Pretty great advertisement for Signal, as the sole cross-platform option in the PQC bucket. Does it seem likely they will match Apple here eventually?
iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
11–20 of 280 posts
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#12[flagged]
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#13Advanced encryption, until it comes time to text 70% of the phones in the world, in which case it defaults to a protocol released 32 years ago.
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#14[flagged]
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#15This is pretty fascinating. For easier reading, the Signal blog post [0] they link to is great.
Both Signal and Apple went with CRYSTALS-Kyber [1] as their post-quantum algorithm. If you're interested in the math, and maybe learned at some point about how classic public key cryptography is built on the idea that it's easy to multiply two primes, but hard to factor them, and how this (or other math problems) can be used as a one-way function to make encryption hard to break, the hard math problem that backs Kyber is the "learning-with-errors" [2] problem.
[0] https://signal.org/blog/pqxdh/
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#16Earlier quoted context omitted.
I thought the fix was trivial - all I need to do is go to settings > my face >> icloud >>> show all >>>> messages and make sure the toggle is off? doesn't that stop iCloud syncing, at least on my end? I understand I can't control what happens on the other end of the conversation but that is all I need to do on my end, right?
You either have to enable E2EE or disable both Messages in iCloud and device backups. Otherwise the device backups contain a copy of your messages.
The "Messages in iCloud" sync is end to end, so you can enable it and disable iCloud backup, or manually backup on your computer: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#17Does anyone know if this is still vulnerable to the iCloud Backups problem? The only solution to that right now is for you and your contact to turn on Advanced Data Protection. Curious if that’s still required.
>The only solution to that right now is for you and your contact to turn on Advanced Data Protection
or don't use icloud backup. Also, confusingly "messages in icloud" is end to end encrypted, and enabling it disables messages for being included in icloud backup.
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#18Advanced encryption, until it comes time to text 70% of the phones in the world, in which case it defaults to a protocol released 32 years ago.
Yes but that would have meant giving up sales in exchange for actually backing up their words.
They aren’t even going to use the developed encrypted RCS protocol.
Apple, when it comes to their values, is all lip service.
I have intimate experience here with them both openly lying and purposefully deceiving their user base in this case.
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#19Advanced encryption, until it comes time to text 70% of the phones in the world, in which case it defaults to a protocol released 32 years ago.
Yes but that would have meant giving up sales in exchange for actually backing up their words. They aren’t even going to use the developed encrypted RCS protocol. Apple, when it comes to their values, is all lip service. I have intimate experience here with them both openly lying and purposefully deceiving their user base in this case.
What word? They never said they'd open iMessage. FaceTime is what they intended (or at least Jobs announced the intent) to open, and then that got caught up in a patent dispute.
Re: iMessage with PQ3 Cryptographic Protocol
#20Does anyone know if this is still vulnerable to the iCloud Backups problem? The only solution to that right now is for you and your contact to turn on Advanced Data Protection. Curious if that’s still required.
>Does anyone know if this is still vulnerable to the iCloud Backups problem? The only solution to that right now is for you and your contact to turn on Advanced Data Protection.
This is such a strange two sentences as a "problem". E2EE security, as it says in the name, is about the protection of dara transmission between two trusted end points. That's it. What the trusted end points themselves choose to do with that data before and after is completely out of scope, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the data transmission aspect. This is true of everything ever. No communication service stops people from backing up with encryption or not, local or remote, or from copy/pasting or for that matter taking photos of the screen ("analog hole"). If you want to "protect" the data from the trusted owners themselves now we're in the realm of DRM.
In this case what you wrote is "do non-e2ee remote backups still occur if users do not enable e2ee remote backups or backup locally?" to which the answer is yes. I definitely do blame Apple for not having APIs for backing up to arbitrary network servers when it comes to iDevices, but it's still orthogonal. And remember iMessage is on the Mac as well where people may be backing up anywhere.