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What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

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11–20 of 61 posts

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#11
post #10

> Because there is one aspect of Turing’s model that makes it more useful: Universal Turing Machines (UTM’s). > Universal Turing Machines The idea of UTM’s is that you can have Turing Machines running other Turing Machines. Just like you can have lambda terms running other lambda terms [1] [2]. In fact an additvely optimal [3] universal lambda term can be as simple as ┬─┬ ─────────────────────────────────────────────…

Yes, but as I said to another commenter, Turing's model helped people think differently.

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#12

I don't believe only turing machines are capable of executing other turing machines... Surely lambda calculus can do the same? I was under the impression, lambda calculus can indeed execute itself with even less code than turing machines There's several very dubious claims that are stated way too confidently like this in the article, like "Yep, virus scanners are almost completely useless"

They are equivalent per the Church-Turing thesis; how many instructions it takes doesn't factor in at all.

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#13
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Its not. Mostly it is an argument that turing-completeness is too mathematical to be practical. > I still had the mainstream belief that AI would be just as capable as humans.

I'm not sure what is more mainstream - belief that AIs are as capable as humans, or belief that they are not. Roger Penrose is one of the more authoritative, for lack of other arguments, voices for humans being more capable than AIs. Still not sure if it implies an existence of God, a class of ability higher than Turing machine or something else.

All it implies is that brains are immensely complicated and have kajillions of connections, which don't work the same as anything branded AI. Consciousness can be an emergent property AND AI capability can be largely oversold at the same time.

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#14
post #10

> Because there is one aspect of Turing’s model that makes it more useful: Universal Turing Machines (UTM’s). > Universal Turing Machines The idea of UTM’s is that you can have Turing Machines running other Turing Machines. Just like you can have lambda terms running other lambda terms [1] [2]. In fact an additvely optimal [3] universal lambda term can be as simple as ┬─┬ ─────────────────────────────────────────────…

Yes, but as I said to another commenter, Turing's model helped people think differently.

Yes, Turing machines have advantages. But having universal machines is not one of them.

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#15
To quickly summarize: A Turing machine program or method can't solve the Entscheidungsproblem, which means you can't have a general algorithm to prove all possible statements true or or false (or equivalent) within a formal system.

For example you can't have a general program that you feed in any 2 mathematical statements and tells you if they're equal. From what I understand this is proven for "regular math" but not all formal systems.

As a counterpoint, there are many algorithms these days that can do theorem proving better than anything before in history (partly thanks to AI, and partly thanks to the massive efforts that went into symbolic computation engines over the past decades). I think in a few years theorem proving will be done elegantly by computers instead of humans. Not all theorems, sure, but this is the world we got to live in.

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#16
(noob rant warning) What bugs me about the decidability thing, is Turing proved 2-undecidability in the action space {halt, loop}, but I still feel like we miss an opportunity to try 3-decidability {halt, loop, paradox} and throw out the functions upon which his proof hinged, namely, the ones that invoke the is_halting function and do the opposite.

Also, the whole, "we make this other program that does the opposite" argument implies the test of `is_halting` is actually a test of some other function "do_opposite" that wraps "is_halting" and does the opposite. That's not exactly fair, that's a test of the opposite function, not the "is_halting" function. Furthermore, the inner "do_opposite" evaluated by is_halting, is a different invocation of the do_opposite source. (I.E. Fregeian Sense and Reference, a different referent for the same sense).

Just because somebody outside the is_halting function can do something counterproductive, doesn't necessarily mean the specific invocation of do_opposite within the closure of is_halting is impossible to classify. Furthermore, is_halting could theoretically refuse to play ball and crash the program at runtime, or induce a compile error before the game can even begin, if we try to create a paradox. Has anyone actually even witnessed a real paradox in real life? Maybe the universe is deeply anti-paradox and the whole argument is a bunch of humbug.

Can someone please tell me how I'm fooling myself? Cuz I'm neck deep in coding this thing and building all the helper functions and it would save a bunch of time to know why it's wrong. Every proof seems to boil down to "muh contradiction" which feels like, ok, so what? If the caller wants to do_opposite, that's their problem, not on is_opposite. A function which can decide halting for all the non_opposite functions (which is, every one that matters in practice, right?)

Plus, who knows what an anti-paradox machine can accomplish? Maybe there's one weird trick quantum scientists or thermodynamic reversible computer engineers hate, and you can solve hard problems by finding the ones which both halt and don't.

Just feels weird how we all accept this quasi-religious belief that we shouldn't even try to decide if programs halt simply because you can't categorize every single program into 2 buckets. What about 3 buckets i.e. 3-decidability of the ternary halting problem?

sorry for long comment, fuck it, ill post code, it sucks and doesn't run, just tinkering, but https://github.com/bionicles/halts published for your pleasure. No promise it will ever actually work.

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#17

I don't believe only turing machines are capable of executing other turing machines... Surely lambda calculus can do the same? I was under the impression, lambda calculus can indeed execute itself with even less code than turing machines There's several very dubious claims that are stated way too confidently like this in the article, like "Yep, virus scanners are almost completely useless"

Author here. Yes, the lambda calculus can. They are equivalent. But Turing's machines gave us the model to think that way. In my opinion.

What does it for me is that turing machines can be thought of as physical. In a way it is more tangible than an electronic computer.

Btw: I think your site would look better with left justified text. Right justified looks best only for long paragraphs (books).

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#18
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Its not. Mostly it is an argument that turing-completeness is too mathematical to be practical. > I still had the mainstream belief that AI would be just as capable as humans.

I'm not sure what is more mainstream - belief that AIs are as capable as humans, or belief that they are not. Roger Penrose is one of the more authoritative, for lack of other arguments, voices for humans being more capable than AIs. Still not sure if it implies an existence of God, a class of ability higher than Turing machine or something else.

> class of ability higher than Turing machine

Yes it does, it would mean that your brain can somehow exploit quantum gravity to turn itself into an oracle machine. How a wet blob significantly hotter than room temperature (in the superconductor definition) is supposed to do that I don't know.

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Author here. Yes, the lambda calculus can. They are equivalent. But Turing's machines gave us the model to think that way. In my opinion.

What does it for me is that turing machines can be thought of as physical. In a way it is more tangible than an electronic computer. Btw: I think your site would look better with left justified text. Right justified looks best only for long paragraphs (books).

Yeah, I was told about left justification last week. Haven't gotten to it since I am in the middle of release crunch.

Re: What Computers Cannot Do: The Consequences of Turing-Completeness

#20
post #18
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure what is more mainstream - belief that AIs are as capable as humans, or belief that they are not. Roger Penrose is one of the more authoritative, for lack of other arguments, voices for humans being more capable than AIs. Still not sure if it implies an existence of God, a class of ability higher than Turing machine or something else.

> class of ability higher than Turing machine Yes it does, it would mean that your brain can somehow exploit quantum gravity to turn itself into an oracle machine. How a wet blob significantly hotter than room temperature (in the superconductor definition) is supposed to do that I don't know.

that's a good question, but the electron transport chain and photosynthesis are both postulated/(known?) to exploit quantum effects at room temperature.
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