81–90 of 111 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah, but they have to hold on to that stuff for a while. a 5 year old cash is still cash. a 5 year old computer is a doorstop.
I would point out the fallacy in your statement - but I will let you figure it out in the next 5-10 years.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah, but they have to hold on to that stuff for a while. a 5 year old cash is still cash. a 5 year old computer is a doorstop.
I would point out the fallacy in your statement - but I will let you figure it out in the next 5-10 years.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not really actually, I just mean having a discrete server that can be "seized" is not a particularly robust solution.
... and what do you think an Amazon slice is? It sits on a physical machine that can be identified, located, and handed over by Amazon given a lawful request, all without the site operators knowing. You think they give a fuck about the other 4 slices on your server? No. They don't. In fact it says so right in their SLA.
If you are trying to defy the FBI, and 100% of your site architecture resides within Amazon's infrastructure you are not robust.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
When was the last time a bomb threat was followed up with an actual bomb in the US? Maybe it's time to stop blindly evacuating buildings in response to anonymous messages.
1996: Pipe bomb at the olympics in Atlanta http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centennial_Olympic_Park_bombing But really, what you're complaining about is CYA (cover your ass) security. It's a lot easier for the person in charge to decide to clear out the building, and answer to a bit of grumbling with "just doing my job to keep you people safe" than it is to deal with the (extremely unlikely) fallout that would come from…
I mean, that is the Essenes of a bomb scare as opposed to a bomb threat or an actual bomb, no?
Doesn't a judge have to issue a warrant?
America's online law enforcement shaping up to be pretty much like the war on drugs.
I say this not to be disagreeable, but to highlight how bad the WOD really is.
With this rash of seize-servers-first-ask-questions-later, sounds like we're heading for a reprise of the glorious Steve Jackson Games era of blunt-weapon policing tactics when it comes to technology.
This seems like a no-brainer to me. The FBI has the duty to find the Pitt bomb threatener. Perhaps Mixmaster truly does make the email untraceable, but it's the FBI's duty to try tracing it - not to take the Mixmaster claims as fact. If the FBI has evidence that criminal emails passed through that server, I absolutely want the FBI to be able to obtain and execute a warrant to seize it and search it for evidence. Anal…
So if riseup.net had been hosted on, say, EC2, what would the FBI have seized? The server hosting the VM and many other completely unrelated VMs? Scary thought. Also, if you haven't done so already I encourage you to read the FAQ at the end of the page. It has one of the best answers to "Doesn’t Mixmaster/anonymous remailers enable criminals to do bad things?" I've ever seen.
If previous seizures are any indication yes. They identify machines by IP and even if its a virtual machine they seize the server running it. Can't comment on whether or not its effective, and of course if you have a disaster recovery plan and your site pops back up I don't know what they do, I guess they play whack-a-mole with search warrants.
I do not understand the sledgehammer approach the FBI 'cybercrimes' division deals with things with. The FBI are not police, are not detectives, and are not competent in these matters. I'm sorry but covert monitoring of a server is going to be vastly more beneficial for an operation than taking the server and is going to net more targets and more evidence. I remember stories of the FBI sitting on a known front for or…
It would be interesting to correlation frequency of these stories with FBI budget cycles.