US regulator considers stripping Boeing's right to self-inspect planes

What this is missing is that you can be forced to do something by someone other than a military.

If a corporation pollutes the air, you're being forced to breathe polluted air. It's not in your interest for them to pollute the air, but it's in their interest because it's cheaper and they value money over incrementally cleaner air. Then you need a means to stop them from doing something they find to be in their own interest, because it isn't in yours and you didn't consent to it.

The problem with this is that if you extend it to its logical conclusion, now you're not allowed to breathe because I didn't consent to you emitting CO2 from your lungs.

The key here is to limit the government to the things that are both important and can only be feasibly accomplished through a monopoly on force. Prohibiting violence and monopolies, pricing major externalities, funding certain types of fundamental research, etc.

Not prohibiting entirely consensual behavior or micromanaging marginal commercial activity or impairing your view of the bay by having the gall to construct housing during a housing shortfall.

There can be some disagreement around the edges on what these things are, but the real hard part is finding a way to create checks and balances effective enough to resist when a wave of populism wants to stop imposing all of these restrictions on Their Guy. Because the thing that follows that is invariably centralization of power, corruption and injustice.

> In general, the Senate's ability to set its own rules surely cannot be unrestricted. For example, when the Democrats had 60 votes in the Senate would it have been constitutional for them to create a new rule that all tax decreases require unanimous consent of the Senate? Or for Republicans in the same situation to create a rule that all tax increases require unanimous consent? Both of these changes would seem to be within the rule-making authority of the Senate. However both rules would be profoundly undemocratic because they would generally prevent a majority (or supermajority) of US voters from changing US tax law in the future.

I think we should clarify that there is no "filibuster rule" in the Senate. The rule is that debate by default is unlimited; in order to close debate on any non-rule change, sixty senators must agree to invoke "cloture," after which debate continues for up to thirty hours under various restrictions. Then the vote on the underlying measure (e.g. a bill, a resolution, advice & consent on an executive matter) takes place with the majority vote rule. (Debate about rule changes can only be ended by 2/3 of the Senate, followed by a majority vote on the rule change itself.)

With that settled, we should also consider that the Constitution itself mandates super-majorities in the Senate for various reasons, including expelling a senator; giving advice and consent for the president to ratify a treaty; convicting an impeached president, vice president, other officer or judge; overriding a veto; or proposing an amendment to the Constitution. It further specifies certain procedures that can be invoked by less than a majority, like the 1/5 vote to record the names of those voting on any given measure, or the minority vote required to compel the presence of absent senators in the absence of a quorum. The Constitution clearly contemplates these situations where the vice president's vote wouldn't matter, so it stands to reason that the Senate is free to adopt rules requiring a different vote threshold than simple majority.

As to the hypothetical about rules governing tax legislation, I see nothing in the Constitution forbidding such a ludicrous procedure. I do see loads of evidence that it would be extremely impractical, including the 2/3 majority required to invoke couture on rule amendments; the "nuclear option" precedent; and the fact that the tit-for-tat is possible.

Finally, all legislative bodies have substantially undemocratic procedures. Referring matters to committee is undemocratic, restricting floor amendments is undemocratic, points of order are undemocratic, etc. It seems to me that preserving the minority's right to further debate is not so different.

thats was my (not very well made) point

they're cutting corners in pusuit of profit and thus the planes are developing fault

> There is a strong correlation between air pollution and rapidly improving quality of life.

There is a strong correlation between air pollution and industrialization and a strong correlation between industrialization and quality of life. That doesn't mean pollution improves quality of life, it means you want industrialization without pollution.

To take a specific example, the ban on leaded gasoline was Good. Lead is powerfully toxic, the science on this is solid, and the negative consequence of the ban is that gasoline costs marginally more if at all.

Now you can list many more examples of the EPA imposing stupid rules with a marginal benefit that doesn't even exceed their implementation costs which in aggregate significantly increase the cost of everything while having negative overall value.

But it's not physically impossible to repeal all of those and keep the ban on leaded gasoline. The question is how to accomplish that in practice, and to maintain that as a stable equilibrium.

> The rule is that debate by default is unlimited; in order to close debate on any non-rule change, sixty senators must agree to invoke "cloture," after which debate continues for up to thirty hours under various restrictions.

There is a solution to that as well: put explicit limits on the length of speech and the number of speakers for each debate item. This worked well in the Turkish legislature to make the legislature faster.