Earlier quoted context omitted.
Google's CRLSets don't cover nearly the full set of revocations (AFAIK). I don't know the details of how "valid" works, but as the Apple root program has recently required CAs to publish full CRLs, I assume they're planning something similar. I mostly cite CRLite as it's well-documented. I don't think OCSP must-staple is deployable. It requires code changes to effectively every webserver in the world, and that doesn'…
I think you're right about CRLSets. IMO, Mozilla really wanted to solve the problem, whereas Chrome just wanted to have a solution that they could use for emergency revocation of certificates of high-profile sites (and intermediates/roots). Small-time sites won't be in CRLSets, although if you know the right people and make enough noise you may be added to their list. As for Apple, no one knows what's going on becaus…
Slides: https://devstreaming-cdn.apple.com/videos/wwdc/2017/701jvytn...
You can also find the client-side code if you dig around under https://opensource.apple.com/source/Security/
It aims to cover all certificates, similar to Mozilla's CRLite.