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It's still easy for anyone to become you at Experian

krebsonsecurity.com

341–347 of 347 posts

Re: It's still easy for anyone to become you at Experian

#341

Stepping back, and looking at the situation as a whole: the real problem is a lack of privacy laws. Banks, businesses and employers should be prohibited from sharing your personal information with third parties. I live in Switzerland, where this is the case. Even the government doesn't get this information. If the government thinks you're cheating on your taxes, they have to use warrants and follow the same procedure…

I would say this problem would also be solved if we stopped pretending that a Social Security number was a serious substitute for secure national ID.

this... we need to stop abusing the system

Re: It's still easy for anyone to become you at Experian

#342

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would say this problem would also be solved if we stopped pretending that a Social Security number was a serious substitute for secure national ID.

I thought the problem wasn't that we use SSN as an ID; rather it's that we use the SSN as a password?

I was imagining some kind of "national ID card" that provided a method to verify it was really you.

Re: It's still easy for anyone to become you at Experian

#343
post #324

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not sure what autopay is, here you usually give the lender permission to directly take the money from your account. It’s part of the contract.

That's essentially autopay (in effect). Autopay is a cron job for your bank account "Send 200$ to this lender every 15 days" or something similar.

We have those too, but that's not exactly the same. Say you have a mortgage with a variable interest rate. A repeated scheduled transaction won't work because the amount can be different each month. Same goes for things like energy bills if you have a flex-contract where you pay the actual amount used each month. In my case they will just take whatever amount is due out of my bank account each month.

Re: It's still easy for anyone to become you at Experian

#344

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't really understand this. If you pay me to store your car in my garage, and it's stolen, who is a victim of car theft?

I think you're imagining the ID thief going to the bank and withdrawing your money from your bank account (which probably happens too). I also think your analogy of a "friend" isn't right... you are the bank's PAYING customer... you pay them to secure your money and only give it to you! If they fail to provide the service they're offering to you... seems like they ought to be responsible for their failure. But anothe…

> I think you're imagining the ID thief going to the bank and withdrawing your money from your bank account (which probably happens too).

No, I'm imagining a scenario where the things used to identify me to service providers is taken by someone.

> I also think your analogy of a "friend" isn't right...

I didn't mention a friend.

> you are the bank's PAYING customer... you pay them to secure your money and only give it to you!

I agree, but as per my analogy, the car's owner has had their car stolen.

> If they fail to provide the service they're offering to you... seems like they ought to be responsible for their failure.

As per my analogy, I'm not saying that the car shouldn't have been secured, nor that the storage provider shouldn't make the situation right via insurance etc. Only that the car owner is the one who is a victim of car theft.

> You aren't really involved... the bank messed up by going "Oh you say you're Bob? Okay here you go!" Why is it your fault that they failed to accurately verify the identity of the person they gave THEIR money to? You didn't play any role in them deciding who to give their money, nor in their ID verification procedures.

The bank being at fault doesn't mean the victim's identity wasn't stolen.

All of these objections seem to assume that if someone has something stolen, it was their fault. That's not true, and that assertion is what I'm objecting to.

Re: It's still easy for anyone to become you at Experian

#346
post #338

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Actually, you can use cryptography to prove who you are without giving anyone else the ability to simply "copy" your ID and impersonate you later. It's how message signing works: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature#Authenticati... Some countries already have national ID systems that use cryptography like this to secure identify oneself online, such as Estonia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_identi…

If the crypto keys are on the ID card, how does my computer read the card? How do I know the hardware and software to do that isn't compromised? Also, the Estonia system apparently includes keys allowing the manufacturer to perform card operations. How do I know that won't get hijacked?

I think computers need a card reader (like a credit card reader) to read the card. Or you can use your phone to read it wirelessly via NFC.

One neat thing about systems like this is that the card itself can perform a cryptographic computation that proves its own "ID", without communicating its private key to the connected computer/phone. So even if your computer was compromised, the ID card connected to it still can't be copied. The card is simple enough that there is less attack surface (as compared to an entire computer), so it's much less likely be be hacked, even if it's connected to a hacked device. Though mistakes do happen, since no system is perfect. So if a vulnerability is discovered, new cards might need to be issued.

Granted, an attacker on your computer (controlling it remotely) could just wait until you log in to your bank via smartcard and then quickly pull all your money out... you need a more complex solution to fix that problem (like cryptocurrency hardware wallets use; they have a little screen that shows the proposed transaction, and you have to physically push a button to confirm it, and then it does another cryptographic operation to authorize that particular transaction).

However, the smart card system does prevent an attacker from simply buying a database dump of email addresses, passwords, SSNs, etc. and using that to get into your bank account.

Re: It's still easy for anyone to become you at Experian

#347

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I get these every so often and I'm curious what you mean my ignore at your own peril. My approach has been to ignore it and assume they will realize their mistake and reregister.

There's any number of risk scenarios, assign likelihood as you will : * owner of account doesn't pay, service sells the debt to collection agency, and they come after you because it matches your email and profile. * owner of account subscribes to something unsavoury or does something illicit, which is now traceable to you * given email is a big part of the incredibly ridiculous and overly pervasive tracking economy a…

I understand the problems with people using your email to register for sites. My confusion was the claim that verifying the email for some random stranger causes fewer problems than ignoring the verification email.
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