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On whether we're living in a simulation

scottaaronson.blog

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Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#181
post #7

"If they say, maybe you should live your life differently, just from knowing that you might be in a simulation, I respond: I can’t quite put my finger on it, but I have a vague feeling that this discussion predates the 80 or so years we’ve had digital computers! Why not just join the theologians in that earlier discussion, rather than pretending that this is something distinctive about computers? Is it relevantly dif…

I loved Stephen Wolfram's answer to that. He did a recent interview with Brian Greene and Brian asked him his take on the simulation question. Stephen replied that he always found it amusing that self-professed atheists would ask the simulation question because the next obvious question is "Who's simulation is it? Who's operating the computers running such a simulation?"

I don’t find the general simulation question interesting nor have I listened to the interview, but from your description I don’t find that response interesting either. Why wouldn’t the answer be a trivial “people like us”?

We don’t know of anything in the natural world that would be able to create the necessary elements for the Universe to exist, but we do know how to create digital worlds even if digital consciousness is currently beyond our grasp.

Thus the difference between the God question and the simulation question is that in the latter there is a clear path to us recursively becoming the gods. Not so in the former.

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#182
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Quantity of information - a simulator whose state itself can be expressed in X bits can't possibly have a simulation with X+1 bits of incompressible state.

Yes, but assuming much incompressible state is already assuming to know a lot about the nature of the simulation, ranging from size, longevity, to the extent which the structure of our perceived universe is the way it is to enable an outside simulator to take shortcuts we don't know about.

That assumption is baked into the question being asked though. When we talk about X bits of storage it's generally accepted that this means being able to store any bit string of length X, not just compressible ones.

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#183
post #169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We can formulate and test hypotheses about the nature of our universe via experiment. I'm not talking about the universe "not conforming to expectations" or being "surprising" as evidence of a simulation, but of our ability to form and test very specific hypotheses, where the outcome is expected to be a certain way due to artifacts of certain types of simulation, thereby providing evidence for it. This requires a spe…

In the sense an intelligent design advocate would also claim they can test "specific hypothesis" about god, perhaps.

Only if “god” is a computational or mathematical system that leads to clearly defined and testable predictions. That isn’t typically consistent with most religious concepts of God.

I can surely imagine an intelligent design advocate trying to formulate a testable physical prediction inspired by theology, but if done rigorously, they are going to be disappointed in the result. And I’ll venture to guess that’s why you are equating the two- you are so certain we are not in a simulation that you think the concept of exploring it scientifically is absurd, and you would not accept any result conflicting with your prior belief, regardless of the evidence, am I right? That kind of certainty without evidence sounds kind of like religious faith to me ;-)

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#184
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, the origin beliefs in this case aren't really faith. Let me frame that as questions: do you: - Believe that we will be able to create a true AI, with self-consicousness? - Believe that we will some day have enough energy and compute power to create a simulation that could contains billions of those consciousness? - Believe that if we are able to do so, we will do it (aka no governmental body will prevent a simula…

- Believe that we will be able to create a true AI, with self-consicousness? To believe this with any kind of certainty is no different from believing in deities.

Disagree. Its as unfalsifiable, but the opposite position is disprovable, at least (if we create a self-aware IA).

Hence why i wrote

> The 1 is a big "i don't know", because i know enough to have no idea

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#185

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would very much like to hear the details of these claims I am making, they sound quite exciting! I'd also like to know why the grandparent post has no burden of proof, are certain claims off limits to challenge for some reason, and can that reason be shared publicly?

> I would very much like to hear the details of these claims I am making, they sound quite exciting! Original assertion - belief that we are in a simulation with 100% certainty is no different than a religious belief in a deity. You: "What evidence do you have that there is no evidence though?" Me: "You cannot claim no evidence is a meaningful assertion here, its not" > I'd also like to know why the grandparent post…

Just so we're all on the same page, I am not the person who made the first comment ("Which sounds as unlikely as Jesus dying for my sins on the cross..."):

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39301776

> Original assertion - belief that we are in a simulation with 100% certainty is no different than a religious belief in a deity.

