IMO when seriously consider the math, the firepower:acquisition cost ratio doesn't make much sense, especially against PRC. SSGN with ~150 tomahawks, subsonic, easier to intercept, will likely never be reloadable at sea, and may not be able to operate permissively around PRC in due time. PRC ASW is improving rapidly, and they're deploying subsea ASW infra within 1st island chain. Not much info on projected upgrade of hypersonics to subsurface flee, but if extrapolate from zumwalt hypersonic projections current 80 cells for TLAM (tomahawks) whittles down to 12 CGHBs (common hypersonic glide bodies), that's ~20 more lethal CGHBs on subs and combined with multi week roundtrip to reload and get back into theatre, it's essentially nothing. For reference it's estimated taking out PRC SCS island bases will require 400-500 tomahawks, and that may only temporarily disable runways. Even if US can take out entire PLANavy, PRC can sustain massive war effort from mainland aviation/rocketry, the latter could feasibly hit CONUS. I think that's whats ultimately driving procurement decisions, trying to deliver the most survivable firepower which a lot of these larger projects are subpar at (again relative to PRC) if war ever escalates to homeland strikes. Hence Navy Force Design focusing on expanding with smaller unmanned ships / distributed lethality model (which will include lots of unmanned subsurface). In the meantime, large, expensive, eggs in a basket platforms that are difficult to crew, impossible to replace during war, that's been in pipeline for a long time and are being pursued to institutional inertia, because brass doesn't want to kill their baby.
VS 100+ B21s with less labour and per unit cost that can deliver around the clock, probably difficult to shoot down unless they're parked in hardened hanger or their midair tanking (if needed) gets degraded, but losing one is a couple pilots and 1/10th the cost.