Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Behaviour can't tell you there isn't internal life, but complex behaviour sure is a big red flag that there might be internal life there. I agree, behavior is evidence, but there are good reasons to suppose that, despite their behavior, computers lack internal lives. To try to make my argument more clearly: I know I have an internal life (due to subjective evidence). My internal life is related to the structure of…
> My internal life is related to the structure of my body in an unknown way That's right, an unknown way. So we know the internal structures of computers and their programs, but we don't know the internal structure of humans and how that leads to sentience, but somehow this translates into having good reasons for thinking the relationships in computers are not isomorphic to or meaningfully related to the unknown stru…
It absolutely follows. The evidence for consciousness is subjective human experience so it makes sense to assume that other humans and living things have consciousness (because living things are all related to each other).
Meanwhile it doesn't make sense to assume that a computer running some program is conscious just because it mimics human conversation. It isn't evolved life and doesn't have the same kinds of structures as evolved life.
It would be unbelievably weird if we reverse engineered consciousness without understanding how our bodies generate consciousness.