I'm so conflicted reading this story. On one hand, yes, there were choices made during the design of the system that directly contributed to this tragedy. And a lot of innocent lives were lost, so saying that's "shit happens, it's an edge case" rings very hollow. On the other hand, this was a very peculiar set of circumstances, very much an edge case. Is it reasonable to expect designers of combat systems to triple c…
The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
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Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
#22I'm so conflicted reading this story. On one hand, yes, there were choices made during the design of the system that directly contributed to this tragedy. And a lot of innocent lives were lost, so saying that's "shit happens, it's an edge case" rings very hollow. On the other hand, this was a very peculiar set of circumstances, very much an edge case. Is it reasonable to expect designers of combat systems to triple c…
Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
#23I'm so conflicted reading this story. On one hand, yes, there were choices made during the design of the system that directly contributed to this tragedy. And a lot of innocent lives were lost, so saying that's "shit happens, it's an edge case" rings very hollow. On the other hand, this was a very peculiar set of circumstances, very much an edge case. Is it reasonable to expect designers of combat systems to triple c…
When it comes to safety-critical systems, the right engineering choice is to lean towards a 'safe' default. For example, the safe default would be to always slave the cursor:
> Once "hooked," the contact would be tracked by Aegis. But critically, unless the operator took the additional step of "slaving" the cursor to that contact, as the contact moved away the cursor would not follow it.
And here, don't reassign a tracking number, at least not within in a short timeframe:
> Vincennes assigned her the tracking number 4474; Sides assigned her 4131. Aegis unified the contacts under the number 4131. 4474 was then available for re-use, so Aegis assigned it to a US A-6 bomber, which happened to be descending.
Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
#24[flagged]
Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
#25Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
#26[flagged]
It's also quite annoying how the piece is split up into small chunks, due to tweets or toots or whatever they're called being limited in size.
The size limit results in each post being a coherent sentence or three, advancing the story by a small but consistent amount. If these same authors used the medium of a free-form blog post to tell the same stories, I think we'd see much more meandering, and the pacing wouldn't be as consistent.
Not saying I don't enjoy a good blog post, but for what it is, I don't mind the (1/x) tweet story format as much as I used to.
Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
#27[flagged]
It's also quite annoying how the piece is split up into small chunks, due to tweets or toots or whatever they're called being limited in size.
Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
#28[flagged]
i also had a hard time reading that piece about bad UX on my phone. i don't know about the desktop experience but you made a valid point.
I guess I'll never know the details of the greatest user interface disasters in history but at least got to experience a smaller one myself.
Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster
#29Also from the Wiki page about this shootdown:
In 1991, political scientist Robert Entman of George Washington University compared U.S. media coverage of the incident with the similar shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by the Soviet Union five years earlier by studying material from Time, Newsweek, The New York Times, The Washington Post and CBS Evening News. According to Entman, framing techniques were used to frame the Korean Airlines incident as sabotage while framing the Iran Air incident as a tragic mistake,[67] stating "the angle taken by the U.S. media emphasized the moral bankruptcy and guilt of the perpetrating nation. With Iran Air 655, the frame de-emphasised guilt and focused on the complex problems of operating military high technology."[68][a] By "de-emphasizing the agency and the victims and by the choice of graphics and adjectives, the news stories about the U.S. downing of an Iranian plane called it a technical problem while the Soviet downing of a Korean jet was portrayed as a moral outrage."