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Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

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Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The triviality of these observations doesn't rise to the level of getting a paper published. You can resolve all of this hype by reading the intro chapters of any applied stats textbooks. I've been to many academic conferences, and the fresh PhDs who pump out this BS are not, err, very credible seeming people. Yes, they're young and naive, and really desperate to make their career impactful -- etc. But they're also n…

I’m pretty familiar with statistics and a range of machine learning techniques from before and after the NN revolution. I’ve applied the techniques plenty of times in production environments. Whatever sort of internal structures that are being formed during the training process is somewhat evident when looking at the structure of a CNN… edge detect kernels emerge, etc. Whatever sort of internal structures formed duri…

Ah good. Well, then if you're interested in a half-empirical sincere attempt to characterise "why certain weights obtain certain values under optimisation" then i'm much more inclined to be, say, more humble on these matters.

The reason CNN weights obtain 'recursive-hierarchical representations' of pixel-pattern geometry in the training data follow from the recusrive-heirachical relationship of their weight matrices and from the geometry of the 'pixel space' from which the training data is drawn.

This is certainly interesting; and there's something magical feeling about 'principles of least action' at work. Indeed, many new physicists have a kind of schizophrenic reaction to discovering action principles -- since it imparts to nature a strange apparent conspiracy.

Of course, the job of any good physicist is to be sceptical of this conspiracy, and to get to the heart of how 'accounting tricks' performed by moving objects over time create this illusion.

Likewise this is the job of any good ML researcher; yet they do the oppoiste. Rather than get to the heart of this apparent conspiracy, they call it 'emergence' -- this offends my sense of what the virtues of a scientist ought be.

In any case, on the matter of the LLMs obtaining 'useful' weights for any given task here the job of the researcher is circumstantial, empirical, and sceptical: go and find those 'accounting tricks' within the training data that give rise to this apparent conspiracy of the system to acquire a useful state.

There is no emergence: there is just a set of weights which compress the structure of a target space. At some point this set is large enough, and 'lies across the space like a mental chain does a gate'.

Emergence is an ontological relation between parts and wholes whereby wholes arent reducible to their parts because of ontologically-relevant interaction properties between their parts which aren't intrinsic properties of them.

The fluidity of water emerges out of hydrogen bonding which does not occur when you isolate H20 alone. There is no such relationship here.

This ontologising of the formal, this language which gives a causal-physical semantics to purely formal properties of abstract models -- this is pseudoscience. It's done as part of a computational-idealist worldview in vogue because it's a helpful language for VC investment were-changing-the-world hype.

The formal properties of NNs cannot be described in these terms, because they do not have ontological relationship -- they have formal (mathematical, statistica, etc.) ones.

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cameras don't have eyeballs, Microphones don't have hair cells, Speakers don't have vocal cords, processors don't don't do arithmetic with neurons, yet we all agree that they are capable of emulating the meaningful aspects of these functions. All of your claims are either incorrect (not adapting, expressing desires, beliefs, preferences, ...) or fail to eliminate irrelevant differences. If we're to have any sensible…

> an implementation detail Yip, so I deny this premise. I take it to be the heart of the matter. > we might as well throw away 80% of our current scientific understanding Yip, i'd be down for that. Though maybe i'd say, 30-40%. Science in the strongest sense has no theory-building need for statistics. Those areas of science which have only statistical models, and not causal-ontological ones aren't science -- and i'd…

You'd probably enjoy reading some of Rodney Brooks' papers. (if you haven't already)

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embodied_cognitive_science https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavior-based_robotics https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=BCGgwlEAAAAJ

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#143
post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It won't ever simulate the human brain. It may simulate human cultural knowledge, or emotions, but only as far as they are encoded in the current millennium's written knowledge. The human brain doesn't even have the concept of written language, that's all culturally learned knowledge.

How would you test whether some arbitrary thing is simulating the human brain? If you have no answer, I put it to you that your assertion is of the no-true-Scotsman type -- that is, unfalsifiable.

First note the difference between "it's simulating the human brain" and "it's behaving in an intelligent way". Only one of the two requires tracking of blood sugar levels (to explain fatigue) and controlling motor neurons.

