Earlier quoted context omitted.
We know a number of customers/users have the code in production, experimental or not. And that was part of decision process. The security advisories we published do state the feature is experimental. When in doubt, err on the side of doing the right thing for the users. I find that's the best approach. I don't consider CVE a bad thing - it shouldn't be treated like a scarlet letter to be avoided. It is a unique ident…
FWIW, in my project the main reason we don't issue security advisories for "unsupported" code ("experimenal" or "tech preview") is to reduce the burden for our downstreams: many of our immediate downstreams are expected by their users to apply every single security patch , regardless of whether they even use the affected functionality. For cloud providers doing this across a massive fleet, this is a fair amount of wo…
The stack included Linux, Java, Chromium, and MySQL. It took multiple person-years of playing whack-a-mole with dependencies to get it into production because we'd have to have conversations like:
Client: there's a CVE in the this module
Us: that's not exploitable because it's behind a configuration option that we haven't enabled
Client: somebody could turn it on
Us: even if they somehow did and nobody noticed, they would have to stand up a server inside your VPC and connect to that
Client: well what if they did that?
Us: then they'd already have root and you are hosed
Client: but the CVE
Us:
So I definitely appreciate any vendor that tries to minimize CVEs.