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iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

security.apple.com

271–280 of 280 posts

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#271

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We're talking about the same company who wanted to scan all your files you uploaded, right?

Uploaded? You forgot what it was about. It was on-device scanning that was the problem.

The plan was to scan (on device) files that were going to be uploaded to iCloud.

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#272
post #83
post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> No communication service stops people from backing up with encryption or not, local or remote, or from copy/pasting or for that matter taking photos of the screen ("analog hole"). At least for the first part on backing up without copy pasting or using the “analog hole”, Signal expressly prohibits and doesn’t allow any kind of backup — encrypted or not — on iOS/iPadOS/macOS.

> Signal expressly prohibits and doesn’t allow any kind of backup — encrypted or not — on iOS/iPadOS/macOS. I do not think you are correct, or perhaps alternatively this is a distinction without meaning. iDevices do indeed lock down against owner control unless the device is jailbroken. But Signal for Mac only requires 10.15 or later. Even if they wanted to, old Intel Macs simply do not offer the hardware guarantees…

GP here, with a late reply. Signal allows chats to be backed up and restored on Android. It does not support (and has said it won’t provide the feature) on iOS and related platforms that I mentioned. You can go through Signal’s help pages to confirm this yourself. If you use Signal on an Apple device and that device is either lost or broken, you’ll lose all your Signal messages when you setup a device again. That’s not necessarily the case with Android. Whatever you’ve written isn’t useful in this context.

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#273
post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> No communication service stops people from backing up with encryption or not, local or remote, or from copy/pasting or for that matter taking photos of the screen ("analog hole"). At least for the first part on backing up without copy pasting or using the “analog hole”, Signal expressly prohibits and doesn’t allow any kind of backup — encrypted or not — on iOS/iPadOS/macOS.

Signal perhaps does not allow you to export your message history through the front door, however decrypting and exporting your message history is relatively low effort. You messages are stored in encrypted SQLite3 database. The Signal encryption key is in ~/Library/Application\ Support/Signal/config.json in plain text. If you have SQLCipher ( https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher ) compiled you can decrypt your Sign…

GP here. Signal allows chats to be backed up on Android. It’s a built in feature.

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#274
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>The only solution to that right now is for you and your contact to turn on Advanced Data Protection or don't use icloud backup. Also, confusingly "messages in icloud" is end to end encrypted, and enabling it disables messages for being included in icloud backup.

> "messages in icloud" is end to end encrypted, and enabling it disables messages for being included in icloud backup. This is misleading at best. Careful reading of Apple's disclosures reveals that the "messages in iCloud" encryption keys are still included in iCloud backups, giving Apple the capability to decrypt your messages on demand for law enforcement or for any other reason of their choosing. The messages may…

[deleted]

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#275
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I thought the fix was trivial - all I need to do is go to settings > my face >> icloud >>> show all >>>> messages and make sure the toggle is off? doesn't that stop iCloud syncing, at least on my end? I understand I can't control what happens on the other end of the conversation but that is all I need to do on my end, right?

Correct. I was referring to the OP asking if Apple would ever fix E2EE not protecting, by default, Photos and Messages and so forth.

E2EE refers to transporting protocols and not data at rest, so the phrasing here is wrong.

If you choose to have some of your data in iCloud, it is transported and stored encrypted. However, one of the keys is escrowed in a HSM cluster for an audited recovery process.

This is how you go request access be restored via technical support with Apple. This is also how surviving family members can get access to photos and the like (requiring a court order, at least in the US). Since they have the key, government entities can request access within the extent of their respective local laws.

If you turn on the Advanced Data Protection feature, Apple no longer has that key escrowed, cannot help with account recovery, and can no longer give out a key they don't have.

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#276
post #259

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your argument about iMessage on Mac’s holds water, but the iPhone is sold as an appliance and there is no concept of a file system presented to the user. They sell the messaging platform as “encrypted” and the word “encrypted” is plastered all over iCloud marketing and documentation. You really can’t blame the user for assuming the appliance is secure by default. When you first set up an iPhone it just asks you if yo…

in what way is iCloud backup 'insecure' or 'unencrypted'?

Aha, you are proving my point about how misleading Apple’s communications are about this!

By default, iCloud backups are “secured” by a key that Apple stores and controls. This means that both Apple and anyone who can compel or hack Apple can still access your data.

Here’s the official documentation: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#277
post #238

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. This will be rolled out to everyone in iOS 17.4, iPadOS 17.4, macOS 14.4, and watchOS 10.4, and is already in the corresponding developer preview and beta releases[1]. [1] https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/

China included?

Asking the real questions here. iMessage is currently not banned in china, beit because of non adoption by the general population, or because the CCP has a way to identify like they had (have?) with airdrop is yet unknown.

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#278

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For me, Signal is so much better for my friend or work group chats. My friends are on a mix of devices and platforms, and Signal is a lot nicer for embedded media sharing. And the auto disappearing feature is a must!

The main things holding back Signal usage in my case is practically nobody in my social circle using it and the desktop client not being as nice as that of Messages or Telegram, the latter being particularly relevant for myself and contacts who primarily message with their computers rather than their phones.

> "practically nobody in my social circle using it"

What i did is, the people i chat with 90% of the time are those in a very small circle around me - maybe 3 people (which i think is the case for most users?)

So, i just installed Signal on the phones of these 3 people;

Problem solved: now most of my messaging happens via an app that respects my privacy.

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#279
post #189

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The main things holding back Signal usage in my case is practically nobody in my social circle using it and the desktop client not being as nice as that of Messages or Telegram, the latter being particularly relevant for myself and contacts who primarily message with their computers rather than their phones.

Signal UX is AWFUL if you have a work PC, a home PC, a phone, and a tablet. Getting messages to flow across all of them is impossible.

Why is it impossible?

I've had 0 issues syncing between my iPhone/iPad/Mac... and i use the app daily.

Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol

#280

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I worked on several integration attempts between Apple and Google. They often presented specs that clearly showed security holes then simply would deny they were there or say “that’s secure”. It was a truly wild experience.

This sounds fascinating, you really should write about this.

I'm following up here just because of your comment. I've thought about this often but I've run into a few problems:

1) This tier of work is roundly invisible to almost everyone in the field. Many in the field are so confident in their knowledge of 'how things work.' that they simply can't accept the real 'in the room' realities of whats going on. Often engineers most of all, who are often deceived by their executives on the real goals. Are you and eng? Have you ever had that feeling of being gaslit by your VP? Yea you probably were, and you didn't know why.

2) Even at that level, I had a limited picture and a good extrapolation of what was going on in other rooms, but nothing I can say fully factually

3) No one wants to know. People love the just-so stories of these companies and really genuinely seem to get hurt/be in denial when they are faced with the reality that they are made up of ultra-selfish, shark like people with very little invested in the consumer, the company, or really anyone else. It's a game played to win for personal satisfaction. I've found that most people, simply cannot accept this.

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