61–70 of 129 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The hack is getting the unsecure system not to damage your encrypted signal, to carry even though it is expecting plain voice talking rather than a stream of binary digits.
We’ve been doing that for dialup internet for decades.
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In any SCIF or SCIF-like office space, they're all prohibited. You leave your cell phone at the front door of the secured area. Internet access is via SIPRNet (for classified) or NIPRNet (non-classified, but secured). Phones are through dedicated secure switchboards. The above is common in the DC area (lots of DoD contractors).
I wouldn't be surprised if something like the Apple Vision Pro becomes common in such spaces (and for classified / company-confidential work in general) over the next few years. I think the combination of biometric authentication with a display that is immune to cameras and shoulder-surfing is really powerful. If the device has anti-screenshot protection and automatically logs the user out when removed from their hea…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think you read my comment fully, the Furby thing was real, based on known facts, that were trumpeted by the manufacturer. The idea the Furby was "[not] real" persisting after reading the comment, is probably why it seemed like I was saying the voice assistants don't record voice.
I read the comment and explained why I don't think it's the fear of the same thing. Maybe you didn't read my comment fully! A Furby didn't have the capacity to meaningfully spy on you. You could be afraid that it actually does but it didn't. A voice assistant is already, in a sense, actually spying on you and you know that - the manufacturer tells you upfront. These aren't the same kind of fear.
The first comment, 10 comments up, was specifically written to provide that context: the Furby manufacturer was up front about spying.
Working with you, and steel-manning your contributions:
- You're trying to explain a distinction you see between local data processing and remote data processing. i.e. a microphone in a room recording you isn't spying, but a microphone with a data connection is "in a sense, actually spying" on you "meaningfully".
- example: "the Furby didn't relay audio data anywhere other than the Furby, and I'd like to point out the voice assistant does - your comment intends to highlight the Furby listened, but it only listened locally. Mentioning voice assistants and using them in an analogy may give a reader the understanding voice assistants process data locally, like Furbys"
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It's interesting to see how quickly the norms around cybersecurity changed. In 1999 the NSA was worried about avoiding ridicule for banning simple electronics in secure areas. In 2010 Stuxnet was introduced via simple electronics into a secure area and set back the Iranian nuclear program by several years. Some of the people receiving these furby emails were probably already conceiving of (or actively working on) Stu…
NSA dealt with cases of espionage via the introduction of simple electronics into secure areas decades before [1] [2], so awareness of the risk was likely widespread. The issue here seems to have been that in 1999, it was a relative novelty for random consumer devices to have a recording functionality. Hard to imagine now, but there we are. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Thing_(listening_device) [2] https://ww…
For added context, the plot of the movie Charlie's Angels from the year 2000, was about stopping an evil guy from using some evil software he developed to ... track people using their cellphones. (ㆆ _ ㆆ)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The hack is getting the unsecure system not to damage your encrypted signal, to carry even though it is expecting plain voice talking rather than a stream of binary digits.
We’ve been doing that for dialup internet for decades.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's interesting to see how quickly the norms around cybersecurity changed. In 1999 the NSA was worried about avoiding ridicule for banning simple electronics in secure areas. In 2010 Stuxnet was introduced via simple electronics into a secure area and set back the Iranian nuclear program by several years. Some of the people receiving these furby emails were probably already conceiving of (or actively working on) Stu…
NSA is a military agency; their norm has always been to protect US assets and attack others.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
In any SCIF or SCIF-like office space, they're all prohibited. You leave your cell phone at the front door of the secured area. Internet access is via SIPRNet (for classified) or NIPRNet (non-classified, but secured). Phones are through dedicated secure switchboards. The above is common in the DC area (lots of DoD contractors).
A relative of mine used to work in this space 20 years ago. Seems policies haven’t changed at all. Tangental story about how serious the Gov takes OpSec. When I was in Iraq, a Marine in my unit found a roll of red Classified tape. He thought it would be cool to put a strip on his personal laptop, which was confiscated almost immediately. It was very clearly a personal machine, but policy is policy, and he never got t…
Did he test it on any other items?
The FOIA documents are up on archive.org now: https://archive.org/details/nsa-furby-memo/ I'm amused at page 8 of the listserve doc, in which someone points out that the ongoing discussion may at some point be released to the public under FOIA and to consider how it might look after showing up on the front page of a news site
It's interesting to see how quickly the norms around cybersecurity changed. In 1999 the NSA was worried about avoiding ridicule for banning simple electronics in secure areas. In 2010 Stuxnet was introduced via simple electronics into a secure area and set back the Iranian nuclear program by several years. Some of the people receiving these furby emails were probably already conceiving of (or actively working on) Stu…