Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just some random Cargo security-related issues I noticed: - No strong link between the repo and the published code. - Many crates were spammed that were just a wrapper around a popular C/C++ library. There's no indication of this, so... "surprise!"... your compiled app is now more unsafe C/C++ code than Rust. - Extensive name squatting, to the point that virtual no library uses the obvious name, because someone else…
> Extensive name squatting, to the point that virtual no library uses the obvious name, because someone else got to it first. Maybe the obvious names should have been pre banned. But I don't see the issue with non-obvious names either way you're going to have to get community recommendation/popularity to determine if brandonq/xml is better or worse then parsers/xml
You don't want to be using Ivan Vladimir's OAUTH package to sign in to Microsoft Entra ID. That probably has an FSB backdoor ready to activate. Why use that, when there's an equivalent Microsoft package?
When any random Chinese, Russian, or Israeli national can publish "microsoftauth", you just know that some idiot will use it. That idiot may be me. Or a coworker. Or a transitive dependency. Or a transitive dependency introduced after a critical update to the immediate dependency. Or an external EXE tool deployed as a part of a third-party ISV binary product. Or...
Make the only path lead to the pit of success, because the alternative is to let people wander around and fall into the pit of failure.