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Qubes OS 4.2.0 has been released

qubes-os.org

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Re: Qubes OS 4.2.0 has been released

#21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Have you been living under a rock [0]? I think you don't understand: Qubes relies on hardware , not software virtualization: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware-assisted_virtualiza...

I think you don't understand. Qubes relies on software virtualization in conjunction with hardware assisted virtualization instruction sets. The aforementioned vulnerability existed in Qubes Xen.

[deleted]

Re: Qubes OS 4.2.0 has been released

#22
post #6
post #5

Anyone using Qubes as a daily driver on laptops (for basic work, not gaming, GPU or video related tasks, etc). I worry that there will be issues with updates, and so on.

Which issues? I'm very happy with Qubes OS, using it as a daily driver for many years. It helps to organize your digital life and gives a great sense of security and control over your computer. I tried to list its advantages here: https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/how-to-pitch-qubes-os/4499/15 Another report from a user: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36267756

I just installed 4.2, and it was indeed smooth.

Impressive improvements, and I like the new interface! I probably test the battery usage and applications, see if I can switch my workflow to Qubes!

Re: Qubes OS 4.2.0 has been released

#23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Have you been living under a rock [0]? I think you don't understand: Qubes relies on hardware , not software virtualization: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware-assisted_virtualiza...

I think you don't understand. Qubes relies on software virtualization in conjunction with hardware assisted virtualization instruction sets. The aforementioned vulnerability existed in Qubes Xen.

It seems the aforementioned vulnerability (XSA-133) didn't even affect Qubes: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/. Also, such vulnerabilities were the reason for them to switch to VT-d by default: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qs....

I'm not an expert, but how could it affect the VT-d even in principle? AFAIK VM escape is impossible with software exploits in this case, only side-channel attacks are.

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