> You: "What evidence do you have that there is no evidence though?"

If we're being "pedantic", there are ~~two~~ THREE claims that "have" a burden of proof:

1. Original assertion - belief that we are in a simulation with 100% certainty is no different than a religious belief in a deity. [Was this actually the original assertion?]

I don't believe this assertion occurred - rather, I think you may have misinterpreted "are in the same ballpark"?

2. belief that we are in a simulation with 100% certainty is no different than a religious belief in a deity

Ontologically + algorithmically, "is not different" is a bold claim.

As an ~analogy, see: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2363143/whats-the-best-s...

3. "You cannot claim no evidence is a meaningful assertion here, its not"

a) One can actually, but not in an epistemically & logically sound manner (and you have a few challenges of your own on that front).

b) "meaningful" is a very tricky word; it is also a subjective word (so, conducting logic upon it is going to produce strange, misleading results like "its not", which is an opinion that has the appearance of being a fact. Unless I am completely misunderstanding you, here we do not disagree (you do believe it to be true, no)?)

>> I'd also like to know why the grandparent post has no burden of proof

> The OP made no claims.

Again, if we are referring to "Which sounds as unlikely as Jesus dying for my sins on the cross...", I believe you are incorrect, there are several claims in there ("pedentically", even an expression of one's opinion and predictions are claims).

> An 'opinion' without an evidence is a belief.

While technically true, this seems like one of those "not wrong" truths:

https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=you%27re%20n...

>>> "you're not wrong" = "you're right", however phrasing it as "you're not wrong" usually that there's more to it -- either there's some missing nuance....

In this case, substantial problems derive from the multiple differing meanings of "is a", which is often mixed up with equals at runtime (under certain conditions).

But also, importantly (maybe even more importantly): this cultural norm where on certain topics of conversation, it is acceptable to simply play the ~"it's just an opinion, everyone is always only expressing their opinion..." as a sort of rhetorical get our of jail free card is (imho) not only annoying, but a giant source of unrealized (recursively compounding, etc) harm in the system. I often wonder what would happen is some set of people in this system were to "do otherwise" (in a comprehensive manner), at substantial scale.

tl;dr: probably just an honest mistake, cheers!

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#186
post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A "Simulationist" who believes we are certain to be in a simulation despite no evidence is just holding yet another religious belief. I see it as a possibility, but a possibility without evidence remains an interesting, untested hypothesis that might be grounds for speculation, not belief.

What evidence do you have that there is no evidence though? Or does a different standard apply to certain claims, like cultural axioms?

You're misinterpreting what I wrote, so let's break it down.

1. If our hypothetical Simulationist believes we are certain to be in a simulation despite the hypothetical Simulationist having seen no evidence, then it is my opinion they are just holding another religious belief.

2. If they expect me to consider their belief as anything but a religious belief, then it rests on them to present the evidence they have seen. They're free not to, and I'm free to dismiss their unsupported hypothesis.

It's not my job to search for evidence for a claim made by someone else if I don't find it compelling.

"No evidence" did not suggest no evidence can and/or does exist somewhere, someplace, but that I have not seen any. My assertion that I have not seen any is all the evidence that is needed for the claim that I have not seen any.

But like Russel's Teapot, if someone claims to know that we are in a simulation, that is an extraordinary claim and the burden of proof lies squarely on them.

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#187
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What else would it be but computation? Coming up with something that isn't computation in some form or other is exceedingly hard. I'm not even sure it's meaningfully possible.

Computation call still have non-determinism. For example, the computation gives e.g. 2 possible options at every step (both physically valid). Then a "consciousness" decides which of the 2 options it prefers, and that's the part we'll see and the other part of the tree is simply not observed. So you can compute it to some extent, just not fully.

That doesn't address what I said at all. If you assert dualism, like what you did here as an attempt to inject "non-computation" all you do is give rise to infinite regress. E.g. how do you propose this "consciousness" would decide in a way that is not itself computation?

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#188

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I loved Stephen Wolfram's answer to that. He did a recent interview with Brian Greene and Brian asked him his take on the simulation question. Stephen replied that he always found it amusing that self-professed atheists would ask the simulation question because the next obvious question is "Who's simulation is it? Who's operating the computers running such a simulation?"