We happen to know how LLMs are trained, and from the loss function it's pretty clear that blood sugar will not magically enter the equation, nor even motor neurons, except as abstract knowledge that the model can reason about.

A LLM trained on western texts will, best-case, simulate a western abstract reasoning process, which usually puts more focus on independent/isolated explanations compared to other cultures. From that training data it will not spontaneously start simulating a generic human brain that was separated from both its cultural knowledge and its spinal cord.

At least in the same sense that the Mandelbrot fractal does not contain a picture of the maxwell equations. You may actually find that picture, but by looking hard enough in a complex enough system, you can find just about anything else you want.

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#144

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cameras don't have eyeballs, Microphones don't have hair cells, Speakers don't have vocal cords, processors don't don't do arithmetic with neurons, yet we all agree that they are capable of emulating the meaningful aspects of these functions. All of your claims are either incorrect (not adapting, expressing desires, beliefs, preferences, ...) or fail to eliminate irrelevant differences. If we're to have any sensible…

> an implementation detail Yip, so I deny this premise. I take it to be the heart of the matter. > we might as well throw away 80% of our current scientific understanding Yip, i'd be down for that. Though maybe i'd say, 30-40%. Science in the strongest sense has no theory-building need for statistics. Those areas of science which have only statistical models, and not causal-ontological ones aren't science -- and i'd…

Yes, the assumption is that if you give a sufficiently sophisticated LLM a sufficiently large corpus of text it will begin to emulate advanced cognitive abilities because it has to, in order to make the most statistically relevant text output.

Its biological evolution distilled and sped up by orders of orders of magnitudes. If we add enough clever context tricks and data I would not be surprised if what comes out the other end is a remarkably convincing emulation of human consciousness because the only way you can perfectly output expected human text is to have a human mind write it.

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it is now quite well established that GPT-4 has impressive out-of-sample performance Err... I can show this is false, kinda trivially. People who engage in prompt-confirmation-bias aren't aware of what the in-sample is. It's basically everything ever digitised: you can ask it for the first paragraph of every dickens novel, to what the average petal length of an iris flower is -- etc. How are you measuring the in-sa…

You can make it invent a new language: https://maximumeffort.substack.com/p/i-taught-chatgpt-to-inv... I am sure you will continue to argue that this is still in line with everything-thats-ever-written prediction but my opinion is that at that point, it's a meaningless distinction. The human brain is also just a machine.

The brain is a machine, the issue is the difference between 2 claims

LLMs are enough to be a brain

LLMs are not enough to be a brain.

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#146

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it is now quite well established that GPT-4 has impressive out-of-sample performance Err... I can show this is false, kinda trivially. People who engage in prompt-confirmation-bias aren't aware of what the in-sample is. It's basically everything ever digitised: you can ask it for the first paragraph of every dickens novel, to what the average petal length of an iris flower is -- etc. How are you measuring the in-sa…

You can make it invent a new language: https://maximumeffort.substack.com/p/i-taught-chatgpt-to-inv... I am sure you will continue to argue that this is still in line with everything-thats-ever-written prediction but my opinion is that at that point, it's a meaningless distinction. The human brain is also just a machine.

So I was with a financial researcher recently, and he wanted to use ChatGPT to summarise some reference financial data -- and it did so, actually correctly.

Being sceptical, as every person ought in these matters, I changed the finical data and performed the same analysis (both in a new tab, and within the same convo). The results were the same!

How strange?

Well, in being reference financial data ChatGPT was reporting prior reference summaries of it. When that data was changed it was reporting the very same reference summaries (which were now wrong).

Since it's incapable of actually summarising financial data. It's only capable of selecting combinations of pieces of its training set.

Now, is this distinction "meaningless" ?

No, it's the difference between this guy being fired for causing a massive loss on a major project; and this guy keeping his job and doing it well.

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#147
post #94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"A neuron just transmits signals. Any cognitive property arises as a consequence of the interplay of those electrical and chemical signals." Do we now understand consciousness? The statement appears fundamentally limited in its implied insight.

What if consciousness is an emergent illusion? “You” are merely a passenger, observing your physical self’s actions and assuming ownership of them. What if consciousness is merely an effect, not a cause?

I hope you haven't read the novel blindsight and I get to be the one to tell you about it. They might as well have given that book your post as a title.

