed and controlled at every level of detail. Which is a "cure" that would be much worse than any disease it could possibly prevent.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#393
What I’d like to understand is it’s proven intentional?

My understanding is it was a few added characters in a header file. I can’t tell you the number of times I was tired and clicked an extra key before committing, or my cat walked across the keyboard while I was out of the room.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#394
post #123

Can someone explain succinctly what the backdoor does ? Do we even know yet? The backdoor itself is not a payload, right? Does it need a malicious archive to exploit it? Or does it hook into the sshd process to listen for malicious packets from a remote attacker? The OP makes it sound like an attacker can send a malicious payload in the pre-auth phase of an SSH session - but why does he say that an exploit might neve…

You can imagine a door that opens if you knock on it just right. For anyone without the secret knock, it appears and functions as a wall. Without the secret knock, there might not even be a way to prove it opens at all. This is sort of the situation here. xz tries to decode some data before it does anything shady; since it is asymmetric; it can do the decryption without providing the secret encryption key (it has the…

I understand that we may never see the secret knock but shouldn't we have the door and what's behind it now? Doesn't this mean that the code is quite literally too hard to figure out for a human being? It's not like he can send a full new executable binary that he simply executes, then we'd see that the door is e.g the exec() call. Honestly this attempt makes me think that the entire c/c++ language stack and ecosystem is the problem. All these software shenanigans should not be needed in a piece of software like openssh but it's possible because it's written in c/c++.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#395

One have question on this is, if the backdoor would not been discovered due to performance issue (which was as I understood it purely an oversight/fixable deficiency in the code), what are the chances of discovering this backdoor later, or are there tools that would have picked it up? Those questions are IMO relevant to understand if this kind of backdoor is the first one of the kind, or the first one that was uncove…

If the exploit wasn't baing used, the odds would would be pretty low. They picked the right place to bury it (i.e., effectively outside the codebase, where no auditor ever looks). That said, if you're not using it, it defeats the purpose. And the more you're using it, the higher the likelihood you will be detected down the line. Compare to Solarwinds.

> That said, if you're not using it, it defeats the purpose.

Not if this was injected by a state actor. My experience with other examples of state actor interference in critical infrastructure, is that the exploit is not used. It’s there as a capability to be leveraged only in the context of military action.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#396
post #252
post #229

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or very untargeted. Something intended just to lay dormant by chance if succeeded... It is very good backdoor to have if you at whatever time have dozens of options. See sshd running, test this you are done if it works, if not move to something else.

Or targeted not really at doing anything but at researching the nature of supply chain vulnerabilities themselves.

This doesn't look like a research.

This looks like state sponsored attack. Imagine having a backdoor that you can just go to any Linux server and with your key you can make it execute any code you wish without any audit trail. And no one without the key can do it, so even if your citizens use such vulnerable system other states won't be able to use your backdoor.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#397
post #218

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I did my own research. If you look at the git repository commit log and some mailing list messages, you will see that the author ("Jia Tan", fake name) speaks impeccable English (already lessens the chance of being a Chinese operative), however he commits in the +0800 time zone (Beijing). He works during Chinese holidays and doesn't work during Western holidays. However, the times don't make sense: It looks like he w…

Another analysis locates Jia in Eastern Europe: https://rheaeve.substack.com/p/xz-backdoor-times-damned-time... But I would like to see analysis of timestamp of GitHub events (like PRs and comments timestamps) which are harder to fake.

FYI, the Australian comment is wrong, WA (which uses UTC+8) does not DST (there's a party to add it, and multiple referenda which failed to add it), given ASIS is in Canberra (as far as we know ;)), it probably wasn't them.

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#398
post #392

As a de facto maintainer of an obscure open source game, I see devs come and go. I just merge all the worthwhile contributions. Some collaborators go pretty deep with their features, with a variety of coding styles, in a mishmash of C and C++. I'm not always across the implementation details, but in the back of my mind I'm thinking, man, anyone could just code up some real nasty backdoor and the project would be scre…

> but in the back of my mind I'm thinking, man, anyone could just code up some real nasty backdoor and the project would be screwed That's true of course, but it's not a problem specific to software. In fact, I'm not even sure it's a "problem" in a meaningful sense at all. When you're taking a walk on a forest road, any car that comes your way could just run you over. Chances are the driver would never get caught. Th…

> But at the end of the day, the vast majority of people just don't seek to actively harm others. Everything humans do relies on that assumption, and always has.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normalcy_bias ?

> It's symptomatic of the insane Silicon Valley vision that the world can and should be managed and controlled at every level of detail. Which is a "cure" that would be much worse than any disease it could possibly prevent.

What "cure" would you recommend?

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#399
post #99

One have question on this is, if the backdoor would not been discovered due to performance issue (which was as I understood it purely an oversight/fixable deficiency in the code), what are the chances of discovering this backdoor later, or are there tools that would have picked it up? Those questions are IMO relevant to understand if this kind of backdoor is the first one of the kind, or the first one that was uncove…

I expect a lot of people will be doing a whole lot of thinking along these lines over the next months. Code review? Some kind of behavioral analysis? IMO the call to system() was kind of sloppy, and a binary capabilities scanner could have potentially identified a path to that.

I’ve been building Packj [1] to detect malicious PyPI/NPM/Ruby/PHP/etc. dependencies using behavioral analysis. It uses static+dynamic code analysis to scan for indicators of compromise (e.g., spawning of shell, use of SSH keys, network communication, use of decode+eval, etc). It also checks for several metadata attributes to detect bad actors (e.g., typo squatting).

1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj

Re: XZ backdoor: "It's RCE, not auth bypass, and gated/unreplayable."

#400

Earlier quoted context omitted.

CFAA covers distribution of malicious software without the owners consent, the Wire Fraud Act covers malware distribution schemes intended to defraud for property, Computer Misuse act in the UK is broad and far reaching like the CFAA, so this likely fall afoul of that. The GDPR protects personal data, so there's possibly a case that could be made that this violates that as well, though that might be a bit of reach.

In which case the defense will claim, correctly, that this malware was never distributed. It was caught. "Attempted malware distribution" may not actually be a crime (but IANAL so I don't know).

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