The genius of this is the realization that browsers do not send the named anchor (technically "fragment identifier"[1]) to the server. Using the named anchor as the cryptographic key enables users to pass around simple URLs to encrypted data. Data is stored on the server, but the server never has access to the complete URL with the key, so it cannot decrypt it. As others have pointed out, this doesn't protect the dat…
Interesting... but bafflingly, doesn't the URL shortener service they provide totally defeat this? http://snipurl.com/230jiso They allow you to shorten the URL by using another service. But now snipurl.com has your URL fragment and can read your stuff!
Imagine a world where SOPA had passed, and everyone who ran a website was legally responsible for everything that their users did.
In that scenario, one way for website operators to protect themselves is to make it impossible to know what their users are doing.
The 3rd party URL shorting service is not storing or associated with the encrypted data and is also not responsible for it.
So this may not be about private data so much as it is about protecting the freedom of information.