All this depends on how many assumptions are in operation about what the state is doing to these networks, and the machines on them. In the end, it can turn all btc traffic off -- and there's no btc at all. Or it could take over the miners within its borders, which are heavily centralised, and run a different protocol.
If you own the machines and own the network you can do anything you want. Anything at all.
As far as assuming that the state hasnt taken control of the miners (unlikely, this is the easiest thing to do), by dropping communication, delaying it, observing it, etc. much can be done following the protocol, including replaying transactions etc. -- the future can be forged.
There are so many assumptions about the realworld, that do not hold up, behind cryto protocols, they're laughable. Assuming that the system will follow the protocol is itself disconnected from reality, quite literally.
The initial paper's realworld assumptions was that mining would be an at-home affair, ie., decentralised; everyone would run their own. And that networks were not own or controlled by centralised actors.
Neither is true. Mininig is incredibly centralised, as is network control. This makes it trivial for a state to pull an off switch.
Even talking about sophisticated denials of service, transaction replays, forging future transactions... all this takes place in a silly imagined scenario in which the state wants to hide what it's doing. If it didnt care, bang goes the whole thing.