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Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

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Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#231

Post by pas »

kornhole wrote: post #110
lame-robot-hoax wrote: post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How did sanctions backfire?

Germany's economy shrunk last year while Russia's grew. Dedollarization has accelerated which will impact the US not immediately but in near future.

the dollar as the reserve currency already has a serious impact on the US (ie. the big upside is that it allows the US to borrow for very cheap, but the nasty downside is keeping the purchasing power of the USD artificially high, which is not great for the non-finance sectors of the US, not great for people who work in those sectors, and double-plus-not-great for US exports [which are not the dollar itself]), basically it's the "natural resource curse" again

that said, dedollarization is unlikely even in the mid-term https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/threats-to-the-dollar-are-just...

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#232

Post by LargeTomato »

TaylorAlexander wrote: post #173
JumpCrisscross wrote: post #164

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> that could have easily been a cover The problem with conspiracies is everyone involved knows it’s a secret. If you’re the CIA, it’s much less risky to compromise a chip design engineer than have everyone from the CEO down at Apple in on the plant.

Maybe but then again what’s another secret when at a high level these firms are already very secretive. It’s not apple but I think a lot about how Eric Schmidt of google was directly meeting with US military officials and talking about how important US defense was. You can end up with a situation where the chip designer and some higher up both know what is happening and the higher up is there as a check to provide co…

There are different levels of secret. I would never leak a normal company secret. But a national security secret is a different story.

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#233

Post by LargeTomato »

TaylorAlexander wrote: post #173
JumpCrisscross wrote: post #164

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> that could have easily been a cover The problem with conspiracies is everyone involved knows it’s a secret. If you’re the CIA, it’s much less risky to compromise a chip design engineer than have everyone from the CEO down at Apple in on the plant.

Maybe but then again what’s another secret when at a high level these firms are already very secretive. It’s not apple but I think a lot about how Eric Schmidt of google was directly meeting with US military officials and talking about how important US defense was. You can end up with a situation where the chip designer and some higher up both know what is happening and the higher up is there as a check to provide co…

There are different levels of secret. I would never leak a normal company secret. But a national security secret is a different story.

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#235

Post by sangnoir »

madeofpalk wrote: post #196
doctorpangloss wrote: post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It could author its format parsers in https://github.com/google/wuffs , and make them BSD-like open source to maximize adoption. An even bigger change: It could allow users to choose their iMessage client freely. Why not open up the protocol? I’m sure a security focused client would be popular and in the grand scheme of things easy to author. Perhaps they could open up more of the OS and apps. Perhaps their claims ab…

I struggle to believe that a third party iMessage iOS app would be a security improvement, beyond Lockdown Mode https://support.apple.com/en-us/105120 . Either a third party app would still use the same vulnerable frameworks as iMessage, or they would re-implement them potentially with more vulnerabilities, or just not implement the features, which is what Lockdown Mode gives you.

One could argue the same about alternatives to Safari, and yet Chrome has proven to be more secure than Safari (based on Pwn2Own results).

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#236

Post by maldev »

Despegar wrote: post #126

I'm curious to know from experts if there's anything Apple can do to create a step-change in terms of security of iPhones? Like if the going rate for a zero day is $1 million, is there anything Apple can do that can drive that up to $2 or $3 million? Or is it just going to be a perpetual cat and mouse game with no real "progress"?

It's already 2-3 million +. Apple has amazing security, especially for the Iphone and continously monitors it and dishes out silent patches. For a REALLY high level example, it restricts system calls per process and requires all calls to be signed with an apple key, AND it restricts who you can do the system call to, these are continuously monitored and updated. Not only this, but persistence on Iphone is effectively dead, meaning you have to reinfect the device after every reboot. One of the big things you notice in the article is the use of ROP, apple requires every executable page to be signed by them, hence why you have to have these assfisting of rop chains.

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#239

Post by azinman2 »

nvm0n2 wrote: post #200
cedws wrote: post #147

>This attachment exploits vulnerability CVE-2023-41990 in the undocumented, Apple-only TrueType font instruction ADJUST for a remote code execution. This instruction existed since the early 90’s and the patch removed it. This is getting ridiculous. How many iMessage exploits have there now been via attachments? Why aren't Apple locking down the available codecs? Why isn't BlastDoor doing its job? This is really disap…

iOS has a reputation for having the best security, but how many times have Android/WhatsApp had these sorts of silent-instant-root exploits via invisible messages? I don't remember it happening. Maybe the strategy of writing lots of stuff in Java is paying off there.

What’sapp has had exploits. See https://gbhackers.com/new-whatsapp-0-day-vulnerabilities/amp...

Re: Operation Triangulation: What you get when attack iPhones of researchers

#240

Post by chatmasta »

apienx wrote: post #237

Reminder that Lockdown Mode helps reduce the attack surface of your iPhone. It also helps tremendously with detection. https://support.apple.com/en-us/105120

I've had Lockdown mode enabled for a few months. It's great, and not much of an annoyance at all. You do need to be fairly tech-savvy and remember that it's enabled, because sometimes something silently breaks and you need to opt-out of it (which you can do for a specific website, or WebViews within a specific app). And it won't auto-join "insecure" WiFi which can be annoying at a hotel, but frankly it's probably for the best. Also you won't receive texts with attachments in them, which is usually desirable but breaks workflows like activating a new SIM card while traveling (it's possible this was broken for me due to some other setting to exclude texts from unknown numbers).

The most noticeable difference is that SVG elements (?) are replaced with emojis. I'm not sure how that fallback works but it's funny to see buttons have seemingly random emojis embedded in them. (Does anyone know the details of how this replacement is done? Is it actually glyph fonts being replaced, not SVG?)

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