People have been coming up with ideas like that regularly. I'm not a fan. The title says that you can "defend" your webpage, but it is not clear how it "defends" against anything. The only thing you possibly achieve is that every now and then, someone with an automated scanner (which may be an attacker, or may be a security researcher or service) will see his tool crash or consume large amounts of resources. You're s…
How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
31–40 of 79 posts
Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#32People have been coming up with ideas like that regularly. I'm not a fan. The title says that you can "defend" your webpage, but it is not clear how it "defends" against anything. The only thing you possibly achieve is that every now and then, someone with an automated scanner (which may be an attacker, or may be a security researcher or service) will see his tool crash or consume large amounts of resources. You're s…
It really is only in the world of IT security is this attitude so pervasive, where you constantly blame victims. While defense is a great offense it can't hurt to be an annoyance to bad actors.
Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#33I've done this without compression but just sending infinite data. On some days I've sent a TB to a single IP address... Might be an idea to combine this. I'd assume the resulting gzip file here contains a repeating pattern that you can generate on the fly?
Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#34I've done this without compression but just sending infinite data. On some days I've sent a TB to a single IP address... Might be an idea to combine this. I'd assume the resulting gzip file here contains a repeating pattern that you can generate on the fly?
Yes, it would be trivial to make an "endless" gzip stream.
$ head -c 10000000 /dev/zero | gzip -c -9 | hexdump
0000000 8b1f 0008 530a 659e 0302 c1ec 0101 0000
0000010 8000 fe90 eeaf 0a08 0000 0000 0000 0000
0000020 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
*
0002010 0000 0000 0000 db80 0383 0012 0000 4100
0002020 5fff 23b7 0150 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0002030 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
*
00025f0 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 e000
0002600 cb26 3ba5 803e 9896 0000
0002609
So you can keep the first 0x18 bytes and repeat zero bytes after that, preferably very slowly. (The middle bit is an arbitrary block boundary, while the last bit is CRC-32 and the uncompressed size which the client will never see.) I have also used `-c` option to avoid the original file name in the result, which precedes the compressed data.Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#35TIL today: ZIP bombs are still a thing, 40 years after the first BBS.
Some servers required you to have X gigabytes of stuff in your shares, so you just had a zip bomb in your share with the correct size.
It reported the size as 10GB to the server, but actually it took a few kilobytes on disk.
Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#36People have been coming up with ideas like that regularly. I'm not a fan. The title says that you can "defend" your webpage, but it is not clear how it "defends" against anything. The only thing you possibly achieve is that every now and then, someone with an automated scanner (which may be an attacker, or may be a security researcher or service) will see his tool crash or consume large amounts of resources. You're s…
It really is only in the world of IT security is this attitude so pervasive, where you constantly blame victims. While defense is a great offense it can't hurt to be an annoyance to bad actors.
Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#37Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#38People have been coming up with ideas like that regularly. I'm not a fan. The title says that you can "defend" your webpage, but it is not clear how it "defends" against anything. The only thing you possibly achieve is that every now and then, someone with an automated scanner (which may be an attacker, or may be a security researcher or service) will see his tool crash or consume large amounts of resources. You're s…
>You're spending time trying to annoy attackers that you should probably just ignore. s/ignore/block at firewall-level/ To me this article is of relevance nonetheless because It inspires me for messing with AI trainers by crafting an html page ZIP bomb full of ZIP-bomb-like embedded attachments (stylesheets, images, etc).
WAFs that "block" "attacks" that ultimately should just cause a 404 error are part of the same mindset: That you think you "have to do something" about an attack that you should probably just ignore. They're also part of the mindset that security should mean adding more complexity, which is the opposite of what you should do.
Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#39People have been coming up with ideas like that regularly. I'm not a fan. The title says that you can "defend" your webpage, but it is not clear how it "defends" against anything. The only thing you possibly achieve is that every now and then, someone with an automated scanner (which may be an attacker, or may be a security researcher or service) will see his tool crash or consume large amounts of resources. You're s…
No one is really worried, and no time is wasted when the outcome is occasional fun. There's no security holes to fix, there's just a bunch gnats poking at your server and you shoo them away, that's all.
Re: How to defend your website with ZIP bombs (2017)
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
>You're spending time trying to annoy attackers that you should probably just ignore. s/ignore/block at firewall-level/ To me this article is of relevance nonetheless because It inspires me for messing with AI trainers by crafting an html page ZIP bomb full of ZIP-bomb-like embedded attachments (stylesheets, images, etc).
No, ignore. WAFs that "block" "attacks" that ultimately should just cause a 404 error are part of the same mindset: That you think you "have to do something" about an attack that you should probably just ignore. They're also part of the mindset that security should mean adding more complexity, which is the opposite of what you should do.