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#148
post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That out of sample performance is a mirage. Yes it’s impressive. Yes it’s got amazing zero shot performance in domains. But there’s a pattern of failure in production which describe a limit, that shouldn’t exist if the emergent properties were stable. You can build this right now and test it. Build a sequence of agents to work on a domain you are not an expert in. Let them loose. See what happens. Do the same thing o…

I'd phrase characterizing the reliability of out-of-sample performance a priori as impossible, but not necessarily automatically failing. There may be a subtle correlation between properties needed to answer a specific out-of-sample request and in-sample features. Unfortunately, prior to training/testing and without recognizing that correlation in the data set, I believe it's impossible to guarantee the model will in…

In essence: “You cant know in advance how far the model can approximate semantic patterns”

So claiming that out-of-sample performance is a mirage, would be a bridge too far?

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#149
post #122

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure it does. It perfectly deliniates it. LLMs are not: sensitive to causal structure, dynamically adapting to environmental changes, growing, developing sensory-motor capacities, they are not with us in our environment, they are not: expressing desires, preferences, intentions, beliefs, motivations, etc. And so on. To say, "they just predict the next word" is literally to say that all apparent functions of an LLM ar…

"Are not" is the rub here. They 100% are not those things... but they also approximate them well-enough to be functionally useful. I.e. the high-dimensional curve-fitting / compression conceptualization of ML, which intuitively expresses both its strengths and weaknesses. If "it" is represented in the data set (explicitly or implicitly), the "curve" will fit to that property. Simultaneously, the "curve" is approximat…

They're statistical approximations of these things -- that's really the rub.

You can approximate a human capacity, say theory-of-mind, with another kind of ape: play some hide-and-seek game. You can approximate the knowledge of a trivia-master with a child and a trivia book.

These are quite different sorts of approximations. A 1/100th scale bridge build to stand for a real one is quite different than taking some prior set of bridges, measuring them, and deriving some merely associative model of their properties.

My issue in how LLMs (etc.) are popularly understood is that people think they approximate target capacities by being 'ontologically similar' capacities -- and this is really very dangerous. You'll lose your job if you think so (and so on).

And every greasy AI-board hocking these to the public is very much pushing out this noxious mumbojumbo.

It matters greately how an approximation works, and why any given output arrives from any given input.

Re: Telling GPT-4 you're scared or under pressure improves performance

#150

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> an implementation detail Yip, so I deny this premise. I take it to be the heart of the matter. > we might as well throw away 80% of our current scientific understanding Yip, i'd be down for that. Though maybe i'd say, 30-40%. Science in the strongest sense has no theory-building need for statistics. Those areas of science which have only statistical models, and not causal-ontological ones aren't science -- and i'd…

Yes, the assumption is that if you give a sufficiently sophisticated LLM a sufficiently large corpus of text it will begin to emulate advanced cognitive abilities because it has to, in order to make the most statistically relevant text output . Its biological evolution distilled and sped up by orders of orders of magnitudes. If we add enough clever context tricks and data I would not be surprised if what comes out th…

> because it has to

Nope. The space of all possible prompts and all possible answers, call it (Q, A) can be sampled with arbitrary precision by a system of arbitrary size, using only statistical sampling and averaging. No intelligence need be developed.

Intelligence is a capacity of animals to cope with the inability to sample from this space, in some sense: what to do when you do not know the answers.

All these systems start with "training data", a euphemistic description of, "all the questions and their answers" and their job is to provide a compresson with engineering utility.

Quite useful, sure. But rather irrelevant as far as, say, intelligence goes.

What all AI does, and indeed what all such research shows, is that many problems we use intelligence to solve do not require it. There are a large number of short cuts, esp if you have the answers ahead-of-time.

As soon as you specify intelligence as a function from single-domain inputs to single-domain outputs you can trivially build a system to implement that function in a "short cut" fashion.

Intelligence, rather, is an empirical phenomenon to be studied as anything -- like the earth's climate say. You have a very large number of empirical measures (better or worse in different environments) that all derive from deeper explanatory theories.

When you study animals this way you will see that you cannot reduce intelligence down to a set of prompt replies, and the veyr suggestion is absurd

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