51–60 of 61 posts
This has more detail than I would have expected, but I see there’s virtually nothing about the reentry bus. From what I’ve read, that’s where most of the secret sauce involving accuracy comes into play.
My favorite fact is that the hard drive also acted as the clock. Each rotation grabbed the program codes from the disk to execute them.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
On the guidance side, "Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance" is awesome.
As implied in the title, this book focuses on sociology and philosophy of science and has very little technical content.
Related: Command and Control by Eric Schlosser Great book.
The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner by Daniel Ellsberg
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Would love to see any/all other albums/photos that you are willing to share.
I’m working on it. Many projects but documenting this collection is bubbling up to the top.
https://www.icloud.com/sharedalbum/#B0Y59UlCqNHCjx
https://www.computerhistory.org/revolution/memory-storage/8/...
This computer earned listing for this innovation.
https://www.computerhistory.org/revolution/memory-storage/8/...
Which puts into context.
I also included the story of it's previous life.
My thinking is we are focused on making circuits too small. We need big circuits that make big but simple decisions. I was collecting pre-microprocessor computing artifacts for a while. I now need to get sit down and figure out what I have.
In the meantime I use them as reference idea to feed my development of a 100 year computer.
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It would almost be as dangerous as us building a system that we think could take out all of their nukes.
Why do you say this? We have been in this very position before, in 1948, when we were the only people with nukes. We didn't first strike then.
The other difference is that literally everything has changed in the past 76 years. But sure, maybe if we dig up Truman, Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao, and Churchill, and put them and their cabinets back in charge, it might work out.
This has more detail than I would have expected, but I see there’s virtually nothing about the reentry bus. From what I’ve read, that’s where most of the secret sauce involving accuracy comes into play.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
On the guidance side, "Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance" is awesome.
As implied in the title, this book focuses on sociology and philosophy of science and has very little technical content.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
>The MGS is an inertial guidance system which directs the flight of the missile. The guidance system operates continuously while the missile is in alert status, thus enabling the missile to be launched in less than one minute. I wonder how often the missile is in alert status? Presumably regular testing? For those just skimming the guidance system info (for Minuteman III) starts on page 49. Looks like they miniaturiz…
> I wonder how often the missile is in alert status? In 1972-74 when I was a Minuteman I launch officer (DMCCC) our 10 missiles were /always/ on alert. You would expect to see 10 green "Strategic Alert" lights across the crew commander's (MCCC's) console unless something was wrong (requiring maintenance or a brief calibration). IIRC we were in a perpetual state of DEFCON 4 in those days.
It's bizarre that this type of information is made publicly available due to freedom of information legislation. What is the benefit? Or is it merely an acceptable side effect of the greater good that FoIA delivers? Not that my curiosity isn't triggered, but...
It's lacking in information of real military value, e.g. accuracy, failure rate, effectiveness of countermeasures, precise alloys used, etc. It's basically a description of a rocket, which probably isn't a surprise to other nations who are themselves building rockets.