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Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

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Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#141

Post by GeekyBear »

atleastoptimal wrote: post #75

I feel like this pattern occurs in too many companies across all sectors: 1. Company is product-quality focused 2. Beats competition and creates mini-monopoly 3. Sales becomes somewhat inelastic to changes in quality 4. This leads "cost-cutting" and marketing focused execs/decision making to beat out product quality execs/decision making 5. Company's product quality takes predictable linear path to the bottom

> “I have my own theory about why decline happens at companies,” Jobs told me: They make some great products, but then the sales and marketing people take over the company, because they are the ones who can juice up profits. “When the sales guys run the company, the product guys don’t matter so much, and a lot of them just turn off. It happened at Apple when Sculley came in, which was my fault, and it happened when Ballmer took over at Microsoft.”

https://hbr.org/2012/04/the-real-leadership-lessons-of-steve...

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#142

Post by mastercheif »

drtgh wrote: post #119
mastercheif wrote: post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> This forward-positioning of the engine causes the nose to pitch up when accelerating quickly (and this can cause stall) and they fixed this defect using software to push the nose down. MCAS was not intended to be an anti-stall system. The only purpose of MCAS was to have the 737 MAX exactly mimick the 737 NG's (previous gen) pitch dynamics so that airlines wouldn't have to retrain their pilots on the 737 MAX. Comme…

MCAS it is correcting the design defect due to put larger motors. Without MCAS that aircraft do not meets the certification requirements for to fly. This video is about bledend-wing designs, but it touches on the 737 MAX problem with illustrations, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59A8-rKRs-0&t=705s at minute 11:45 , but it's also worth watching the part at 4:31 , where another illustration explains the forces at work…

Recent statements and speculation from FAA / EASA / Pilots suggests that the plane would've likely passed certification without MCAS: https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-development/mcas-may-not-...

That said, it's true the MCAS was intended to address some comments from test pilots during development.

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#143

Post by SubiculumCode »

That we tolerate such monopolies in our generally capitalist nation really demands re-evaluation. Efficiency of scale does not tend to benefit consumers that monopolistic rent extraction detracts. Moreover, I think that any National Security arguments for monopoly control is such sectors is, on its face, weak.

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#144

Post by drowntoge »

MilStdJunkie wrote: post #46
skyyler wrote: post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What can reasonably be done to combat it? Leadership at all the biggest firms is on board with shareholder capitalism. To them, Welch style management just means line goes up...

If leadership gets stock as part of their compensation, they don't get to sell it off until long after their tenure in leadership is ended. The time horizon of these jokers is too short. If they had a 10 or even a 5 year risk horizon, they would not make these short-sighted decisions. The Welchian approach isn't just value destruction, over a longer time horizon it's quantifiably unprofitable for the business as a wh…

> Again - not for the first time - I marvel at the structural similarities of end-stage Soviet industry and our own late-stage financier capitalism.

Concerning.

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#145

Post by code_biologist »

bcantrill wrote: post #90

The answer to this is "yes" -- and for details, I would recommend Peter Robison's excellent Flying Blind . (Selfishly, I would also recommend the conversation that we had with Robison on Oxide and Friends shortly after the book was published.[0]) For insight into the deep roots of the broken McDonnell Douglas culture, I would recommend an older book, John Godson's Rise and Fall of the DC-10 . [0] https://oxide-and-fr…

Actual interview begins around the 5 minute mark. Edit: these twitter space voice cutouts are brutal. Probably pass on this one if you like tight interviews.

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#146

Post by paulcole »

code_biologist wrote: post #145
bcantrill wrote: post #90

The answer to this is "yes" -- and for details, I would recommend Peter Robison's excellent Flying Blind . (Selfishly, I would also recommend the conversation that we had with Robison on Oxide and Friends shortly after the book was published.[0]) For insight into the deep roots of the broken McDonnell Douglas culture, I would recommend an older book, John Godson's Rise and Fall of the DC-10 . [0] https://oxide-and-fr…

Actual interview begins around the 5 minute mark. Edit: these twitter space voice cutouts are brutal. Probably pass on this one if you like tight interviews.

What happens during minutes 1-4?

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#147

Post by truculent »

hencq wrote: post #86
sneak wrote: post #4

This is the “everybody knows” narrative that seems to get trotted out whenever modern Boeing has problems. I’m curious - how much of it is true? Is it really systemic, or has it manifested only with one specific model plane? It seems to fit very well with the “financialization is bad” narrative, too, but is there any other data to support the claims? It’s possible that engineer-driven Boeing could have fucked up the…

Yeah, agreed, it makes intuitive sense and also neatly fits an emotional "finance bad" story, but shouldn't we then also expect the 787 to have similar problems? Or, why would the 787 with its entirely new airframe exist in the first place? As an outside observer with no particular knowledge of the industry it at least seems like Boeing was able to produce a high quality new plane more than a decade after the 1997 me…

The claim isn’t exactly “Boeing can’t make a good plane anymore”, though.

It’s more like non-engineering culture resulted in a push to create a new plane as quickly and cheaply as possible. In other words, the execs at the start of the process created an impossible task that the downstream employees couldn’t follow through on. In this sense, it is consistent that under “normal” conditions, Boeing could still produce a good plane; the problem is that nobody wants to or is able to enforce those conditions.

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#148

Post by lmm »

atleastoptimal wrote: post #75

I feel like this pattern occurs in too many companies across all sectors: 1. Company is product-quality focused 2. Beats competition and creates mini-monopoly 3. Sales becomes somewhat inelastic to changes in quality 4. This leads "cost-cutting" and marketing focused execs/decision making to beat out product quality execs/decision making 5. Company's product quality takes predictable linear path to the bottom

Reputation is an asset like anything else. It's probably economically rational to build up a reputation for good quality while you're small, and then switch to extracting as much value as you can from that reputation once you've gotten big. (I don't like it but I don't see any way to prevent it being the most profitable course)

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#149

Post by wglb »

zw123456 wrote: post #122

I know ahead of time that what I am about to say, will result in me getting yelled at by the HN crowd that what I am saying is anecdotal and all that. But, after refraining for a while, I guess I have to say something so, I know you will down vote me because this is not based on a scientific A-B test blah blah. Cool. People's lives are at risk. And No, I DO NOT work for Boeing and never have. I work for a company tha…

The guidlines ask you not to comment about downvoting.

Re: Did a 1997 merger ruin Boeing?

#150

Post by aslatter »

GeekyBear wrote: post #141
atleastoptimal wrote: post #75

I feel like this pattern occurs in too many companies across all sectors: 1. Company is product-quality focused 2. Beats competition and creates mini-monopoly 3. Sales becomes somewhat inelastic to changes in quality 4. This leads "cost-cutting" and marketing focused execs/decision making to beat out product quality execs/decision making 5. Company's product quality takes predictable linear path to the bottom

> “I have my own theory about why decline happens at companies,” Jobs told me: They make some great products, but then the sales and marketing people take over the company, because they are the ones who can juice up profits. “When the sales guys run the company, the product guys don’t matter so much, and a lot of them just turn off. It happened at Apple when Sculley came in, which was my fault, and it happened when B…

I keep this clip open in a browser tab so I can go back to it from time-to-time: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3NASGb5m8s

It's the same basic message from Jobs, but this time about Xerox.

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