Everything that you've seen over the last, eh, 15 years in the tech industry seems to be a bunch of rationalists (who often tend to be non-religious) trying to reconstruct the irrational institutions of spirituality. Simulation theory is basically positing there's a higher power. Eternal life has been replaced with efforts to digitize the human consciousness for indefinite storage. Pilgrimages have been replaced with…

Simulation theory posits there might be an outside power.

Bostrom's version posits a "post-human" civilisation, but it might just as well be someone barely smarter than us.

For that matter, there are plenty of ways of positing simulation that does not require intelligence at all - computation is naturally everywhere, so if the "real" universe is infinite, and simulation is possible, then it is not unreasonable to consider the possibility that there might be an infinite set of "natural simulations" playing out in interplay between matter and energy in an "outside" world without anyone every doing anything for it.

If the "outer" universe is infinite, it only requires a non-zero probability and enough time.

The main reason to consider we're not in a naturally occurring simulation in some soup of matter is that it seems more likely, albeit a total guess, that more intentional simulations would have a higher probability of existing.

But arguing gods might be running a simulation, to me, seems borderline arrogant. Why "gods", and not a bored teenager playing a game? Who would those gods be anyway that'd make us consider them gods, rather than just another species?

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#189
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but assuming much incompressible state is already assuming to know a lot about the nature of the simulation, ranging from size, longevity, to the extent which the structure of our perceived universe is the way it is to enable an outside simulator to take shortcuts we don't know about.

That assumption is baked into the question being asked though. When we talk about X bits of storage it's generally accepted that this means being able to store any bit string of length X, not just compressible ones.

The question was:

> What's the reason for the simulation to be smaller than the simulator?

And the answer to that is that there's no reason. There's no reason to assume the state of a simulation isn't compressible, because have no knowledge about whether or not it is, and we do have plenty of knowledge of how to create simulations that appear complex but that reduces to easily computable sequences "from the outside".

The more restricted question isn't meaningful because we have no basis for assuming we can restrict ourselves to consider incompressible state, because we have no way of determining if the state is incompressible.

There would be any number of sets of possible simulations that would indeed be smaller than their simulators, but given that within two similarly sized universes, you would be able to fit more simulations that are reducible, the probability that any given simulation is an approximation that allows for shortcuts ought to be higher than that it is a simulation of an irreducible set of data.

So much so, that perhaps if we were able to somehow demonstrate aspects that would prove incompressibility (and I'm not convinced that is possible, or even meaningful) that might indicate that we're more likely to be in the "outer" universe. Conversely, the more compressible our universe looks, the more we might want to consider that it's an indication that we're more likely to be in a simulation.

Re: On whether we're living in a simulation

#190
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That variant is simply Pascal's Wager. It's more interesting to ask whether, of we are in a simulation, it is possible to prove and/or find "escapes". All our experience with computational sandboxes so far is that preventing information leaks or escapes is extremely hard. Of course, we still have the problem that if we fi d nothing we don't know what that means. From my perspective, I'm on the side that it's a fun ph…

> All our experience with computational sandboxes so far is that preventing information leaks or escapes is extremely hard. I believe this is due to the path-dependent nature of our hardware architecture, not anything fundamental. x86 is not really designed with virtualization in mind. Theoretically, perfect airtight simulation is the primary ability of computers, and we're just too sloppy to exploit it properly. Ano…

> Can entities inside the simulation get info about your CPU architecture? Not really, not unless you really messed up (let's assume you don't make any gross concessions to performance over correctness).

I would consider it magnitudes more likely to assume we would really mess it up than to assume there are no information leaks, and I think it's wildly unrealistic to assume we wouldn't make gross concessions to performance over correctness.

> If you have the ability to simulate anything close to our universe, I just don't think it's that hard to make it actually correct and therefore inescapable.

I think it's naive to assume that increased ability create complex systems correlate with increased ability to predict all possible ways of exploiting those systems.

But even more so, I consider it naive to assume we would even if we could.

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