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Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

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Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

extremely difficult to get physical access in a datacenter

Sure but this is the German police and more generally nation states, not only they can, they don't even need to they just ask

While the rule of law in Germany is much worse than most people think, it is not so bad as you assume. I doubt that Hetzner would give in to a police request. A court order, yes. But not to a police request. This does not mean, the police won't try it: https://www.dw.com/de/e-mail-firma-kritisiert-ermittler/a-18...

Unfortunately can't find the original post. Every idiot police officer thought he has a right to just email them to handle over data :-)

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cloudflare is horrible for privacy. It is also a bit of a sovereignty issue for European countries to have all their citizens web habits to be MITM by a forging power (no matter how friendly they seam). Edit: not even going in to the sovereignty issue of having an American private company effectively decide your internet regulations.

Cloudflare exists out of necessity for the most part. The alternatives to shield from large scale DDoS are all US American too.

> Cloudflare exists out of necessity for the most part.

I agree with this, there don't seem to be that much self-hosted software that someone could (easily) setup for the use cases that Cloudflare serves.

> The alternatives to shield from large scale DDoS are all US American too.

Not only that, but the WAF functionality is also pretty useful. To be honest, the same applies to something like wanting to have CAPTCHAs on your own site - not that many options out there.

As far as I can tell as a hobbyist, if you wanted to host everything yourself:

  - dealing with load: at best you can probably just run multiple nodes with round robin DNS and something like HAProxy, or even just live with Nginx/Apache/Caddy, though all of those would crumble under attack; probably with some resource limits in place so the software getting overloaded just crashes it (with automatic restarts) and doesn't grind the entire server down to a halt
  - WAF: you could get a basic WAF running with something like Apache2 and mod_security, or if you can compile it for Nginx and get it working (a bit annoying to do, also apparently slower than Apache2 version), or something like Coraza (still new), but even then you need sets of rules, OWASP has some, but they're not updated as often as whatever Cloudflare uses, so the effectiveness of it all is debatable; there's also something like fail2ban, but some people really don't like it for some reason
  - there's also additional stuff you can use, like LibreCaptcha for CAPTCHAs, something like Keycloak or Authentik for SSO and managing your users on prem (especially with mod_auth_openidc), stuff like Matomo Analytics instead of GA, Uptime Kuma for uptime monitoring, even your own self-hosted mail servers if you feel brave; but all of those take effort and need maintenance
And even then, certain things are not an option - you won't be shrugging off huge DDoS attacks and you probably won't be running your own CDN (easily), unless you have bunches of money to spend and the know-how. So of course people would rely on external orgs for whatever they can.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#103
post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So… compromised.

Compromised means they got hacked, which would translate to all servers in Linode and Hetzner being unsafe for all customers. Since this affected only one client and it's more likely than not a lawful intercept, it's not a compromise.

You're both using your own internal dictionary differently for the same correct word.

In hacking, compromised means hacked.

In intelligence, compromised means you have someone doing something on your behalf that they feel forced to do.

You seem to understand this so I'm not sure where the confusion lies.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#104
post #44

The summary of the attack from https://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/ is very interesting: * The attacker managed to issue multiple SSL/TLS certificates via Let’s Encrypt for jabber.ru and xmpp.ru domains since 18 Apr 2023 * The Man-in-the-Middle attack for jabber.ru/xmpp.ru client XMPP traffic decryption confirmed to be in place since at least 21 July 2023 for up to 19 Oct 2023, possibly (not confirmed) since…

>affected 100% of the connections to XMPP STARTTLS port 5222 (not 5223) Why did they only target the STARTTLS port? On a related note, I would never use the STARTTLS port (opportunistic encryption) if I knew that the server had a regular TLS port...

>I would never use the STARTTLS port (opportunistic encryption) if I knew that the server had a regular TLS port...

That is what XMPP clients tend to do...

These days XMPP servers tend to default to requiring TLS on both 5222 and 5223 (Let's Encrypt has changed everything). Prosody does this for example. It doesn't even support port 5223 by default anymore. Port 5223 was never an official port assignment.

