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The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster

octodon.social

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Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster

#11

I'm so conflicted reading this story. On one hand, yes, there were choices made during the design of the system that directly contributed to this tragedy. And a lot of innocent lives were lost, so saying that's "shit happens, it's an edge case" rings very hollow. On the other hand, this was a very peculiar set of circumstances, very much an edge case. Is it reasonable to expect designers of combat systems to triple c…

Sorry, I don't see where's the edge case. In a given area there are going to be lots of planes. If there is risk of confusing them and making decisions based on non-reconciled information, it seems a pretty critical flaw.

Hard agree here. There are so many small things there that could be improved.

One simple one is identifier re-use, if it is necessary for some reason, then at the very least it shouldn't happen within a specific time frame, so that you may have the same identifier used again as in the scenario.

Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster

#12
post #2

[flagged]

The tragedy of Iran Air Flight 655, which was shot down by the USS Vincennes in 1988, highlights significant user interface (UI) flaws in the Aegis Combat System used by the U.S. Navy. Here's a breakdown of the key UI problems that contributed to this incident:

IFF Console Operation Flaw: The aircraft identification friend or foe (IFF) system, crucial for distinguishing between civilian and military aircraft, had a critical operational flaw. Although Flight 655's IFF correctly identified it as a civilian airliner, the Aegis system required operators to manually follow the contact with a cursor. In this instance, the operator did not "slave" the cursor to Flight 655, causing the system to query the IFF of a different aircraft, an Iranian F-14, from the same location.

Dashboard Design Issue: Aegis' large displays, used for senior decision-making, failed to show critical information like altitude. This omission made it challenging to assess the intent of an approaching aircraft. Flight 655's climbing trajectory, a non-threatening maneuver, wasn't immediately apparent to the captain from these displays.

Tracking Number Confusion: Aegis' feature of unifying data across multiple ships led to a fatal misunderstanding. Both the Vincennes and its escort, USS Sides, tracked Flight 655 but assigned it different tracking numbers. When Aegis unified these contacts, it chose one tracking number and recycled the other, which was then assigned to a U.S. bomber. This led to confusion about the altitude of Flight 655, as the captain, unaware of the tracking number change, received data about the wrong aircraft, believing it was descending rapidly.

These UI issues, combined with the high-stress environment and other factors, contributed to the crew's misunderstanding of the actual situation, ultimately leading to the tragic decision to fire on the civilian airliner. This case underscores the critical importance of intuitive, clear, and comprehensive user interface design, especially in high-stakes environments like military operations.

Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster

#13

I'm so conflicted reading this story. On one hand, yes, there were choices made during the design of the system that directly contributed to this tragedy. And a lot of innocent lives were lost, so saying that's "shit happens, it's an edge case" rings very hollow. On the other hand, this was a very peculiar set of circumstances, very much an edge case. Is it reasonable to expect designers of combat systems to triple c…

Sorry, I don't see where's the edge case. In a given area there are going to be lots of planes. If there is risk of confusing them and making decisions based on non-reconciled information, it seems a pretty critical flaw.

I agree, the described scenario could just be another day at any airport and surrounding airspace (I guess any airport that is dual purpose military and civilian).

Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster

#17

I'm so conflicted reading this story. On one hand, yes, there were choices made during the design of the system that directly contributed to this tragedy. And a lot of innocent lives were lost, so saying that's "shit happens, it's an edge case" rings very hollow. On the other hand, this was a very peculiar set of circumstances, very much an edge case. Is it reasonable to expect designers of combat systems to triple c…

Reusing identifiers after such a short time was a pretty galactic design cockup. I'm a consultant and if I came across that in a design doc or while analyzing a system to form an understanding in my head of how it works, it would have immediately screamed out to me as asking for this kind of trouble. Operator punched the ID in for (civilian) aircraft A, and unknowingly got the trajectory data for (military) aircraft B.

Coding for the 90% common conditions are easy, it's the edge cases where things get hard and true engineering talent shines through. Ignoring them is simply incomplete design.

It's not tolerated in other fields of engineering (eg. civil) and it shouldn't be in ours either.

Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster

#18
post #2

[flagged]

It's not a text article though, it's a public microblogging forum like Twitter, implemented with a protocol for which this just happens to be a web interface. And a forum with more features than the one we're on, most of which would be quite inconvenient to implement in a purely static website.

Now, maybe what you're actually trying to say is that the content of the Mastodon thread should have been static website instead. That might be your preferred method of consuming this information, and that would be a valid desire. I can't say I'm a fan of twitter-style threads either.

Having said that, that does not take into account what the author of the thread wanted to accomplish. In all likelihood they're on Mastodon precisely because they want interaction with strangers. Otherwise they would have written the static website version. So it's a matter of misaligned needs.

Also, note that Mastodon is built on a protocol - it does not need a web app. So you could build a thread unroller or use an existing one to meet your static website needs, although I have to warn you: current implementations use JavaScript for that[0].

[0] https://unroller.zachmanson.com/

Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster

#19

I'm so conflicted reading this story. On one hand, yes, there were choices made during the design of the system that directly contributed to this tragedy. And a lot of innocent lives were lost, so saying that's "shit happens, it's an edge case" rings very hollow. On the other hand, this was a very peculiar set of circumstances, very much an edge case. Is it reasonable to expect designers of combat systems to triple c…

Yes - but the implications of reassigning the number immediately to another contact seems something that should have been noticed in the design phase.

> Vincennes assigned her the tracking number 4474; Sides assigned her 4131. Aegis unified the contacts under the number 4131. 4474 was then available for re-use, so Aegis assigned it to a US A-6 bomber, which happened to be descending.

> But he didn't realize that its tracking number had changed. He thought it was still tracking number 4474,

Re: The 1988 shooting down of Flight 655 as a user interface disaster

#20

I'm so conflicted reading this story. On one hand, yes, there were choices made during the design of the system that directly contributed to this tragedy. And a lot of innocent lives were lost, so saying that's "shit happens, it's an edge case" rings very hollow. On the other hand, this was a very peculiar set of circumstances, very much an edge case. Is it reasonable to expect designers of combat systems to triple c…

This was not an edge case, it was a swiss cheese failure that was just waiting to happen.

In a tech company this would correctly be thought of as a systemic failure as opposed to a personal one.

There are so many questionable design choices here for a system that is supposed to be used in high-stress situations. A lot of it reads as someone thinking "ooh yeah it would be cool if it did X" instead of "what's the simplest and dumbest possible way to do this".

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