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Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

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Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#121
post #118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I know. Most of them have a fill in the blanks sheet with name address and document s/n. I can understand scanning documents if one rents a vehicle, although for hotels I fail to see why the form shouldn't be enough. It's not like they don't have cameras at the reception desk and I don't pay with a card under my name, they can also check my ID and fill in the form themselves if they don't trust the customer. Why shou…

Interesting. That didn't happen to me when I stayed a month in an Airbnb in Serbia, although the host did ask me for a copy of my passport. (Not that I'd expect it from an Airbnb host even if hotels were doing it... just an additional data point). For renting a vehicle (or more likely, something like a bike or moped), I can understand why they take your ID as a form of collateral in exchange for the material goods th…

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Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#122
post #41

The summary of the attack from https://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/ is very interesting: * The attacker managed to issue multiple SSL/TLS certificates via Let’s Encrypt for jabber.ru and xmpp.ru domains since 18 Apr 2023 * The Man-in-the-Middle attack for jabber.ru/xmpp.ru client XMPP traffic decryption confirmed to be in place since at least 21 July 2023 for up to 19 Oct 2023, possibly (not confirmed) since…

> * The attacker failed to reissue TLS certificate and MiTM proxy started to serve expired certificate on port 5222 for jabber.ru domain (Hetzner) This is gold.

I mean, I’ve seen the auto renew fail a lot with the certbot. They definitely should have checked it in the renew period to make sure it was working, but I feel for them

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#123
post #91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. Most probably it merely implies someone upstream of them (presumably their hosting provider under compulsion from German law enforcement) intercepted and spoofed their unencrypted, unauthenticated ACME HTTP traffic. Same can happen to you.

The same way they are intercepting the jabber port they can intercept any other port for the HTTP ACME challenge. No need to get involved at the name server level.

Right. That makes the most sense. Let’s Encrypt wasn’t involved … it’d just need to be linode/hetzner

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#124
post #44

The summary of the attack from https://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/ is very interesting: * The attacker managed to issue multiple SSL/TLS certificates via Let’s Encrypt for jabber.ru and xmpp.ru domains since 18 Apr 2023 * The Man-in-the-Middle attack for jabber.ru/xmpp.ru client XMPP traffic decryption confirmed to be in place since at least 21 July 2023 for up to 19 Oct 2023, possibly (not confirmed) since…

>affected 100% of the connections to XMPP STARTTLS port 5222 (not 5223) Why did they only target the STARTTLS port? On a related note, I would never use the STARTTLS port (opportunistic encryption) if I knew that the server had a regular TLS port...

It is pretty simple. 5223 port is called "legacy SSL". So, because it is legacy, clients would, by default, use 5222 + starttls. I.e. majority of clients connect with 5222.

Also, I've never understood why they've moved 5223 (regular TLS) into deprecated. It was pretty useful to enable SSL on AWS ELB on this port. Which is not possible with 5222, because it does XML stuff before switching to TLS.

I would speculate it is to not keep 2 ports open or something, was a reason to move it to deprecated. + you can do some cleartext communication before switching to TLS (not like it is that useful).

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A business can request visiting law enforcement to do all those things, and hopefully law enforcement complies. However, if they refuse to comply, realistically you just have to let them in anyway. Document their non-compliance and provide it to your lawyers, who can decide what action to take (lodge a formal complaint to the law enforcement agency, apply to a judge for an injunction to compel their compliance, etc)…

> realistically you just have to let them in anyway No, you don't. If they have a warrant then you need to let them in for the purposes specified in the warrant. Otherwise you're free to tell them to piss off. Unfortunately you're also free to acquiesce to any of their demands. This kind of passive, default-compliant attitude from service providers, while understandable from a "path of least resistance" standpoint, i…

> No, you don't. If they have a warrant then you need to let them in for the purposes specified in the warrant. Otherwise you're free to tell them to piss off.

Any lawyer will tell you - if law enforcement attempts a warrant-less search, you tell them you do not consent to it, but you do not attempt to physically stop them from performing it. Tell them they are unwelcome and to come back with a warrant, but if they insist on entering in spite of that, you let them in.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#126

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A business can request visiting law enforcement to do all those things, and hopefully law enforcement complies. However, if they refuse to comply, realistically you just have to let them in anyway. Document their non-compliance and provide it to your lawyers, who can decide what action to take (lodge a formal complaint to the law enforcement agency, apply to a judge for an injunction to compel their compliance, etc)…

Latter is not correct. It's well known difference in Russia between companies that willingly cooperate with government agencies informally, and those who just provide information upon formal request according to law.

How do you know for sure the people who “just provide information upon formal request according to law” aren’t covertly engaging in informal cooperation?

If one morning the CEO gets an unexpected visit at home from a group of FSB agents asking for some favours, is the CEO going to say “no”? And if the CEO says “yes”, are you going to hear about it, or are they going to let the CEO continue that pretence?

Western CEOs don’t have the same worry about “accidentally” falling out of hospital windows.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#127
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Agree re: everything you said but wanted to add datadentre security staff are some of the most interesting characters I’ve encountered. Not sure I sleep as well at night after seeing what I saw.

Do tell, please; stories about "interesting characters" are often the best.

GP may well be under NDA and easy to identify.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#128
post #55

> What would a perfect attacker do? If you had physical access to the computer, some sort of bus interception to exfiltrate data from the machine.

Thinking laterally for a moment regarding the big picture here, why do we still rely on data centres. They made sense in a world of dialup and low speed / high latency broadband. But there are lots of places with high speed fibre and not much latency to the peering points. And the more we break away from data centres and clouds, the more the internet infrastructure will have to work the way it was designed instead of…

IP addresses, IP addresses, IP addresses, IP addresses.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#129
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would suggest that if you are the police, you can break into a datacenter with a flash of a badge. I can't imagine many would attempt to stop you.

I would hope they at least: * Require a copy of the badge number, and verify that this officer is assigned and expected to be at this business right now. * Require them to sign into and out of the site. * Annotate which systems / compromises are in place. - That all of the above MIGHT be sealed under a court order; I would hope any such order has an automatic 'sunset' date, and possibly renewal upon review by a diffe…

You would expect that at AWS, but Hetzner is a low-cost operation.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

extremely difficult to get physical access in a datacenter

Assuming this was done at the government's request, I assume Hetzner is more than willing to comply with a court order mandating they allow them to monitor and physically size a machine. And outside of nation-state requests, even ignoring the fact that someone could probably pay-off an employee, I think ease would depend a lot on the datacenter and target; judging by the awesome and hilarious story behind the Fremont…

> Assuming this was done at the government's request, I assume Hetzner is more than willing to comply with a court order mandating they allow them to monitor and physically size a machine.

Amusingly, I read about an incident like this on one of those forums (probably ServeTheHome). It apparently happens so often that Hetzner's control panel has a special state for it. Server status: "seized by law enforcement" and the power-on button is disabled.

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