So it is very possible that the MiTM was only done on port 5222 because that was the only port that clients were using.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#105
post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cloudflare is horrible for privacy. It is also a bit of a sovereignty issue for European countries to have all their citizens web habits to be MITM by a forging power (no matter how friendly they seam). Edit: not even going in to the sovereignty issue of having an American private company effectively decide your internet regulations.

The EU regularly de-facto tries to decide regulations for other countries. All is fair in a globally connected world.

That is how American tech monopolies like to paint what the EU does. Lol

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They were doing their own TLS handshake - that's how the attack was discovered (the attacker presented a different certicate, which eventually expired, presumably due to negligence). They were decrypting and re-encrypting.

Read it again: > they would have to do their own client-side TLS handshake By intercepting the STARTTLS port the attacker can merely decrypt -- rather than, as you wrote, decrypting and re-encrypting .

I don't know what jabber.ru's policy is, it's running a very old version of ejabberd. But you would be hard-pressed to find an XMPP server that would allow authentication without TLS. Starttls makes no difference.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#107
post #55

> What would a perfect attacker do? If you had physical access to the computer, some sort of bus interception to exfiltrate data from the machine.

Thinking laterally for a moment regarding the big picture here, why do we still rely on data centres. They made sense in a world of dialup and low speed / high latency broadband. But there are lots of places with high speed fibre and not much latency to the peering points. And the more we break away from data centres and clouds, the more the internet infrastructure will have to work the way it was designed instead of…

> They made sense in a world of dialup and low speed / high latency broadband. But there are lots of places with high speed fibre and not much latency to the peering points.

Yes, but then you need backup power, someone to replace disks / hardware if things break, proper security for compliance reasons, cooling, noise. Once you set up all these things you just invented a data center again.

I don't see how getting rid of data centers makes any sense.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cloudflare is horrible for privacy. It is also a bit of a sovereignty issue for European countries to have all their citizens web habits to be MITM by a forging power (no matter how friendly they seam). Edit: not even going in to the sovereignty issue of having an American private company effectively decide your internet regulations.

Cloudflare exists out of necessity for the most part. The alternatives to shield from large scale DDoS are all US American too.

DDoS protection is standard among hosting providers now, including budget ones like OVH.

The fact that Cloudflare is allowed to continue hosting websites which are obviously illegal, some notorious, is deeply strange. As I wrote in my article on the subject, it makes no sense when you consider the way the US responds even just to copyright infringement; see how they nuked Megaupload's business without trial because they saw them as knowingly enabling piracy. However, it's a known fact that US authorities will keep illegal or disreputable services up if they see them as a source of more intelligence. I can't really see any other explanation for how Cloudflare is allowed to host some of the sites it does without pressure from the US unless it's basically funnelling all of the data to the NSA.

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#109

The summary of the attack from https://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/ is very interesting: * The attacker managed to issue multiple SSL/TLS certificates via Let’s Encrypt for jabber.ru and xmpp.ru domains since 18 Apr 2023 * The Man-in-the-Middle attack for jabber.ru/xmpp.ru client XMPP traffic decryption confirmed to be in place since at least 21 July 2023 for up to 19 Oct 2023, possibly (not confirmed) since…

XMPP supports channel binding, which is not mentioned in this post but would have prevented this attack. Unfortunately jabber.ru is running server software from 2016, and that old version doesn't support it. Pinning is problematic these days, because certificates are short-lived and renewed frequently. Users would be constantly asked to accept new certificates on a monthly basis, and they wouldn't think twice about c…

If you care enough to pin, purchasing actual certificates isn't that hard is it?

Re: Mitigating the Hetzner/Linode XMPP.ru MitM interception incident

#110
What is the fundamental technical solution for these kinds of attacks from nation-states and other powerful actors? Is there anything which can satisfy the nerdy dream of software which is freely distributable, yet completely safe from censorship, intervention or mutation by anyone other than its author?

Are properly built P2P systems over the current internet infrastructure a good enough answer? Or should we rolling out a second low-bandwidth global mesh internet working over radio?

I just hope Freenet 2023 evolves to have a zero-friction DX for P2P applications.

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